Into the Storm: On the Ground in Iraq

the 1st and 2nd Marines, started their breaching operations into the Iraqi minefields and other static defenses a few kilometers inside Kuwait. The 1st CAV's 'Tiger' Brigade (as part of the 2nd Marine Division, on the west flank of the Marine attack) followed close behind, to give the Marines additional heavy M1A1 punch. (The Marines also had a battalion of M1A1s.)

• To their west, the Egyptian-led JFC-North continued to prepare to launch their 25 February attack into the Iraqi security zone.

• To their west, in VII Corps, the 1st CAV, now under CENTCOM command, continued their deception into the Ruqi Pocket.

• To their west, 1st INF attacked into the Iraqi security zone, to take out reconnaissance and observation posts, and the 2nd ACR moved twenty kilometers into Iraq to their west.

• And, finally, to their west, XVIII Corps launched their attack toward the Euphrates with their light infantry and air assault elements.

There were three initial phases to Gary Luck's attack plan to cut off the RGFC escape routes and supply corridors along Highway 8:

First, elements of Major General Peay's 101st Airborne Division were to airlift to an objective about 150 kilometers from their launch point and set up there what was known as FOB (Forward Operating Base) Cobra, which would be their logistics and operational anchor for their second phase.

Second, the next day, another helicopter assault by the 101st would establish an airhead near the Euphrates.

Third, Major General Barry McCaffrey's 24th MECH and 3rd ACR would drive east of the 101st, toward Highway 8.

Meanwhile, on the western flank of XVIII Corps, the French division, beefed up by the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne and the American 18th Field Artillery Brigade, attacked toward Objective Rochambeau, fifty kilometers into Iraq. When that was taken, they were to move on toward Objective White, the town of as-Salman, and the airfield north of town.

To say that all of these attacks went well is an understatement. The Iraqi frontline defenses crumbled. The fearsome Iraqi defensive barriers proved to be far less fearsome than everyone believed, or dared to hope for (though they still weren't easy, and there were casualties and deaths). Some Iraqi troops and entire Iraqi units surrendered without a fight, while others fought back. Predictions of U.S. casualties into the tens of thousands never happened. No chemical or biological attacks were detected. Such a result had been far from a sure thing only hours before.

By 1800 on the twenty-fourth, the two Marine divisions had advanced through the two Iraqi defensive belts. The 1st Marine Division had gone about forty kilometers, and the 2nd, on the west, had gone twenty kilometers. As the official Marine Corps history states: 'During the night of 24–25 February, both divisions assumed defensive postures…

'In the early afternoon, Lieutenant General Walter Boomer received a call from General Schwarzkopf concerning the allied main attack with VII Corps and the Joint Forces Command-North immediately to MARCENT's left' — i.e., to the left of the Marine divisions. 'The Marines' speedy progress caused Schwarzkopf to worry aloud about possible exposure of I MEF's left flank once they became abreast of Manaquish, where the border turned due west… General Boomer recommended that the main attack begin as soon as possible. Shortly after this conversation, General Schwarzkopf ordered the main attack to commence. Although ARCENT's VII Corps crossed its line of departure at 1500, the Joint Forces Command-North attack on MARCENT'S left was delayed until after 1800. It stopped just inside their breach for the night.'

Thus, the wheels were set in motion for an early attack by VII Corps — much, as it turned out, to Fred Franks's surprise.

EARLY ATTACK SUNDAY 24 FEBRUARY VII CORPS TAC CP

At 0930, John Yeosock called.

'Fred, John, CINC wants to know if you can attack early.'

'Say again.' I was not sure I heard this right.

'The Marines have been having success, and the CINC does not want to wait until tomorrow to attack. He wants to know if we can go early, today.'

I was genuinely surprised — shocked maybe was more accurate. We had considered every other possibility except this. In a flash, my brain went from the reflective, intensely focused, get-ready pace of a moment before to 'warp-speed' active. Before I replied to John, dozens of thoughts flashed through my head, along with dozens more about what I would have to do to make it all happen.

What is the CINC really asking? was the first mental question. I quickly concluded that it wasn't actually 'Can you attack early?' but 'How soon can you attack?' I quickly ruled out telling John we could not do it, because I had no doubt that we could.

Other questions shot through my head.

What about unit positions in relation to one another? Would they have to move? What about artillery preparations, logistics (especially fuel), the British move forward, and the orders already disseminated and rehearsed? And how would an early attack affect day and night operations, and operations forty-eight hours from now?

I told myself, Whatever you do, keep it simple. I knew that success early on in an attack builds its own momentum. I had seen that many times before. So, given this go-early situation, I did not need to put additional barriers in front of the corps by making some sudden change of plan. If we could simply back everything up to today that we had planned to do tomorrow at BMNT, then that would be the best way to do it.

All this raced through my brain in nanoseconds. OK, I decided, keep it simple and continue with what we've already set in motion, but with some major time and tactical adjustments. Now I had to see whether that was possible.

'Yes, we can do it,' I told John, after a pause of no more than a second or two. 'Tell the CINC yes, but I still want to talk to my commanders.'

'XVIII Corps said they could go on two hours' notice,' Yeosock answered. 'How does that sound to you? Based on how soon the Egyptians can get ready, it looks like 1500 at the earliest. Take that as a warning order, with a confirmation at 1300, for a 1500 attack.'

'Sounds OK to me, but I still want to talk to my commanders.'

That call, and the cease-fire decision four days later, turned out to be the biggest surprises of the war for VII Corps. We had been over the plan with Third Army and with CENTCOM so many times that I thought we had considered every possibility. And now came one that we had never considered; it was that unexpected.

Why did the CINC want us to go early? What had brought on this very large, very sudden change? Except for John's remark that the Marines were doing well in the east, I was without a clue. The best understanding I could come to in the first moments after John's call was this: Since the Marines were going faster than expected, the fixing operation to our east was now going to take much less than a full day; this would allow us to attack today instead of tomorrow. Thus, as I understood it, the call from John Yeosock was primarily a matter of moving up the attack timetable fifteen hours.[26]

If that was the case (and I had no indication from John of anything else; he hadn't mentioned any change of missions or different methods of attack), I figured that the CINC was making no other changes in the plan. Nothing in my own intelligence indicated that the Iraqis in our sector were doing anything different from what we expected. There was no release of the 1st CAV Division from theater reserve, which would have signaled that all was well in the east, and that the Iraqi situation was so well known that early commitment of the reserve was a good choice. There was no 'go as soon as you are ready.' There was only 'go early,' but in coordination with XVIII Corps and the Egyptian Corps, just as the original plan said.