Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces

ON TO THE END

As U.S. and coalition forces closed on Kuwait from the west, the reconstituted Kuwaiti forces that the 5th Special Forces had helped train and equip (four brigades) were entering Kuwait City from the south. For political and symbolic reasons, the Kuwaitis and other Arab units formed the liberating spearhead designated to take Kuwait City, their maneuver and air support being coordinated by the accompanying SF personnel that had trained them.

By the time the Kuwaiti troops roared into the city on pickup trucks with.50-caliber machine guns mounted on the back, the Iraqi units guarding Kuwait's capital had already fled.

The ground war quickly turned into a rout, as the battered and hopelessly outclassed Iraqi army fell back toward Basrah. Pounded from the air and in many cases cut off from retreat, vast numbers of Iraqis surrendered or were captured. The Republican Guard and other Iraqi units had been decimated and suffered heavily as they fled in disarray toward Baghdad.

The allied objective of freeing Kuwait had been achieved, with relatively little loss of American life.

Acting on the recommendation of the Chairman, the SECDEF, and others, President Bush ordered American troops to halt the attack one hundred hours after the ground war had begun.

At the time of the cease-fire, somewhere between two and three hundred Special Operations personnel were behind the lines, with at least one patrol north of the Euphrates. Some SOF units had to drive out on their own; others were picked up by helicopter at night.

DESERT STORM had been a resounding success and a complete victory over a formidable foe. But no one had anticipated the end would come as abruptly as it did.

As with all conflicts, many things still needed to be done after the last shot had been fired. Unfortunately, the Civil Affairs units that would play the major role in helping Kuwait get back on its feet had not begun arriving in Saudi Arabia until after the start of the air war. Despite their inadequate planning time, CA did play an important role in post-liberation Kuwait. Working as part of the combined Civil Affair Task Force, CA personnel provided relief operations in the city and throughout the liberated country. Within two months, the task force distributed 12.8 million liters of water, 125,000 tons of food, and 1,250 tons of medicine.

Though after the war senior CA leadership came under criticism for a lack of initiative and 'ill-coordinated' initial planning, CA's problems resulted from its late arrival and the unanticipated early end of the war — both beyond its control.

POSTWAR OBSERVATIONS

Carl Stiner will conclude:

Desert Storm was a brilliantly conceived and executed military operation frorn beginning to end that achieved the desired result — the liberation of Kuwait. There is no question that the President — after considering all the involved factors and consulting with all the concerned allies — made the right decision. He was right to stop the war when he did.

Monday-morning quarterbacks will always question decisions — particularly people with neither resportsibility nor accountability.

With regard to Special Operations support to the operation, I offer the following observations:

• Special Operations forces performed all missions outstandingly and contributed significantly to the victory. When SOF capabilities are integrated appropriately with those of conventional units, the result is a capability not otherwise achievable.

• CINCs need the best available advice and experience for most effectively employing and supporting Special Operations forces. All CINCs now have flag rank officers as commanders of their Special Operations Commands (SOCs). This was not possible during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, because USSOCOM was not authorized to have a flag rank officer at CENTCOM headquarters.

• Better intelligence support is needed for reconnaissance teams operating deep in hostile territory — particularly current maps and overhead photo coverage. The Grenada invasion produced a similar finding.

• SOF units need to be 'flowed,' so as to arrive in sufficient time to prepare appropriately for mission assignments; otherwise their potential is proportionately limited.

• Could SOF have done more? The answer is yes! But the CINC is the one who is responsible and accountable. He calls the shots as he sees them. Once he has made up his mind, all other CINCs fall in line to support. That's the way it is according to Goldwater-Nichols. And the way it should remain.

XIII BULLDOG AND HIS PACK: AN INCIDENT IM THE WAR

There's a story from the war that merits chapter in itself, so Carl Stiner and I have pulled it out and presented it here.

With something like nine thousand Special Forces personnel in the Gulf, there is no 'typical' SF story. However, the best-known deep recon account to come out of the war involved a team led by CW2 Richard 'Bulldog' Balwanz. Their experiences illustrate not only the difficulties of SR missions in general, but the challenges (many of them unnecessary) that Special Operators faced during the war.

The warrant officer arrived in the Gulf with the first SF units at the end of the summer. Posted to the border area for surveillance, he also served as one of the 'trip wires' in case Saddam attacked Saudi Arabia. He'll now take up the story:

Desert Storm was a defining moment for SOF, in that it validated the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act in setting up USSOCOM. This was really the second time that SOF was deployed in its entirety, covering the full spectrum of their missions.

In the early part of the war, I was up on the border doing surveillance just outside of Khafji. Anyplace that I ran into coalition forces, I always found SF guys with them. We had SF teams down to brigade levels, sometimes to battalion levels, with every coalition force in theater — including the Syrians and the Moroccans. We would traditionally consider those fellows unfriendly toward U.S. interests; but there we were, working side by side with them.

About half a dozen teams covered the entire border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. I was with an SF team working with a Saudi Arabian counterpart — their equivalent of a Special Forces team — but they were border guards as well. We'd patrol the border at night; and the Iraqis were obviously doing the same thing just across on the Kuwaiti side. We'd have visual contact with them; and we could see the buildup and the fortifications over there. Every so often, we'd actually get deserters coming over, waving their white flag, particularly after the bombing campaign kicked off.

If you can picture the border, a big berm ran along the Saudi side and one also on the Kuwaiti side. It was