There was no way they could have missed the sign WELCOME TO IRAQ, COURTESY OF THE BIG RED ONE proudly displayed in front of three Big Red One M1A1s.
The airfield ran generally southwest-northeast. The strip itself was macadam, about 50 feet wide and 3,500 long. Halfway to the northern end of the strip and on the left were a pair of tents, where MPs would search each member of the cease-fire delegations for weapons. Next to these tents was a separate tent for General Schwarzkopf; in there he could talk to anyone he needed over the secure comms we had set up. Next to his tent were the actual negotiation tents — two standard U.S. Army field tents hooked together. Inside was a standard government conference table, with chairs around it, as well as seating for all the other members of the Coalition who were present that day. On the other side of this arrangement was a VIP tent, where senior Coalition officers could go for short breaks. Directly across the airstrip from the negotiation tent were the three 1st INF M1A1 tanks, with their WELCOME TO IRAQ sign. Next to the tanks was an area for the media, with an MP cordon, to keep it under control.
It had been forty-two hours since 1600 on 1 March, when Tony Moreno and his second brigade, and Bob Wilson and the Quarter Horse (1/4 Cav), had secured the site.
General Schwarzkopf seemed very sure of himself as he looked around, chatted briefly with the troops, and waited for the Iraqis to arrive. He knew what he wanted to do. That had been apparent to me on the ride up there in the Blackhawk. One of those he greeted was a senior Saudi general, with a clean Kevlar helmet and goggles on top. This, I learned, was Lieutenant General Khalid, the commander of JFC-E and JFC-N. In large measure, General Khalid had been the real glue in the Arab part of the military coalition.
When the Iraqis rode up in our HMMWVs and got out, they gave him a salute, which General Schwarzkopf returned. Through an interpreter, he explained the setup and the first order of business: they would be searched and would have to surrender any weapons. He would also be searched, he explained. They agreed and that formality was accomplished. General Schwarzkopf then led them into the tent, followed by the Coalition delegation.
When I started to enter, I got stopped at the door by the CENTCOM security troops. My name was not on the CENTCOM list, they told me. 'I'm going in, name or no name,' I told the MP at the entrance, and in I went.
None of the CENTCOM component commanders, Boomer, Arthur, Horner, or Yeosock, was present at Safwan that day, nor was Gary Luck, though all the Coalition allies were there. I knew some, such as Peter de Billiere of the UK and Saleh Halaby of Egypt, but most I did not.
I found an empty seat in the back by the entrance. Gus Pagonis had a front-row seat, but neither Tom Rhame nor Bill Carter was in there.
It was hot in the tent, and I could hear nothing of what was said at the table; I had a hard time staying awake. General Schwarzkopf seemed to be doing most of the talking, and the Iraqis were very still. They nodded now and then but said little.
It was clear to me what was going on. This was a battlefield meeting of the commanders of the opposing forces, to agree on the separation of forces; later, more detailed strategic-level talks would determine the Iraqi penalty for their aggression against Kuwait.
After about an hour, they took a short break. As the Iraqi generals walked by me, I looked into their eyes. These men had the coldest-looking, most impassive expressions I have ever seen on military officers — Vietnam, Warsaw Pact, NATO, Korea, anywhere.
That day I wrote in my journal, 'No compassion in the Iraqis' eyes — none. They are ruthless and we should not let them up before we get what we want. Fear they have mistreated our POWs. We must hold them
As they passed, I tried to figure out who these Iraqi officers were. They wore no name tags. Were they RGFC? That did not appear to be so, since they did not wear the red Republican Guards' armbands. Much later, I found out their names: Lieutenant General Salah Abdoul Mahmoud, III Corps commander, and Lieutenant General Sultan Hashim Ahmad, chief of staff of the Ministry of Defense.
I was also still curious to find out how this event had come about in this particular place. Who had picked the site? Was the site important to the objectives to be achieved? What did we want to accomplish here? Who had decided on the Iraqi level of representation? How much negotiation room did General Schwarzkopf have? Who had decided what he would say?
At the time, I assumed the answers to all these questions had been tied together between State and Defense in Washington, and approved by the President. I did not give it much further thought. Later, I would.
After the break, I stayed outside for a while, since I could not hear what was being said anyway, and talked with Lieutenant Colonel Bob Wilson and Command Sergeant Major Cobb of the 1/4 Cavalry to hear their accounts of the war.
Later, I went back inside and did my best to catch some words, but without any luck. I dozed off from time to time, embarrassed that an obviously historic event, taking place right there in front of me, would not stimulate me more.
General Schwarzkopf seemed to be on top of his game, and I was confident he would do for us what was right. We had done our part.
The talks ended and the tent emptied. They had lasted about an hour and a half.
Afterward, General Schwarzkopf and Lieutenant General Khalid held a session with the media, right in front of the Big Red One tanks and their sign. It was skillfully done (I do not recall that Khalid answered any questions), but I was sorry to see that there was no mention of 1st INF or VII Corps, or introductions of any of the soldiers or leaders.
After the press conference, I lost track of General Schwarzkopf for a time, and walked over to talk to some of the soldiers and to tell Tom Rhame and Bill Carter thanks for the great job. While I was talking to them, Toby grabbed me. 'General Schwarzkopf wants to see you in his tent,' he said.
The CINC wanted me to listen as he reported the results of the talks to General Powell, and also as he gave General Luck his orders, to make sure he did not leave anything out. That way Gary and I would have the same set of orders to implement. (At this point, both Gary and I knew more than our boss, John Yeosock.) I took rapid notes.
Here is a summary of what I wrote:
First was the issue of Iraqi helicopters. At Safwan, the Iraqis made a simple request that they be able to fly from Baghdad to Basra in order to implement the agreement. Since we not only had cut Highway 8 but had also forbidden them any use of military air, they needed some way to get back and forth. No Iraqi helicopters were to be shot down if they had an orange panel on their sides. The helicopter agreement was nothing more than that, and only in that context — a matter of command and control to implement the cease-fire. And that is what General Schwarzkopf agreed to. I do not think he was fooled by the Iraqis that day. He knew exactly what he was doing with that specific request in those circumstances. Later, the Iraqis took advantage of their ability to fly the helos, when they saw we would not do anything about it, and used them to kill their own people. But I think that occurred to them later. That we did nothing then is an entirely different issue.
Then there were a number of other provisions.
There was to be a demilitarized zone two kilometers wide to separate the forces. John Yeosock and Steve Arnold had drawn it on a map used by General Schwarzkopf, and the Iraqis agreed to it.
There were rules of engagement:
• The intent was not to engage if Iraqi forces were trying to get away;
• Vehicles and helos flying an orange panel would not be engaged;
• We were not to get into big battles if all the Iraqi were doing was trying to get out of the theater;
• Bypassed Iraqi units were to be allowed to leave;
• We were to be on weapons hold unless the Iraqis showed clear hostile intent; and
• The Iraqis were not to be allowed to remove ammunition.
General Schwarzkopf also said we would not give up one square inch of Iraqi territory until the permanent cease-fire was signed (and I assumed we got what we wanted). He instructed us to set up a meeting point for radio communications with the Iraqis, and where the two sides could meet to settle any disputes (we subsequently
