walked over to Ron.
Since Toby and John also had seen the firing, they asked some of the 1st AD troops there what was happening. It was Iraqi fire, they said, but they didn't give it much thought, since they kept firing in the same place. (That meant that the Iraqi fire was what we call 'unobserved fire.' If they had been able to 'observe' what they were hitting, they would have by now shifted it to be more effective.)
'Sir,' Ron began, 'although the Iraqis continue to fire artillery, we've had a hell of a successful brigade fight here and are just beginning to finish it. I estimate we've destroyed about a brigade of the Medina.'
That was great news.
'Terrific. Proud of you and your troops. Keep the heat on the Iraqis.' At that point I did not know what an overwhelming victory the Medina Ridge fight had been for 1st AD, and how badly they had hurt the Medina. 'What I came to see you about is the passage of the 1st CAV around to your north later this afternoon.'
Meanwhile, because our own artillery was firing continually, and this noise was added to the occasional
'Ron, this is a lousy place to do some future battle planning. Got a suggestion?' I shouted.
'Let's go back to my TAC. It's about five kilometers west of here, right in center sector. I'll drive in my HMMWV and meet you there.'
'OK,' I said, then went back and got in my waiting Blackhawk and flew the five kilometers to 1st AD TAC CP.
MEDINA RIDGE
First AD's battle at what they called 'Medina Ridge' had been the biggest and, as it turned out, the fastest and most one-sided individual battle of the war.
By late morning, Ron had all three division ground brigades on line abreast. The 2nd Brigade, commanded by Colonel Monty Meigs (Monty's great-great-grandfather had been quartermaster general of the Union army for General Grant) had four battalions, but his 6/6 Infantry was still catching up, following their finish of the al- Busayyah fight. The day before, 1st AD had successfully fought off an artillery attack from out of XVIII Corps's sector in the north, and by a combination of artillery and attack helicopters had destroyed a brigade of the Adnan RGFC Division that the Iraqis had repositioned south to thicken their defense.
It was shortly after noon when the 2nd Brigade ran into a reinforced brigade of the Medina.
'The Republican Guards,' Ron Griffith said later about 1st AD's battles, 'were much more capable forces' than the ones opposite us initially, and the other Iraqi forces in the southern part of Kuwait were 'better equipped, trained, fed, led, and disciplined. The battles that were fought out there in the desert were very large battles, and they were not with forces that were running. In fact, they were forces that continued to reinforce and tried with some determination to defend.'
Lieutenant Colonel Steve Whitcomb's account of the fight gives a firsthand account of what happened (Whitcomb was commander of 2/70 Armor, consisting of three M1A1 companies and one Bradley company, and one of the three TFs in 2nd Brigade's fight).
'At 1140, brigade began moving forward. While intelligence had not pinpointed enemy locations, we expected the enemy to be twenty to forty kilometers out front.
'Within minutes, as BANDIT's [Company B's] lead platoon was crawling out of a small wadi, the tanks stopped suddenly and backed down to turret defilade. Almost immediately, both BANDIT and ASSASSIN [Company A] reported T-72s and BMPs to their direct front. We confirmed friendly positions and ranges (2,800-3,500 meters). The wadi provided excellent firing positions for the tanks and the task force commenced firing.
'It quickly became obvious that the Iraqis were totally outclassed by our soldiers and equipment. Fire commands were textbook, with only an occasional hint of excitement as a T-72 would explode in a ball of flame. The day had been very gray and overcast and visibility limited to perhaps 1,500 meters. The wind blew sand. Through the haze, one could see muzzle flashes as the enemy tanks attempted to return fire.' Steve later told me that it looked to him as though 'Hoffman devices' — the training device used to simulate enemy tank fire—'were going off.' They were totally ineffective, and as the captured Iraqis would later confirm, they could see us shoot, and watch their comrades explode, but could not identify our vehicles by any means other than their general direction. Our tankers far exceeded their training ranges of 2,200 to 2,400 meters with precise but deadly shots, the longest being 3,650 meters.
'Soon, the horizon was a series of over seventy smoke plumes. In forty-five minutes, the task force's share of the annihilation of the 2nd Brigade of the Medina Tank Division, Republican Guards, would later be confirmed at 27 T-72 tanks, 8 BMPs, and 6 air defense command-and-control vehicles… In those forty-five minutes, the brigade would destroy 55 T-72s, 6 T-55s, 35 armored personnel carriers, and 5 SA-13 antiaircraft weapons systems.'
The enemy 'had positioned themselves in an eight-kilometer-long 'fish-hook'-shaped line the day prior and had dug fighting positions for their tanks. They had tied their defense in with what good terrain they found and actually had set up an excellent reverse-slope defense. The enemy was there to fight and knew the importance to the rest of the Iraqi army of their ability to stop us.[51]
'During the fight, incoming artillery, around several hundred rounds, was received to the left rear of our flank unit, behind us and TF 4/70. The intent of the enemy had been to hit us and force us back into the artillery… The brigade fire-support officer called for counter-battery fire, and within seconds of 'Shot,' the Iraqi guns fell silent…
'In addition, A-10s and Apache attack helicopters, which had been requested earlier, arrived at about 1250 and were able to clean out enemy forces behind the front line of destroyed vehicles. Our soldiers were treated to an aerial display, as repeated runs by the A-10s and engagements by the Apaches' Hellfire missiles silenced any enemy activity…
'It was truly an awesome sight as we passed the still-flaming hulks of the enemy. Explosions continued, even over two hours after the fight, as tank rounds cooked off inside the vehicles, shooting flames skyward. Prisoners were captured, wounded, some seriously, treated and evacuated, and quick examination of the area for intelligence value conducted.'
The above account was not merely the story of one battalion, it speaks for the whole division. While Steve Whitcomb's tankers executed the direct-fire fight, the brigade commander, Monty Meigs, ensured maximum combat power forward and used his artillery in direct support and for counterfire. Ron Griffith at the division would see that Monty had all the firepower he could provide, and ensure that the division executed the counterfire, and simultaneously fight in greater depth with A-10s and division Apaches.
This was combined arms — AirLand Battle at division level — working in harmony at each echelon. General George Patton in World War II called it the 'musician of Mars.' We had the whole VII Corps combined-arms orchestra crashing down on the Iraqis.
This fight also was why Ron Griffith had had his attention drawn to the situation in front of him, rather than to the problem of finding room for 1st CAV. He needed to bring the full weight of the division to bear, just as he had done at the beginning of Medina Ridge and was continuing to do.
1ST AD TAC CP MEDINA RIDGE
The 1st AD TAC CP was not really a CP at all. To keep up with his fast-moving series of battles close and deep, Ron had been moving about the battle area in his HMMWV and a helicopter. While he was doing that, Brigadier General Jay Hendrix had been inside an almost continually moving G-3 M577, directing the close fight.
One M577, with Jay Hendrix inside. I was really pumped up and pleased with what 1st AD was doing in their sector. Clearly they were hitting the Medina hard and were hitting other Iraqi mech and armor units deep. The price
