Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces

named the Sea Isle City was struck the next day. Though seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured in the attack, the vessel was not seriously damaged.

The Reagan administration ordered a retaliation. But the President, seeking to limit the conflict, ruled out a strike against Silkworm sites, which were on Iranian soil. He opted instead for the destruction of an Iranian oil platform known as the Rashadat GOSP (GOSP stands for gas and oil separation platform; this one had multiple structures). The Rashadat GOSP had two platforms 130 meters apart. At the north was an oil-drilling rig; at the south was a platform used as living quarters and equipment storage and repair. A third platform, supposedly abandoned, lay about two miles north of these structures.

Three destroyers, a frigate, and a cruiser were tagged to shell the platforms. A SEAL platoon would then board and search for prisoners before blowing them up.

The operation got under way at 1340 on October 19. Broadcasts from the destroyer Thach warned the Iranians to abandon the platforms; they quickly complied, and shelling began. Flames leapt up within minutes, and the fire soon spread.

Smoke and flames towered over the SEALs as their three rubber assault boats were lowered from the deck of the Thach. They could feel the heat as they approached the ravaged oil rig. 'The surface of the water was on fire within a two-hundred- to three-hundred-foot radius around the burning platform,' remembered the SEAL officer in charge.

Trying their best to ignore the heat, flames, and smoke, the SEALs set charges on the oil drilling platform, then searched the other platform, capturing cryptographic encoding devices and documents. All three platforms were eventually destroyed, with no American causalities and none known to the Iranians.

Though the Iranians did not immediately end their attacks, the U.S. Special Forces activities caused them to sharply reduce the tempo of their attacks and shift their focus to the central and southern Persian Gulf.

It was not until April of 1998, when the U.S. frigate Samuel B. Roberts struck a mine east of Bahrain, that another major operation was launched, this time primarily by regular Navy units. Initially targeting oil platforms, the engagement eventually included several Iranian patrol boats and aircraft, most of which were destroyed or heavily damaged.

PACIFIC WIND

That was the background when, in September, Stiner journeyed to the Gulf with Downing to get a firsthand view of the situation, brief Schwarzkopf, and finalize details on the embassy operation, which came to be called PACIFIC WIND. Before departing, Stiner checked with Powell to see if he had any special guidance.

'Saddam is making threats about waging a worldwide terrorist campaign,' Powell told him, 'and I don't want Norm worrying about this. You keep the terrorists off his back and tell him that we want his focus to be to the North.'

In Saudi Arabia, Stiner linked up with Jesse Johnson, while Downing coordinated the details of PACIFIC WIND with Schwarzkopf's staff and component commanders.

For the next three days, Stiner and Johnson visited every coalition support team, as well as other SOF forces, including those involved in retraining and equipping the remnants of Kuwait's army that had ended up in Saudi Arabia, and the training of resistance teams for infiltration into Kuwait City.

In Stiner's mind, the contributions that SOF could make were limited only by what SOF would be allowed to do — and by Johnson's ability to effectively manage the myriad of complex mission profiles. Johnson's problem was his colonel's rank — every other component commander for Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine conventional forces carried three stars. This just wasn't going to work. The general officers would inevitably command more resources as well as respect. He was going to have to take it up with Schwarzhopf.

Meanwhile, Downing had settled on the details of PACIFIC WIND.

The plan for taking the embassy was deceptively simple: JSOTF special mission units, supported by USAF air strikes to neutralize air defenses and isolate the embassy compound, would land at night by helicopter in the compound, take out the Iraqi guards, and rescue the personnel being held there.

If the goal was straightforward, however, the chances of achieving surprise and neutralizing the Iraqis in the occupied city was not. The invaders had located their theater headquarters in the Hotel Safir next to the embassy. The nearby beachfront, as well as the local road network, gave the enemy easy access to the target. Even the act of positioning the assault group close enough to Kuwait to launch the attack was a complicated logistics matter.

Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet and the Navy component of Central Command, solved part of the logistics problem by making a Navy LPH available for the mission. LPHs look like World War II-era escort carriers, and in fact, the first versions of the assault ships were converted from just such vessels. At about 600 feet long, LPHs are only half as long as attack carriers such as the Nimitz, and displace less than a fifth of a supercarrier's bulk; but they can carry a reinforced Marine battalion and its vehicles, as well as support them once an attack is under way. Optimized to get the assault troops on and off quickly via helicopter, LPHs typically carry two dozen helicopters, and can make about twenty-three knots. Though now overshadowed in the Navy by the newer Wasp and Tarawa LHA vessels, the LPHs nonetheless offered the Special Operations troops both a jumping-off point and floating headquarters.

At a meeting in the Gulf, Arthur assured Downing he could quickly off-load the Marines and replace them with the Special Operations package.

Downing and Stiner were well aware that the Iraqis had to be neutralized with overwhelming firepower at the start of the operation. The most practical method for that was to use the Air Force. Soon after their arrival, they met with Brigadier General Buster C. Glosson, a command pilot who oversaw all U.S. Air Force wings in the Gulf and directed planning for Lieutenant General Chuck Horner, the CENTCOM air commander. Downing and Colonel 'Pete,' one of his commanders, laid the plans out in Glosson's small command room in Riyadh, carefully going over the assault. When he finished, Glosson had a funny look on his face.

'Are you guys serious?' asked Glosson.

'Yeah,' said Downing. 'We're serious.'

'You guys really think you can go in in downtown Kuwait City?'

'If we got your support the way we want it, we can do it.'

Glosson looked at the map again. 'You're goddamn right,' he said finally. 'You got my support.'

Glosson's F-117As and F-15Es — the Air Force's front-line tactical bombers — were what they wanted. As eventually perfected, the plan called for a pair of F-117A Stealth Fighters to launch laser-guided missiles at the Iraqi headquarters in the Hotel Safir precisely sixty seconds before the helos landed. The 2,000-pound warheads would reduce the hotel's eight floors to rubble, wiping out the Iraqi headquarters, as well as depriving the enemy of a fire control center. Electrical power would be cut with another F-117 attack on a nearby electrical tower. The F-1 5E Strike Eagles would then drop cluster bombs around the embassy, neutralizing Iraqi troops and creating a minefield to isolate the building.

Cluster bombs were a common weapon during the war. Officially called CBUs (Cluster Bomb Units), they are actually a collection of smaller bomblets, and can be configured for different missions. CBU-87s spray more than two hundred antipersonnel and antiarmor bomblets over an area, killing unprotected personnel and destroying lightly armored vehicles. CBU-89 'Cators' lay down a mix of about a hundred antipersonnel and antiarmor mines, creating an instant minefield. The word Gator comes from the twenty-four BLU-92/B antitank mines the CBU launches; the image of snapping alligators provides an apt metaphor for these weapons' devastating effect on vehicles.

Glosson did more than commit Air Force support for the assault. He took the plan personally to General Schwarzkopf. Though the CINC was still not enamored of an attack that might precipitate a war he wasn't ready to fight, he gave his okay.

At a meeting with Schwarzkopf, Downing briefed PACIFIC WIND. Then, with Downing and Johnson present, Stincr summarized his visit for the CINC: 'I have visited all SOF teams and units in your area of operations, and in my judgment they are doing an outstanding job. The coalition support teams (CSTs) will be worth their weight in gold — they'll give you 'truth in reporting' about what the coalition units are doing.