Secondary explosions destroyed the vehicles beyond recognition… The annihilation of this Iraqi armor battalion continued when the troop found itself surrounded by burning hulls and exploding ammo bunkers… The report of advancing T-72s from the east told us the battle wasn't over. Seven T-72s had managed to crawl out of their reveted positions and attempt a counterattack. The enemy was advancing at about 2,500 meters to our front. The flash from their gun tubes confirmed they had a fix on us. The scouts were in no position to continue the advance on T-72s. The T-72s' 125-mm main guns splashed short and kicked up a wall of dirt. In seconds they would have us in range and a Bradley was not built for such a hit. Again, the tanks quickly bounced forward. At 2,100 meters, the inferior T-72 didn't stand a chance against the Abrams M1A1. The depleted uranium long-rod penetrators from the sabot round passed through the T-72s like a hot knife through butter. The TOW missiles also had no problem with the range on penetration, and the counterattack was squelched like a match in a cup of water… We lost one vehicle in the armor battle [I-14] but thankfully the crew… all survived. Three of the crew members returned the following day, and the other two were medevaced for burns.'
I learned later the extent of the damage the 2nd ACR had inflicted on the Tawalkana. The Battle of 73 Easting, which went on the rest of the afternoon and on and off into the evening until about 2300, proved to be a watershed event for our VII Corps attack and, in the longer run, for the U.S. Army.
For the Army, it was a vindication in microcosm of all our emphasis on tough performance-oriented training; of our investments in combat maneuver centers at NTC and Hohenfels; our quality soldiers, NCOs, and leaders; our leader development; and our great leading-edge equipment. It had taken the U.S. Army almost twenty years to get to the results of 73 Easting. When Troop G commander, Captain Joe Sartiano, was later asked how his troop had been able to do so well their first time in combat, he answered that this hadn't been their first time; he and others in his troop had been in combat before — at the National Training Center.
Here was the ultimate battlefield payoff of performance-oriented training under realistic combat conditions against a world-class opposing force at the National Training Center and at other combat maneuver centers. Later, other actions by units in 1st INF, 1st AD, and 3rd AD would lead many to the same conclusions. 'After the OPFOR,' a soldier in 1st AD said, 'the Medina ain't nothin'.'
For VII Corps, the battle was critical because the 2nd ACR not only succeeded in collapsing the security zone of the developing Iraqi defense, but delivered a resounding defeat to the Tawalkana first echelon and kept the Iraqis off balance until we got the 1st INF into the fight. Moreover, as I noted earlier, the 2nd ACR had found a seam between the RGFC defense and its subordinate units. Though there was no physical break in the defense, the identification of a seam or boundary is important. Where two different units have to tie together is a vulnerable area in any defense, and one you always try to attack. This was especially the case where two units had been thrown together as quickly as the Iraqis had done.
While I was at the 2nd ACR TAC, I talked mainly to Lieutenant Colonel Steve Robinette. What I wanted most was to get a picture of the battles, of what they had learned about the Iraqis, of the passage forward of the 1st INF, and how to exploit that seam. My first instincts were to use the 2nd ACR by sending them toward Objective Denver. The 1st CAV was another possibility, since by that time they would be ready in Lee.
My most important thought just then, however, was that the 2nd ACR had found the security zone and collapsed it, and then had severely punished the first-echelon defense of the now formerly elite RGFC.
Some quick considerations led to a decision to pass the 1st INF somewhere between 65 and 75 Easting. I now left the specific location of that to the commanders of the 2nd ACR and the 1st INF to work out. I still wanted the passage to occur in daylight, but at this point that no longer looked possible. (It actually started at around 2200 that night, soon after the Battle of 73 Easting was winding down.)
At 1600, I left the 2nd ACR and flew over to the 3rd AD TAC CP, by now forward in their new zone.
1630 3RD AD TAC CP
At the 3rd AD TAC, I met briefly with both Butch Funk and Ron Griffith. Ron was there to personally coordinate boundaries and flank contact between the divisions. The normal rule of thumb in units is that contact responsibility is from left to right. Since Ron was on the left, he had come to 3rd AD.
Both commanders were concerned about boundary coordination and had gone to great lengths to see to it they were tied in on the flanks. Because they were about to enter a night attack posture, we all were increasingly concerned about fratricide.
Meanwhile, both divisions had done a superb job of making the sharp ninety-degree turn in the trackless desert with no landmarks and only GPS and LORAN to guide them. Complicating navigation was the fact that 1st AD used mainly LORAN while 3rd AD used mainly GPS.
At that point, Butch Funk was right at the beginning of what they would call the Battle of Phase Line Bullet.
Butch told me he had two brigades on line, Colonel Bob Higgins's 2nd in the north and the 1st of Colonel Bill Nash (of recent Bosnia command) in the south. Both brigades had units in contact. At around 69 Easting, their 2nd Brigade reported sixty to seventy T-72s in revetments and began a fight. At 1610, farther south, their CAV squadron (4/7 CAV) and 4-18 INF (1st Brigade) were in a battle from 69 to 73 Easting with T-62s and infantry in bunkers. At 1645, both brigades passed through Phase Line Tangerine. From there and on into the night, they had a series of running tank fights with Iraqi defending units in reverse-slope defenses with T-72s. It confirmed what I already knew. Along 70 to 80 Easting, we had hit a hastily defending RGFC division plus reinforcements. They were fighting back — just as they had fought back against 2nd ACR.
So Butch had a lot to tell me.
Ron Griffith also had a lot to report.
By now, after his ninety-degree turn, he had three brigades on line, with his aviation out front. He was anxious, though, to get his Apache battalion back from the 2nd ACR for his coming fights.
He'd get them back, I told him, after the passage of the 1st INF through the 2nd ACR.
There were several other things on his mind: First, he had left an infantry battalion in al-Busayyah to finish the action there (6/6 INF under command of Lieutenant Colonel Mike McGee). Second, because XVIII Corps units were a good sixty kilometers or so behind him, he now had the open flank. And finally, he told me about a possible fratricide between one of his engineer units and an element of the 3rd ACR that had crossed the boundary into our sector.
All combat elements of 1st AD were by then forty to sixty kilometers east of al-Busayyah. On a number of occasions, the 3rd ACR had been told over the radio by both Griffith and Brigadier General Jay Hendrix, his assistant division commander, that only friendly logistical/support elements were on or near the airfield near al-Busayyah. (At that time, they were highly concerned about seizing this airfield, because it was planned as the center of a log base to be established if combat actions were extended.) The blue-on-blue event resulted in the deaths of two soldiers, while two others were wounded.
That shook me up.
Apparently, Hendrix, with corps approval, had denied the 3rd ACR permission to cross the VII Corps/1st AD boundary. This refusal had been needless, since the battle for al-Busayyah had long been over, and 1st AD was well forward. But it had happened. Ron and I both exploded… and then we had to go on the move again.
1700 VII CORPS MAIN TAC
I flew the short distance to the TAC, which was now set up at our new location.
I still had to make the decision on the Big Red One. Should I pass them forward at night or wait until morning? Clearly, the 2nd ACR had not only collapsed the RGFC security zone, they were now attacking main RGFC defenses and had found a seam between the RGFC and another unit. If we were going to sustain the attack momentum the regiment had started, I needed the 1st INF's 348 M1A1s fresh into the fight to replace the 2nd ACR's 123 tanks, which had been fighting most of the day.
But a hastily coordinated night forward passage of lines leading right off the march into a night attack was a
