Dead or Alive

sending a warning to the Sunnis to mind their manners. Worst case, this is the real deal and they’re planning an incursion.”

“To what end?”

Kealty had asked the question, which was good, Netters thought, but there was no curiosity behind it. When it came to Iraq, the President was solution-focused to a fault. From day one, he’d made it clear that he intended to withdraw U.S. forces as quickly as possible, with only token regard paid to tactical safety. Kealty lacked two critical ingredients for good leadership: flexibility and curiosity. He had each in abundance in the political arena, but that was about power, not genuine leadership.

“Testing the waters, see how we react,” Kilborn replied. “The longer we delay in drawing down, the more time Tehran has to work behind the scenes with the Shia militias. If an incursion doesn’t reverse our drawdown now they’ve got a preview.”

“I disagree,” Admiral Netters said. “They’ve got nothing to gain and everything to lose by crossing the border. Moreover, they’re light on triple-A.”

“Explain.”

“They’re fielding only token antiair elements. That’s not an oversight. They know if we come at them, it’ll be from carriers in the Gulf first.”

Kealty’s National Security Adviser, Ann Reynolds, said, “A message?”

“Again, Ms. Reynolds, that falls into the ‘intentions’ category, but I’ll tell you this much: For all their shortcomings, the Iranians aren’t blind, and they’re big believers in the Soviet order of battle model, which is big on mobile antiaircraft systems. They saw what we did during Gulf One and Two, and they haven’t forgotten it. You don’t strip out your antiair elements just for the hell of it.”

“What about air cover?” This from NSA Reynolds. “Fighters?”

“No change,” Netters replied. “Nothing moving but routine patrol flights.”

President Kealty was frowning. A fly in his soup, Netters thought. He’d promised the country he’d get the United States out of Iraq, and the clock was ticking, but not on the troops or America’s strategic welfare but rather on Kealty’s chances for a second term. Of course, Netters had from the outset his own reservations about the Iraq War, and he still did, but those were dwarfed by the very real possibility of getting it wrong over there. Like it or not, the United States was up to its eyeballs in the Middle East, more so than it had in perhaps its entire history. A painless withdrawal was a pipe dream Kealty had sold to an understandably war-weary nation. While the current drawdown plan would never succeed, it was measured enough that Iraq would slowly slip into chaos rather than fall headfirst into it, in which case he hoped Kealty would have the good goddamned sense to regroup and listen to the theater commanders.

In one respect, Scott Kilborn was correct: This business on the border may well be a preview of Kealty’s endgame for Iraq without American troops, though whether Iran would actually put troops on the ground once U.S. forces were gone was anyone’s guess. If they did, however, they’d use soaring Sunni-on-Shia violence to justify it.

It was a perplexing game the Iranians were playing. A delay in U.S. troop withdrawal seemed contrary to Tehran’s interests-or at least those visible from Washington.

Kealty leaned back in his chair and steepled his fingers. “So, Admiral, since you’re not willing to talk about intentions, I’m going to do it for you,” Kealty said. “The Iranians are saber rattling. Testing our resolve. We ignore them, keep to the drawdown plan, and give them a message of our own.”

“Such as?” Admiral Netters said.

“Another carrier group.”

A message. Another mission without a goal. While it was true enough that carrier groups were all about projection of power, the concept was analogous to basic firearm safety: Never point a gun at anything you don’t intend to shoot. In this case, Kealty just wanted to wave the gun around.

“What assets do we have available?” Kealty demanded.

Before Netters could answer, Kilborn said, “The Stennis-”

Netters interrupted. “Sir, we’re stretched thin as it is. Stennis group was just relieved on station ten days ago. It’s long overdue for a-”

“Goddamn it, Admiral, I’m getting tired of hearing about what we can’t do, is that understood?”

“Yes, Mr. President, but you need to understand the-”

“No, I don’t. That’s what you’re paid to do, Admiral. Get it done, and get me the plan, or I’ll find someone who will.”

Tariq walked into the living room, where the Emir was reading, and picked up the television remote control. “Something you should see.” He turned on the TV and changed the channel to a cable news station. The pretty blond-haired, blue-eyed anchor was in mid-sentence.

“-again, a Pentagon spokesperson just confirmed an earlier BBC report of an Iranian Army exercise being conducted on its border with Iraq. While the Pentagon admitted the government in Tehran failed to announce the exercise, it went on to say such events are not uncommon, citing a similar movement of troops and equipment in early 2008…”

Tariq muted the television.

“Strange bedfellows,” the Emir murmured.

“Pardon?”

While Tehran had been generally unsupportive of the URC’s cause, neither had it been a hindrance, knowing well that one never knew where interests might intersect. In this case, the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and National Security, or VEVAK, had in recent years turned its attention to how a postoccupation Iraq might look. Though well represented by several militias and bolstered by both Hezbollah and Pasdaran aid, the Iraqi Shia population was still a minority, and therefore vulnerable to Sunni persecution, an imbalance of power that Tehran despised and the URC was only too happy to exploit. Even as the United States had begun banging the drum for war in 2002, the Emir had conducted his own cost-benefit analysis and developed a strategy to further the URC’s aim. The fact that the strategy was obliquely based on the American economic model was something that would likely never occur to Washington.

The United States would eventually leave, or at least decrease its presence to a nominal level, at which time Iran would begin its play for domination in Iraq, a feat it couldn’t hope to accomplish without an advantage over the Sunni majority. In this, Iran had a need. It was a customer-in-the-making.

The URC’s involvement in Iraq had begun in August of 2003 with an influx of men, materiel, and expertise, all of which were freely offered to Sunni extremist groups. Based on a mutual hatred of the U.S. occupiers, resources were shared and goals intertwined, and by 2006 the URC held sway over great portions of Baghdad and most of the Sunni Triangle. This was the good or service for which Tehran was willing to pay.

As Mary Pat Foley and the NCTC well knew and Jack Ryan Jr. had recently realized, information availability in the digital age could be as much a hindrance to intelligence work as it could be a blessing. Computers can categorize, collate, and disseminate massive amounts of information, but the human mind can absorb and use only so much of it. The application of information is the pivot on which decisions-good, bad, and neutral-are made, a fact that engineers, game wardens, casinos, and hundreds of other seemingly unrelated disciplines had long ago recognized. Who does what, and where and when do they do it? To a city planner, a list of intersections prone to traffic gridlock was virtually useless; a dynamic map on which he or she could see hot spots and trends, invaluable. Sadly, as was too often the case, the U.S. government was playing catch-up in the fields of Data Visualization and information architecture, having to outsource such services to private cyber-savvy firms while the federal bureaucracy threw millions of dollars and lost time at the issue.

For Jack and Gavin Biery, the project they eventually dubbed PLOWSHARE began as a technical challenge: how to take the flood of open-source information on the Internet and beat it into something useful-a sword with which they could pare down the overload. The slightly overwrought metaphor notwithstanding, they made rapid progress, starting with a software program designed to gather obituaries from the eastern seaboard and map them according to various groupings: age, location, cause of death, vocation, etc. Many of the patterns that emerged were predictable-such as elderly deaths clustered around retirement homes-but some were not, such as the recent raising of the drinking age in one state preceding more young-adult deaths on highways leading to a nearby state