Marine: A Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit

coastline. The MEU (SOC)'s special training gives it versatility across a finite but significant range of possible special missions, including raids, rescues, and security operations. And its ability to plug itself into a variety of 'joint' military operations makes it a valuable addition to any military force. Thus, regional CinCs covet a MEU (SOC) whenever they can get one. Finally, because it can be, and usually is, forward-deployed into possible trouble spots along with its own aviation and logistical components, it is fast, mobile, and self-contained. It needs nothing to get the ball rolling on an operation and keep it going for up to fifteen days without external support. So let us look at this unique family of units, and get to know their organizations, missions, and history.

Beginnings: The Road to the MEU (SOC)

The beginnings of the MEU (SOC) concept date to just after the end of the Second World War. As early as the late 1940s, the need for forces based close to potential trouble spots was already posing a problem for the U.S. and its Cold War allies. One result was the Marine afloat battalion, which became something of a standard unit in the decades ahead. These were created by using some of the vast amphibious shipping tonnage that had been built up in World War II and a few battalions of the dwindling Marine Corps of the time. Quickly, they began to prove their worth. Each one was a typical Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), with ground, air, and logistical units (or components as they are called), matched together into a fighting team. This turned out to be an excellent idea. In the Taiwan Straits (1957), Lebanon (1958), Cuba (1961 and 1962), and the Dominican Republic (1965), the forward-deployed Marine units aboard U.S. Navy ships were to make themselves felt. Even during the height of the Vietnam War, amphibious ready groups (ARGs) with their Marine units aboard prowled the oceans and seas of the world, protecting American interests.

Following the end of the Vietnam war and the rough years of the 1970s, things began to become a bit more regular within the Marine afloat battalions. Redesignated as Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs), they now had a formal headquarters unit, which would then fill out its component parts from regular Marine units from around the Corps. Previously, the units just were thrown together for the duration of their cruise afloat. This move to a formal headquarters structure was more than just cosmetic; it meant that the Corps had begun to consider the MAUs one of their premier MAGTF organizations. Now they would become fully integrated MAGTFs under the command of a full Colonel (O-6), capable of a wider variety of tasks and missions. In fact, with the drawdown of Navy and Marine forces in the late 1970s during the Carter Administration, the compact MAUs aboard their ARGs quickly became the only U.S. military units that could begin to rapidly respond to a crisis around the world.

The coming of the Reagan Administration in 1981 brought the MAUs the opportunity to prove themselves in combat. Initially, the results were decidedly mixed. On the plus side was Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada in October 1982. The 22nd MAU provided much of the combat muscle for that operation. Things unfortunately did not go so well for the 24th MAU. Two days before Urgent Fury hit the beaches of Grenada, while it was on 'peacekeeping' duty in the war-torn city of Beirut, Lebanon, an Iranian driving a truck bomb wiped out much of the 24th's ground component. Over two hundred Marines were killed in the explosion, which occurred early on a Sunday morning. It today remains one of the worst disasters in U.S. military history, and had a variety of effects on the Marines and their MAUs.

The Beirut disaster and problems in other operations began to show that the Marines had some problems in their combat doctrine. Much like their sister services, who had seen such difficulties following the Vietnam War, the Corps was beginning to experience some serious shortcomings in its ability to carry out even traditional missions like amphibious invasions and raids. Grenada, while successful, had been costly and poorly coordinated. Luckily, the solution to these shortcomings came in the form of a new senior Marine Corps leader, General Alfred M. Gray, who would eventually become the 29th Commandant in 1987. While he was the commander of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLANT), General Gray began his campaign to promote 'warfighting' as the primary task of the Marine Corps in the 1980s and 1990s. Much like visionary thinkers in the other services, Gray helped promote the idea that combat was the core ability of the Marines (this earned him the nickname 'the warfighter'). What made his effort unusual was that he felt it was not enough just to know how to shoot and blow things up. He urged Marines of all ranks, officer and enlisted, to apply intellectual power as a force multiplier for the Marine ethos. This began to pay immediate benefits. He also promoted the use of the word 'expeditionary' to describe the inherent characteristics of Marine units of all sizes. In particular, he pushed renaming the MAUs as MEUs (the E obviously standing for 'expeditionary'), to reflect the kinds of missions he wanted the Marine Corps to be ready for.

Along with these intellectual developments, General Gray began to think about the kinds of units that the Marines had formed over the years, and just what kinds of missions each was capable of. One particular kind of mission which had come to be vital in the 1980s was special operations. The failed Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980 had forced all of the services to look at their capabilities in this area. Out of this came a 1983 study that examined what the Marine Corps would need to become a credible player in future low-intensity ('short-of-war') conflicts. Unlike the other services, there was no drive within the USMC to create new and separate special operations units. Instead, it was decided that regular units within the Corps would be given special training prior to a deployment. This would make them 'special operations capable' (SOC) across a fixed range of missions and tasks.

In 1984, Marine Corps Headquarters ordered FMFLANT (at the time commanded by General Gray) to put together a program to create a special-operations-capable Marine unit, and deploy it on an ARG for an overseas cruise of some six months duration. General Gray and then-Colonel James Myatt (who eventually rose to the rank of Major General and commanded the 1st Marine Division during Desert Storm), came up with a list of special missions and equipment that they wanted to put into the unit assembled. Along the way, Gray and Myatt made several key decisions. These included:

• FMFLANT would modify one of the MEUs to produce a battalion-sized SOC-capable MAGTF that could carry out the special missions that they had in mind.

• They made plans to establish a training and certification program to make sure that every unit would go through a standardized curriculum.

• The actual unit, to be called a MEU (SOC), would be given an extra infusion of equipment and personnel to support its expanded mission.

The units for the first MEU (SOC) were taken from a regular MEU, the 26th, preparing for a deployment to the Mediterranean. Personally selected to command the first MEU (SOC) deployment, Colonel Myatt took the 26th out for a six-month cruise in 1986.

Now it should be said that this first MEU (SOC) cruise did not shake the world. The 26th did support the Navy carrier groups that were operating against Libya at the time, and these actions were generally successful. But more importantly, that first MEU (SOC) deployment brought home valuable lessons that were immediately applied to the next cruise, and all the others that followed. Even though actual combat eluded them for the next few years, MEU (SOC)s were nevertheless very active. First combat by a MEU (SOC) occurred on April 18th, 1989, when a strike force of Marines from the 22nd MEU (SOC), was tasked to take part in Operation Preying Mantis. Preying Mantis was a rapid response to the mining, several days earlier, of the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) by Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf. The operation was designed to take out several Iranian oil platforms that were being used as targeting bases for attacks against tankers coming down the Gulf. The 22nd, along with several surface-action groups (SAGs) of U.S. warships, was tasked to capture and then demolish the platforms, while aircraft from Carrier Air Wing Ten (CVW-10) embarked on USS Enterprise (CVN-65) provided cover against Iranian aircraft and ships. The results were startling. By the end of the day, the oil platforms had been destroyed, and most of the Iranian Navy had either been sunk or disabled. The MEU (SOC) lost one AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter with both of its crew, but it was an impressive combat debut for the new unit, and it went almost unnoticed by the world.

Just fourteen months later, the MEU (SOC)s hit their stride, thanks to a rash of crisis situations that erupted in the summer and fall of 1990. The trouble started when a civil war in Liberia escalated. Initially, the 26th MEU (SOC) was sent to handle any possible evacuation of U.S. nationals and embassy personnel. It had been planned to relieve the 26th with the 22nd MEU (SOC), but the eruption of hostilities in the Persian Gulf in August meant that both units had to stay out to cover both problems. Eventually, the 22nd handled the evacuation, and the 26th went on to support operations in the Mediterranean. At the same time, the 13th MEU (SOC) from the West Coast was