political commitments on settlements and other more difficult issues (such as Barak offered)? That remained to be seen.
The Palestinians were very leery that he could or would do any of that. They were convinced that he’d be glad to move forward on Tenet and get the security concessions out of the way; but he would stall on political progress once the security situation leveled off.
In my mind that was always a possibility. I simply wasn’t sure. Would he move forward or not? I can’t say. He could definitely start a process. I wasn’t sure whether he could finish one.
As for the other side — I don’t think Arafat could even start it.
Sharon and Arafat eventually came around and agreed to set up the committee; but for one reason or another, we could never get it off the ground.
For three weeks we tried to get something started, to get an agreement working on the ground and to get the violence tamped down. It didn’t work.
I knew time was running out and we were close to it all falling apart.
The attacks and retaliations escalated. Targeted assassinations by the Israelis sometimes spilled over and killed nearby innocents. The Israelis had suffered a large number of casualties; innocents on buses or in cafes were brutally slaughtered by suicide bombers — young brainwashed Palestinians, agonized by the plight of their people. We were one event away from collapse.
It came on December 12 when a suicide bomber blew up a bus near the settlement town of Emmanuel. Ten Israelis were killed and thirty wounded. This brought the total killed since I’d arrived to forty-four, and it ended the Israeli willingness to continue the talks. They were now going to retaliate big-time. Arafat’s headquarters in Gaza, his helicopters, and many of his government facilities were bombed.
I was deeply dismayed that things had not worked out.
Many nights I had stood on my small balcony at the King David gazing at the softly lighted Old City of Jerusalem. I knew of no other place on earth that had seen so much glory and triumph and so much sorrow and violence, all in the name of religion.
It was decided that I would come back to the States for consultations, rather than stand helplessly by while the spiral of violence continued, and there was no immediate hope of talks.
Before we left, I was joined by Bill Burns; and on the way home we passed through Jordan and Egypt to talk to King Abdullah and President Mubarak. Since I knew both of them well, it was not easy to call on them after our failure to make progress. Both of them had high expectations and hopes for peace; and I felt their disappointment and frustration.
I arrived back in the U.S. on the seventeenth of December, and debriefed the President and Secretary Powell on the twentieth. They were still determined to make this work — a most encouraging development. The President thanked me for my efforts, and the Secretary told me to be ready to reengage when things settled down.
“I’ll be ready to go back at any time,” I told him.
In the days following, both Sharon and Arafat sent letters to the President asking for my return. In his reply, the President insisted on more action on the ground to curb the violence; but the news from Secretary Powell was slightly more positive. He asked me to prepare to go back after the holidays… if the situation improved.
Over the Christmas and New Year’s holidays I reflected on my trip: It seemed to me that the extremists were calling the shots. If it looked like we were making progress or creating hope for a peaceful resolution, they would attack with a vengeance, knowing retaliatory strikes would follow and talks would break down. Unless Palestinian security forces put genuine effort into curbing these attacks, there was no hope.
On a personal level, I knew that both sides had tested me at every opportunity, trying to measure my commitment and impartiality. On a more positive note, I felt I had made connections on both sides and had the trust of key people; and with the exception of a few members who felt compelled to create political theater (outrageous political statements, heated diatribes, screaming), I liked the makeup of the Trilateral Committee. Yet if I went back, I was determined to put an end to the screaming and the diatribes. The time for venting and posturing was past.
My greatest conviction: We could make progress if we could get a break in the violence.
As I followed the daily news, I sensed that things were quieting down.
The Palestinians had grown desperate. The Israelis had destroyed their headquarters in Gaza; Arafat was pinned down in Ramallah (the Israelis refused to let him go anywhere); things were coming apart; and they didn’t know what the Israelis would do next. Was Sharon going to take out Arafat?
The Israelis were also in a bind. Sharon had tried negotiating; and when that broke down, he’d tried a powerful military incursion. Now he seemed to have spent most of his options. He had to be asking himself, “What do I have to do to get this monkey off my back?” He was under a lot of political pressure, and hadn’t produced anything. He was getting a lot of bad world press as a result of the heavy retaliatory attacks.
So I think that for different reasons they were both desperate to get this thing restarted.
The decision was made for me to return immediately after the holidays. But this time there would be a different approach: Our visit was to be short, only four days. We would convene the Trilateral Committee, and give them very specific tasks and goals to accomplish over the course of two to three weeks. During that time, Aaron would return to determine whether or not there was significant progress. If there was, I would return to move to the next phase.
There were several reasons for this approach: First, we had to take the “theater” out of the meetings. With me out of the way, the temptation to waste time in heated rhetoric would be gone. Second, we had to force both sides to put more effort into bilateral communication and coordination, and not to rely on us to arbitrate every issue. Third, we wanted to take away our high profile, which drew press focus that was frequently disruptive. Fourth, low-key talks (unburdened of my continuous, direct involvement) might reduce the extremists’ will — and opportunity — to use terrorist attacks to break up the talks.
ROUND TWO
Aaron and I left for Israel on January 2, 2002, and arrived on the third.
As soon as we landed, we were briefed by the Israelis on an impending takedown operation: A ship in the Red Sea, the
The Israelis were planning to grab the ship when it moved into international waters, which would be around noon the following day. (The operation had to take place in international waters, rather than, for example, Saudi territorial waters.)
This news put me in a fury; it was a total surprise to me. No one had briefed us on it before we left the States, and now it threatened to derail our efforts before they even got off the ground… Later, to my immense relief, both the Israelis and the Palestinians kept their cool and did not use the takedown as an excuse to back away from the Trilateral Committee meetings or our proposed plan. Still, my mission was once again off to a less-than- desirable start.
The next morning at Prime Minister Sharon’s farm in southern Israel, I received more information on the pending operation: It would occur at noon during my first scheduled meeting with Chairman Arafat in Ramallah. Before I left the farm, I asked Sharon if I could break the news of the
“Yes,” he said, “but don’t do it before noon. That’s when we’re going to run the takedown.”
Later that morning, I met with the members of the Quad, who recommitted to working with us. Since they had significant influence on the Palestinians, they proved to be invaluable in facilitating progress on confidence-
