abuse, tried to excuse their behavior as part of a process to extract intelligence information from their Iraqi prisoners. Neither was it helpful when hostile critics attempted to portray this crime as typical of all the military, or as a result of political policies they believed wrong.

What should be the lesson learned from Abu Ghraib? Our military, and even our government beyond the Pentagon, must examine our capabilities in order to bring together the elements needed to stabilize another postwar situation such as we find in Iraq today.

? Historically the church and the military are highly resistant to change. The dogmas of both are etched in stone; their self-images are articles of faith, not of reflection; and their leaders are more concerned with preservation of the institution than with change. The military can no longer remain that inflexible. Technology, the challenges it must confront, and the means by which it plies its trade are simply changing too rapidly to allow it to maintain those traditions. Today’s wars are fought in a revolutionary manner, with new capabilities emerging every few months. The pace of information technology revolutions is even quicker. Land, sea, air, and space vehicles become obsolete more rapidly than in the past, and in some cases even before they can be deployed, as new materials are invented, microprocessors shrink in size and balloon in capacity, and new countermeasures are created to offset advantages in armor, speed, stealth, or range.

Technology is not the only consideration that demands rapid and constant change in our military. As the United States military forces prove their prowess in battle, potential enemies take note and later tailor the threats they pose to our vital interests in ways that take advantage of holes and weaknesses they perceive in our capabilities. The guided weapon of the terrorist is a human being with an explosive vest ready to die for his cause. The B-2 bomber of a radical Islamic terrorist is a B-767 filled with fuel and flown into the Pentagon. The battlefield is no longer the deserts of Iraq but the minds of young Islamic people forced to choose how they see the world and what their place is in it.

A huge role remains for military forces to protect our country’s vital interests and its citizens, but the challenges and the threats to those interests are changing almost more rapidly than our military forces can adapt to them. The need to change, and the pace of that change, are the greatest challenge our military forces face today. Fortunately, because we live in a free and profoundly diverse society, and because of our ability to master technology and our willingness to be self-critical, our nation and our military are highly adaptable. We will confront the changes and institute the needed reforms.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks to all the men and women who flew over the Gulf and performed such magnificent feats, as well as those who supported them on the ground and on the water. Thanks, too, to G. P. Putnam’s Sons, for letting me do these four books on command — it’s been a real learning experience. And thanks to you, Chuck — the right man in the right place at the right time.

TOM CLANCY

The folks who deserve acknowledgments from me are Tom Clancy, who collaborated with me and got me hooked up with William Morris, who didn’t want me but learned to love me. To John Gresham, who got me started with lots of clerical help and shared enthusiasms. And to Tony Koltz, who asked the right questions, told me how sorry a writer I am, and procrastinated sufficiently to mean I am working on this four years after I was ready to go.

CHUCK HORNER

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Atkinson, Rick. Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1993.

Cohen, Eliot A., dir. The Gulf War Air Power Survey. Washington: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1993. Five Volumes and a Summary Report.

Coyne, James P. Airpower in the Gulf. Arlington, Virginia: The Air Force Association, 1992.

Creech, Bill. The Five Pillars of TQM: How to Make Total Quality Management Work for You. New York: Truman Talley Books/Dutton, 1994.

Gordon, Michael R., and Gen. (Ret.) Bernard E. Trainor. The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. Boston/New York: Little, Brown Co., 1995.

Hallion, Richard P. Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War. Washington: Smithsonian, 1992.

Khaled bin Sultan. Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander. New York: HarperCollins, 1995.

Kitfield, James. Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.

Levins, John. Days of Fear: The Inside Story of the Iraqi Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait. London: Motivate Publishing, 1997.

McMaster, H. R. Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam. New York: HarperCollins, 1997.

Powell, Colin L. My American Journey. New York: Random House, 1995.

Schwarzkopf, Gen. (Ret.) H. Norman. It Doesn’t Take a Hero: The Autobiography. New York: Bantam, 1992.

Tennant, Lt.-Col. J. E. In The Clouds Above Baghdad: The Air War in Mesopotamia 1916– 1918. Nashville: The Battery Press, 1992. Originally published 1920.

Ullman, Harlan, and James P. Wade et al. Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance. Washington: The Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, 1996.

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Примечания

1

Later F-15 models could be used in other roles, as well.

2

Born Margaret, but called Pud from childhood. Ellen and Mary Lou were the other sisters. Chuck was the only son.

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