forward of the border would support two divisions side by side. He told his two commanders to take a look at the terrain. Butch Funk and Ron Griffith both favored two divisions abreast. It would be tight, they said, but they could do it.
To settle this question, Franks sent a ground reconnaissance party out to the area to look around, and on 24 January, he and Stan Cherrie went out to look at it from his Blackhawk. That same day, after his own look and when the recon report came back positive, Franks decided to put the two divisions side by side. Because 1st AD had farther to go, and more to do initially (they had to seize the Iraqi town of al-Busayyah early in their attack), Franks put 1st AD on a twenty-five-kilometer, two-brigade front, and 3rd AD on a fifteen-kilometer, one-brigade front. This would mean that 3rd AD would stretch to the rear over 100 kilometers, and that it would take time and considerable coordination for them to get in a combat posture of two brigades forward. But that was better than putting them behind the 1st AD.
Now Franks had the geometry of his forces that he wanted. He had an enveloping force to the west—2nd ACR, 1st AD, and 3rd AD. He had the 1st INF doing the breach, with the 1st UK following quickly through the breach to defeat the tactical reserves to the east. Logistics, particularly fuel, could also now be easily transported through the breach to the north, where it would be available to the enveloping force. Supporting artillery brigades could be initially passed through to join the enveloping armored divisions before their RGFC attack.
On 26 January, Franks made this note in his journal: 'Planning session A.M. Trying to 'what-if' mobile Iraq forces. Think he will fight attrition battle from successive positions. Must shape battle with air, not extend myself logistically, and beat him to positions. East flank vulnerable. If Egyptian attack stalls, then flank thru UK is vulnerable. Must attrit 12th (Iraqi) Div (the one in reserve just behind the frontline Iraqi divisions) so UK can push east and hold while I go north with 1st AD to threaten his flank. Keep 3rd AD in reserve in center able to go east to assist UK or commit north. Should not commit 3rd AD until sure I'll get 1st CAV.'
That day Franks also finalized VII Corps's plans for artillery raids across the border and for feints. The purpose of these was to destroy Iraqi combat capability, especially artillery in range of the breach, and to deceive the Iraqis through the artillery fire and ground maneuver feints by the 1st CAV in the Ruqi Pocket that VII Corps's attack was going north up the Wadi al Batin.
On 26 January, Franks also sent Tom Goedkoop, his planner, to assume command of 4/66 Armor, an M1A1 tank battalion in the 1st AD, to replace the unit's commander, who had been injured. Goedkoop went on to command the battalion with distinction in combat. To replace him, Franks selected Lieutenant Colonel Bob Schmitt, another SAMS graduate, who had been working at Third Army on their planning. Schmitt proved to be an excellent choice — well read in the situation, bright, motivated, and savvy.
On 13 January, the VII Corps attack order had been published to include Franks's intent. That basic order remained unchanged in its essentials from that point until the actual attack on 24 February — though modifications in it continued to be made as air attacks caused Iraqi dispositions to change and as they received better-focused intelligence.
Yet Franks knew there was a limit to how long such adjustments could be made. That limit, in his judgment, was to be about two weeks before the ground attack. 'Now is not the time to tinker with the plan,' he told Toby Martinez on 13 February, a few days before the attack. 'The more senior you get, the less you must meddle — do not try and make 100 percent. We have a good plan, just let the people execute.' He wanted subordinate commanders to have time to do their planning, to brief and discuss their options with their soldiers, and to be able to conduct rehearsals. That all takes time. If he continued to change the plan, they would never be able to do that. A good plan that is thoroughly understood will be better executed than a perfect plan that nobody has internalized and rehearsed.
To better see how all of this affected individual units, let's take a quick look at how the 2nd ACR saw their own plan, which was published on 20 January. Their mission, it read, was to 'attack through the western flank of enemy defenses and conduct offensive cover operations to develop the situation for VII Corps.' In their concept of operations, it went on to say, the 'regiment's task is to set the terms for action for the corps's main body and to serve as a base of fire and observation for the corps commander's maneuver… If the enemy is moving, regiment meets and destroys advance guard battalions and develops the situation for the corps commander. If he is defending, regiment fixes the enemy from standoff range, finds his flanks, and assists in getting the divisions into the fight.' Don Holder, the regiment's commander, and Franks discussed the regiment's maneuver many times both before and after their order was published. Since the regiment would be the key to finding and fixing the RGFC, Franks wanted Holder to be on the same mental wavelength with regard to possibilities for the coming battles. He was.
On 5 February, for instance, Franks visited a training exercise of the 3rd AD. Butch Funk had his commanders and key staff out in the desert in HMMWVs moving cross-country as though he had the whole division out there. At a break in their movement, he huddled all the commanders for a short AAR, and Franks spoke to them about the VII Corps plan and what he expected the Iraqis would do. The more the commanders knew, the better they'd be able to execute when the time came.
Late in January, Franks's planners began to develop the FRAGPLANs that would give the corps options off their basic maneuver and put them in the right attack formation to destroy the RGFC.
On 8 February, Franks flew to Riyadh for the final briefing with Cheney and Powell. The briefing was held the next day.
Franks had printed his most important conclusions on the bottom of his concluding briefing chart. These were:
VII Corps is ready to fight
Soldier will and attitude unbeatable
Support of body politic and public has been vital to date
Spare parts a big unresolved problem
Use of massed air with intelligence and ground maneuver is key to success
During the briefing, Franks went through the final iteration of the plan in detail, including a summary of combat actions up to that point, the RGFC's likely options, and a review of training time for each major unit.
Some questions came up, and then Cheney asked the biggest question of the war: 'How will it all end?' It was a great question. Franks hesitated a moment, thinking Cheney should really hear the answer from General Schwarzkopf, from a theater perspective, instead of the perspective of one of five attacking corps commanders. But there was only silence. So Franks said, 'Mr. Secretary, I cannot answer for anyone else, but I can give you my opinion from a VII Corps perspective. I believe the Iraqis will defend from positions about where they are now. We will get to a position about here' — he pointed to objective area Collins—'and then turn right ninety degrees, slamming into the RGFC with a three-division fist. We will continue to attack and finish around the area of the Kuwait-Iraq border here' where it intersects Highway 8. 'XVIII Corps will attack to our north. We will be the anvil along the border area and they will be the hammer coming in from the north.'
There was no discussion.
After the briefing, the CINC asked everyone to stay for a few minutes, and General Powell spoke in an informal setting. He told everyone thanks and related how Whitney Houston had sparked an emotional outburst of patriotism when she'd sung an inspired rendition of the national anthem at the recent Super Bowl. He said it was an indication of the lift the country had gotten from the operation so far, and said everybody should be proud of it. This operation was proof that the United States could do things well. He asked all the commanders to pass on to the soldiers how much they were supported at home. It really pumped Franks up. He was glad to hear it and pass it along.
General Schwarzkopf also spoke to the assembled commanders. He said he was 'very well pleased' with what he had heard. 'You should start on your countdown. February 21 to 24 is the window for attack.'
