mission was required.
In the Marines, a CSAR mission is called a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel, or TRAP. TRAP missions are something of an MEU (SOC) specialty, and are practiced regularly. The key to carrying out a TRAP, or any other MEU (SOC) special mission, is training and planning.
TRAP packages come in various shapes and sizes, with a variety of options available to the MEU (SOC) staff. For example, let's say that a helicopter from the ACE goes down as a result of a mechanical problem in neutral territory. And let's say that the aircraft is not too badly damaged, so it would be possible to repair the helicopter and fly it out. In that case, a small security team from the GCE, together with some maintenance personnel from the ACE, would fly out and establish a security perimeter around the downed aircraft. The TRAP force would then repair the aircraft and fly it home to fight another day.
The downing of Basher 52 was an entirely different problem. In that case, the shootdown was in an isolated area, over 30 nm/55 km from the coast, and in generally rough and mountainous terrain, well within reach of hostile Bosnian Serb forces. Given these parameters, and the expected threat level (there might still be an active SA-6 battery in the area), Gunther and Berndt decided to lay on what they call a 'D' package. This was the largest of the five TRAP packages available to the 24th, and involved sending a pair of big CH-53E Super Stallions loaded with the mortar platoon from the 3/8 BLT's headquarters company. When I later asked why the mortar platoon was chosen for this duty, Chris Gunther answered, 'They were available, and they did it during the workup.' In other words, given the variety of tasks that the 24th was being tasked with at that time (possible evacuation of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia-Herzegovina, etc.), these personnel were not tasked for other duties, and they had trained specifically for the job. The CH-53Es from HMM-263 (the 24th's ACE unit) were chosen over the elderly CH-46Es Bullfrogs because of their greater range, speed, and lifting capability. In addition to the cargo helicopters, there would be an escort of AH-1 W Cobras, and AV-8B Harrier IIs. All told, the rescue force, if it were ever needed, would have fifty-seven Marines and four Navy Corpsmen. By the morning of June 3rd, the personnel for the TRAP package had been alerted and the aircraft readied. The planned TRAP package looked something like this:
• CH-53E Super Stallion Flight (2)—The lead CH-53E was flown by Major William Tarbutton (the air mission commander) and Captain Paul Oldenburg. This helicopter would carry half of the mortar platoon commanded by First Lieutenant Martin Wetterauer, Lieutenant Colonel Chris Gunther (the BLT CO and mission commander), and two Navy corpsmen. The second Super Stallion was to be flown by Captain Paul Fortunato and Captain James Wright. This aircraft would carry the rest of the mortar platoon, two Navy corpsmen, Colonel Martin Berndt — the 24th MEU (SOC) CO, and Command Sergeant Major Angel Castro, Jr.
• AH-1W Cobra Flight (2)—The lead Cobra was to be flown by Major Nicholas Hall and Captain James Jenkins II. The second helicopter by Major Scott Mykleby (the escort flight leader) and Captain Ian Walsh.
• AV-8B Harrier II Flight (4)—This flight was led by Major Michael Ogden of VMA-231, and was made up of four aircraft, so that at least two would be available over the recovery site.
In addition to these forces, there would be mission spares (called 'bump' aircraft) readied, as well as reinforcement units (known as Sparrowhawk and Bald Eagle), should the TRAP package encounter problems.
For the next six days, the situation remained quiet, as the pilots of the 31st FW flew over northwest Bosnia-Herzegovina, hoping to hear something from Basher 52. During this time, the TRAP package stayed on Alert 60 (an hour's notice), eating and sleeping on alert, hoping for the chance to go in and snatch the young Air Force officer out of harm's way. Down in the 24th's LFOC on the
Down in the 24th's LFOC, the decision to use the 'D'- size TRAP package was reaffirmed, and the final steps necessary to ready the force were under way. Aircraft were fueled and armed. Weapons were test-fired and checked. And then they had what's called a 'confirmation briefing.' This took place down in the
The confirmation briefing is the final coordination meeting for the officer and enlisted personnel of the ARG and MEU (SOC). And it is an amazing thing to watch. Taking only about fifteen to twenty minutes, it covers more than twenty different subjects — from weather and intelligence to radio call signs and aircraft weapons loadouts. The briefing can proceed so quickly because every movement and action of the TRAP mission has been practiced many times in training back in the U.S. and while afloat. In the confirmation briefing, the speakers execute what is called 'briefing by exception': A speaker walks (rapidly!) to the front of the wardroom, slaps down a briefing transparency just long enough for the assembled crowd to see it, and speaks only about those operations that are not normal or running to plan. In short, you brief a particular topic in between thirty and sixty seconds. This procedure is not designed to be hasty or frivolous. Rather, it's done only when time can kill a mission. This was one of those times.
Following the briefing, the Marines moved up the ramp from the hanger deck to the flight deck. Each 'stick' of Marines was led to their aircraft by Combat Cargo personnel from the ship and trooped aboard. When the loading was completed, the order was given for the helicopters to start engines. By 0505 hours, all of the helicopters were airborne, waiting for the word that the NATO support package was airborne and in position. At 0545, the 'go' order was given. And at 0549, the TRAP force went 'feet dry.' At 0640 the lead Cobra, code named 'Bolt,' made contact with O'Grady, and ordered him to pop a smoke flare. Sighting the smoke, the Cobra crew dropped a flare of their own, and began to coach the lead CH-53E into a small clearing adjacent to the young pilot's position on the side of a hilly, rock-strewn pasture. Heavy fog blanketed the area, and caution was required to get the big choppers down. As soon as they hit the ground, Lieutenant Wetterauer and his mortarmen exited the helicopter to set up a defense perimeter and commence the search for O'Grady. The standard TRAP mission plan assumes that the person to be rescued is injured, so a security perimeter was established, just in case extra time was needed to carry O'Grady out. As it turned out, this was not required.
As the lead helicopter was unloading, and the second CH-53E was coming in to land, there was a small problem. A small fence was in the LZ, and the second chopper came down on top of it. This only caused a moment's delay, however. Moving forward a bit to clear the fence, Captains Fortunato and Wright set the CH-53E down and dropped the rear loading ramp. Before they could unload the chopper, though, Captain O'Grady came sprinting out of the underbrush, brandishing his radio and pistol as he headed into the CH-53E. After he was relieved of these items (for safety's sake!), the helicopter lifted off. Captain Fortunato then notified the air mission commander that O'Grady was safely aboard. This done, the four helicopters, with their Harrier escorts flying above, headed back to the coast at full speed and minimum altitude. Even during the burst of AAA and SAM fire, their planned procedures worked well. When the Cobras sighted the ground fire and SAMs, they immediately ordered an SAM break from the CH-53Es (an evasive turn while firing flares and chaff decoys) and continued on to the coast. With the rescue completed, TRAP rules advise that you avoid a fight in enemy territory, so the rescue force continued on with only a few return shots fired by a door gunner. By 0730, the TRAP force was back over the
