Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces

In Carl Stiner's words: 'As a result of his understanding of the complex nature of the challenges that our nation would face, as well as the capability of Special Forces for meeting these challenges, in large measure General Meyer is due the credit for bringing the SF back from their lowest point ever, as well as for the many critical missions they have performed since.'

It was a good start, but much more was needed. At this point, Congress picked up the ball.

In 1986, spurred by the same real-world concerns that had inspired General Meyer, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act. A sweeping work of military reformation, it strengthened the unified combatant commanders (such as the CINCs of CENTCOM or EUCOM) and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the President's chief military adviser, and in general integrated the forces of the different services more effectively.

That same year, Senators Sam Nunn and William Cohen proposed an amendment to the act to provide the same kind of sweeping changes to U.S. Special Operations. It passed, too — and the effects were stunning.

First, it established the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), which was to be commanded by a four-star general and would include all active and reserve special operations forces stationed in the United States (outside the United States, such forces would normally be under the command of the CINC of a particular arca).

Second, it established an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflicts — ASD (SOLIC) — whose job was to supervise those areas, including oversight of policy and resources.

Third, it defined the mission requirements of special operations. These now included: direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, civil affairs, psychological operations, humanitarian assistance, and other activities specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

Fourth, it gave the new USSOCOM its own funding and control over its own resources. A new major funding category was created — Major Force Program 11 1 (MFP-11) — which required the Defense Department to keep special-operations forces funding separate from general service funding. USSOCOM funding could be revised only by the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the CINC of USSOCOM.

Fifth, the amendment (and later follow-up legislation) specified in unusual detail the responsibilities of the new CINC and the Assistant Secretary of Defense, the control of resources in money and manpower, and the monitoring of SOF officer and enlisted promotions.

At long last, Special Operations had arrived.

The devil, of course, was in the details. Congress could mandate, but it was the military that would have to implement.

To begin with, a brand-new command had to be set up — created and staffed pretty much from scratch — and opinions varied on how to do it. For instance, General James Lindsay, the new commander (in late 1986) of the U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM), had one idea. REDCOM's job was to prepare conventional forces to support the unified regional commands, a job that included deployment and contingency planning, joint training of assigned forces, and defense of the continental United States. Lindsay saw the mission of the new special operations command as similar to REDCOM's, in its own way, and reasoned, 'Why not combine the commands? And make the special forces component subordinate to REDCOM?' He further refined the idea by proposing that they both be combined into a new command, called USSTRICOM (U.S. Strike Command).[20]

Neither his original idea nor its revision worked, because they failed to take into account the mandate of the Nunn-Cohen legislation to create a broadly service-like organization commanded by a full, four-star general — (not a three-star subordinate to a REDCOM/STRICOM commander) — but they got people thinking… and the result must have been a surprise to him.

In January 1987, Senator Cohen sent a directive to the JCS Chairman, Admiral Crowe, specifying that the new command had to be pure Special Forces and would have a 'blank check. Subsequently, on January 23, the Joint Chiefs announced that it was REDCOM itself that would no longer be needed, and that SOCOM would be built on REDCOM's foundation, using its facilities, resources, infrastructure, and any staff that could handle the assignment. It was formalized by the Secretary of Defense in March of the same year, and on April 16, SOCOM was activated in Tampa, at the former REDCOM headquarters — with General Lindsay as its first commander.

Now that the infrastructure was settled, the commands had to decide exactly who was going to be in it — who were the 'special forces'? Predictably, there was no little debate about this, too. The Army part was easy. It passed to the new command all of its Special Operations Forces — the SF groups, the special operations aviation units, and the 75th Ranger Regiment (PSYOPS and civil affairs came later, during Carl Stiner's tenure as CINC). For the rest, it was more complicated. The Air Force special operations forces, for instance, then under the Military Airlift Command (MAC), were transferred to USSOCOM, but the Air Force hoped to retain some control. The Marines had units that were labeled special operations — capable, but they had no actual special operations units. Though the Navy had never previously shown much love for its SEALs, it suddenly discovered that the SEALs were an indispensable part of the Navy family and tried to hold on to them — and their part of the special operations budget. The Navy managed to keep that debate going for the better part of a year, but it was a lost cause, and the SEALs went to USSOCOM. Finally, there was debate about whether the Joint Special Operations Task Force should become part of USSOCOM, or report directly to the national command authorities without the hindrance of an interim layer. In the end, it was placed under USSOCOM as a sub — unified command.

PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER

Meanwhile, while all this was going on, the 'Functional Area Assessment' that General Meyer had inspired was beginning to produce results.

The Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) had been tasked to conduct an in-depth analysis of how SF should be organized, manned, equipped, and trained. It was to answer the questions: 'Where are we now? What is broken? How do we fix it? Where do we need to go in the future?'

General Maxwell Thurman, the vice chief of staff of the army, was the overseer of the analysis; the TRADOC commander, General Bill Richardson, supervised it personally; and other outside generals — Mike Spigelmire, Tom Fields, Fred Franks, and Ed Burba — headed the panels. The study was conducted by the Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg.

Thurman's leadership gave the analysis particular force. Everyone involved reported to him, and everything they reported was put on the front burner. He listened to everybody, heard every problem and every solution, and put a time clock on it. This was not some committee report to be filed away somewhere and forgotten. At the end of the process, there would be an implementation plan — approved by Generals Thurman, Richardson, and Lindsay, and then done: no complaining, no foot-dragging.

When it was all over, the analysis proposed the following:

First, Army Special Forces could no longer exist in the wilderness; there would be a separate SF branch (like Infantry, Armor, or Aviation) and an NCO career-management field. That meant that SF troops and officers could have a career path within Special Forces itself; previously, they'd had to rotate among other parts of the military if they expected to get ahead. This goal was accomplished in April 1987; the commandant at the Special War Center and School became the chief of branch, just as the commandant at Fort Benning was the chief of branch for the infantry. 'At this point,' Jim Guest remarks, 'we went from being looked at as something kept in the dark and under the covers to sitting up at the head table with the rest of the big shots.'

Second, the Green Berets needed to become a major, three-star (lieutenant general) command. This allowed Special Forces to become masters of their own destiny, and to oversee and execute their own training and readiness programs. When a three-star commander sat down at a table with other three- and four-star commanders, he carried weight that one- and two-star commanders didn't. Army Special Forces became a major command in 1989.