Marine: A Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit

Book IV of Julius Caesar's War Commentaries describes his amphibious invasion of Britain with two Roman Legions in 55 B.C. The details would be familiar to any Marine who has ever hit a beach. Though Marines are capable of conducting many other missions, storming ashore is the role most associated with the Corps. These include guarding U.S. embassies and diplomatic personnel overseas, helicopter transportation for the President and senior Administration leaders, and security for 'special' (i.e., nuclear) weapons and their storage sites. Marines have also excelled in peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Haiti, riot control in Los Angeles, security operations at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, and disaster relief almost anywhere an earthquake, hurricane, or other natural catastrophe strikes. Finally, just ask Marines themselves what they think their mission is. I can guarantee that they will give you an icy look, square their shoulders, and respectfully tell you that they are riflemen, first and last, whatever their actual job specialty. Keep that in mind as we look at the real roles and missions of the Corps that follow.

All the missions we mentioned above are surely important, but going over enemy shorelines and winning battles is what defines the mission of the Marine Corps today. Following the end of the Cold War and Desert Storm in the early 1990s, the Navy published a white paper called From the Sea, which redefined American seapower for the 21st century. From the Sea, and a revised edition called Forward…From the Sea, have been controversial. The Navy has backed away from its traditional 'blue water' combat role,[7] now that the Soviet naval threat has, in effect, disappeared. With no real blue-water threat on the horizon, Navy leaders see the roles and missions of the sea services increasingly tied to operations in the 'littoral' or coastal zones of the world. Littoral zones in the Middle East, Indian Ocean, and Asia probably offer the highest likelihood of conflict in the coming years. The majority of the world's population centers are within these areas, along with vast industrial, energy, and mineral resources. Since the end of World War II, most of the U.S. Navy's operations have taken place in littoral areas, notably the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Tonkin, and the Mediterranean Sea.

So ingrained is the mentality of the sea service towards battles in the open ocean, some naval analysts have questioned the Navy's turn to the coastline. However, whether or not you accept the doctrine in Forward from the Sea, the Marines see it as yet another validation of their basic mission as America's seaborne assault force. Now, after 220 years, that mission is finally part of the official U.S. Navy doctrine. It has even survived a recent Department of Defense (DoD) Roles and Missions commission, which left much of the Marine force structure virtually untouched after months of examination.

Clearly, the Marine Corps' first mission is the maintenance of the three active division-aircraft wing teams as rapid-reaction forces for trouble spots around the world. These forces can support other Allied forces already in place, or open a new flank from the sea. This is exactly what happened in Korea in the 1950s, Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, Desert Shield in 1990, and Desert Storm in 1991. In each case, Marines added mass to joint operations with the U.S. Army. While this mission may not be the favorite of the leadership at Marine Corps Headquarters, given the decreasing size of the Army, it is vital. The three active Marine divisions represent almost 25 % of U.S. ground forces today. This means that any major overseas deployment will probably include one or more of these powerful division-air wing teams.

Another mission is for large, regimental-sized Marine units (up to fifteen thousand Marines) to fall upon prepositioned equipment stocks in land-based depots (such as in Norway) or stowed on ships of the Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons (MPSRONs) based in the Mediterranean Sea, at Agana Harbor at Guam, and at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. These stocks include all of the arms, equipment, and supplies necessary to sustain the unit in the field for a month. The advantage of this scheme is speed, because the only thing that has to be delivered are the Marines, who would fly in aboard aircraft from the Air Mobility Command (AMC), the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and chartered airliners.

Once the Marines begin to arrive in-theater, the prepositioned stocks from the ships would be unloaded, distributed to the units, and then deployed. This means that a combat ready force of Marines can be on duty in a crisis area in a matter of days, as happened during Operation Desert Shield. The whole scheme requires a friendly nation willing to host the prepositioned stocks on its soil (like Kuwait or Norway), or a port facility capable of rapidly unloading the heavy ships of the MPSRON. Thus, while the prepositioning concept has worked on the occasions that it has been used (1990, 1994, and 1995 in the Persian Gulf), there are no guarantees that future conflicts will occur in places with such convenient facilities. Without friendly ports and airfields, prepositioning falls apart. Luckily, the Marines and their Navy brethren can deal with such problems. They just fall back on old tradition, head over the beach, and take what they need.

Marines are old-fashioned shock troops, still able to come from the sea and win the first battles of a war. Despite the huge cuts in force structure between 1990 and 1995, the Marine Corps lost only about 11 % of its strength, primarily because its missions were well understood and appreciated by Congress, which controls the money. Much of the amphibious capability that the Corps built up in the 1980s has been retained, and the capability to 'kick in the door' is still an option for U.S. policymakers. The Navy retains enough sealift to move and land about 1.25 Marine divisions, though not all at once, or at the same place. As a result, considerable time may be required to assemble a substantial landing force of amphibious ships and Marines, if it is possible at all. To overcome this problem, the Navy and Marine Corps have developed a strategy of rotating small, forward-based Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) into potential trouble areas. In this way, one or more battalion-sized landing forces (each about 1,500 to 2,200 Marines) can arrive anywhere in the world within a matter of days, sometimes even hours.

Each of these Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs), with a helicopter squadron and support group, forms a MEU (SOC). The MEU (SOC) does for amphibious warfare what the Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) has done for airpower in naval warfare. It provides U.S. policymakers with options to threaten an enemy's coast, take or destroy a vital target such as a port or airfield, and conduct raids or rescue operations. Only the Marines, with support from the Navy, can keep a landing force hovering for months off a hostile coast, and then strike at a moment's notice.

Unlike the heavy armored forces of the U.S. Army, Marine units are infantry formations, whose feet provide their mobility once they hit the ground. Well armed with personal weapons, they tend to be lightly equipped with heavy artillery and armored vehicles. Their offensive potential and mobility, once they are on dry land, requires reinforcement with additional artillery, armor, and transportation. For the afloat MEU (SOC) units, though, such augmentation is unlikely. Their strategy is based on stealth, maneuver, and deception. Once they're on location, they either accomplish their goal quickly and leave, or dig in and hold until relieved by other friendly forces.

While Marine units may be somewhat less mobile than their Army counterparts after they hit dry land, they have many ways to reach a particular strip of coastline. They can ride helicopters, crawl ashore in armored amphibious vehicles, or land from conventional or air-cushioned landing craft. And a MEU (SOC) can put units ashore using all of these options simultaneously, if weather and seastate conditions are favorable. The enemy can even be hit in many, widely separated places all at once, if that is desirable. Such operational mobility is paralyzing to an enemy, and will often enable the Marines to achieve surprise.

Marines have developed their own form of 'maneuver warfare.' They leap across or over the water to gain operational mobility, hit an enemy at weak points, and confuse and befuddle his command structure. Whenever possible, they try to avoid stand-up fights, preferring to shock an enemy into running or surrendering. The key to all this is intensive training and practice down to the squad level. This requires intelligence and initiative on the part of every Marine, from the commanding officer to the most junior private. Far from the image of 'dumb jarheads,' today's seaborne Marines are among the most intelligent, motivated, and positive young people you will ever meet. They have to be, because there just are not enough of them to go around.

Marine resources are stretched pretty thin these days. As an example, between October 1993 and October 1994, Marine deployments included:

• October 1993—The 22nd MEU (SOC), based around the USS Guadalcanal with the USS America Carrier Battle Group in support, moved from the Adriatic, where it supported operations off former Yugoslavia, to Somalia, where it landed forces to enforce UN peacekeeping and famine relief efforts.

• April 1994—The 11th MEU (SOC), based around the USS Peleliu, deployed from operations off Somalia to the waters offshore from Mombassa to support famine relief in the Rwandan Civil War and evacuation of non-combatants.

• August 1994—The 15th MEU (SOC), based around the USS Tripoli, deployed from