Into the Storm: On the Ground in Iraq

Powell, General (Ret.) Colin. Personal interview. 15 July 1996.

Rhame, Lieutenant General Thomas. Personal interview. 6 June 1996.

Schlesinger, James. Personal interview. 30 November 1995.

VII Corps Desert Storm Veterans in a variety of conversations and recollections.

Starry, General (Ret.) Donn. Personal interview. 23 May 1996.

Sullivan, Major General (UK) T.J. Personal interview. 13 February 1996.

Tilelli, General John. Personal interview. 18 June 1996.

Vuono, General (Ret.) Carl E. Personal interview. 25 July 1996.

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Примечания

1

Third Army was Franks's next higher command, while CENTCOM (Central Command) was the overall U.S. Joint Command (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) in the Gulf. CENTCOM was commanded by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf.

2

A meeting engagement is a tactical action in which a force that is usually moving 'meets' or otherwise runs into an enemy force that is also usually moving, but which could also be stationary. Normally, this is a surprise encounter, even though you know the enemy is out there somewhere. The faster-reacting force usually wins. It takes a lot of practice for units to absorb the initial surprise and continue to act faster than the enemy and in a way that brings combat power to bear. It is a tough tactical maneuver, and indeed a commander obviously would prefer to know in advance where the enemy is so he can think ahead about his mode of attack.

3

In order to lure the Iraqis into believing that the main American attack was coming due north up the Wadi al Batin axis rather than further west, Franks and his planners had devised a deception scheme that had the division operating in the Ruqi Pocket of the Wadi al Batin. (The Ruqi Pocket was at the tricorner area where the borders of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi joined. This area lay at the eastern edge of the VII Corps zone of operations.) Here the 1st CAV had conducted a skillful series of feints and demonstrations against Iraqi forces. During their operation they had captured 1,800 Iraqi prisoners.

4

The following ideas — as well as most of the other more 'conceptual' or 'philosophical' portions of this chapter — do not actually represent Fred Franks's understanding of his experiences while he was in Vietnam. Rather, and more accurately, they represent the distillation of a lifetime of experiences. In Vietnam, this understanding was in seed and green shoot form. But it was there.

5

After Vietnam, Leach became armor branch chief at the Army's Personnel Command in charge of assignments of all armor officers. While there, he saw to it that battle-wounded soldiers who wanted to remain in the Army were given the opportunity to do so. More than anyone else, Jimmie Leach helped Franks stay on active duty. Franks would never forget this. It was the cavalry family looking after its own.

6

The following dialogue was reported by James P. Sterba in 'Scraps of Paper from Vietnam,' The New York Times Magazine, 18 October 1970.

7

Dialogue again as reported by James P. Sterba.

8

For a more complete description of all these systems, see my Armored Cav: A Guided Tour of an Armored Cavalry Regiment.

9

Divisions normally differ only in the number of tank and Bradley battalions; an armored division might have six tank and four Bradley battalions, while a mechanized division will normally have five battalions of each.

10

Large metal shipping containers.

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