learned from Tannous. The Marines were always eager to get intelligence and operational information about Beirut, but often complained about their vulnerable location, a situation made worse by the scarcity of accurate information about the areas around them.
After meeting the Marines, I would normally be picked up by Marine helo and flown out to Rear Admiral Jerry Tuttle's flagship, where I would brief Tuttle and his key officers. These meetings kept everybody up to speed operationally, but the truth of the matter was there was very little intelligence information available about the nature of threats to American forces.
As I went about assessing the senior leadership of the Lebanese armed forces, particularly the senior field- grade officers (lieutenant colonel and colonel), I came to realize that they were the most educated group of officers 1 had yet encountered. Each had recently attended practically every military course available in England and the United States, and most held master's degrees from American universities. All of this education came with a price, however: Most of them were content to be staff officers; they lacked the motivation to be troop leaders, and particularly the skills to be warfighters.
Of the senior officers, the one I came to respect most was the director of operations, Brigadier General Abbas Hamdan, a very intelligent and articulate Shiite, and a man of principle. He had been educated in France, where he had married a French woman, and had two fine children. He was loyal without question to the democratic government of Lebanon, and motivated to do everything possible to help his nation.
I was also extremely impressed with the younger officers, particularly the lieutenants and captains. Most were graduates of Sandhurst in England, and had received their commission there. They were energetic and dedicatcd, constantly present with their troops, and motivated toward making their units the best ones possible, regardless of their ethnic mix. The cohesion and esprit that seemed to exist there was a joy to behold.
Meanwhile, the Chairman's office and my daily meetings with Ambassador Bartholomew kept me informed about ongoing political initiativcs aimed at the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces.
In early August, General Tannous began to confide his concerns that a concurrent Syrian-Israeli withdrawal would be very difficult to arrange. Assad had no reason to withdraw from the Bekaa Valley, even if the Israelis withdrew from the parts of Lebanon they occupied. On the other hand, the Israelis had every reason to leave. They had suffered heavy losses during the invasion, and pressure for a withdrawal was mounting in Israel. The problem was that it would be some time before the Lebanese army was in good enough shape to replace them. If the Israelis proved unwilling to remain in place until the Lebanese army forces were ready to conduct an orderly relief, the situation in Lebanon could become perilous.
That gave Tannous only one viable option: With President Gemayel's permission, he wanted to negotiate directly with Israel to obtain an agreement for Israeli forces to remain in place until his own forces were ready to take over from them. To that end, he asked if I would be willing to take Brigadier General Abbas Hamdan and Colonel Simon Quassis, Tannous's director of intelligence, to Israel for talks with Uri Labron, the Israeli Minister for Lebanese Affairs.
General Vessey and Ambassador Bartholomew agreed to this plan, and Bartholomew offered to provide an officer from the Embassy to accompany us.
The meetings were to be kept close-hold and conducted at night.
In fact, though I agreed with Tannous's analysis of the situation, I was never optimistic about his plan's chances for success. A relief in place was unquestionably imperative for the security and stability of Lebanon, but there was no doubt that the Israelis would do whatever they perceived was in their best interests, and the Lebanese army had better be prepared to react to the results — ready or not.
I arranged for a Marine helicopter to fly us out to Tel Aviv on the next night; it would then wait until the meetings were over and return us to Beirut before daylight. The meetings were held in Uri Labron's office, usually from nine in the evening until midnight, and were always cordial, frank, and direct.
At the first mecting, Abbas Hamdan detailed his government's concerns about the timing of the Israeli withdrawal, but indicated that three brigades were almost ready to relieve Israeli forces in place. Tannous's hoped- for plan: He would first relieve the Israeli forces in the Chouf Mountains overlooking Beirut, while keeping a brigade employed in the vicinity of Beirut. When all Israeli forces had withdrawn, he would station a brigade in southern Lebanon to provide a security zone for Israel's northern border.
Labron's reply was vague. In essence: (1) The Israeli forces had pretty well achieved their objectives in Lebanon by driving the PLO out. (2) He had no indication from his government of a timetable for withdrawal of Israeli forces. (3) We should continue the meetings next week. (4) The group should meet the commanders of the Israeli units in Lebanon in order to get to know them better and work out a plan for relief of forces in place.
The next afternoon, Hamdan, Quassis, and I met with the Israeli Defense Force director of operations and the chief of intelligence for the Israeli forces in Lebanon to discuss plans for the relief. Like Labron, they were not aware of a timetable for withdrawal, but would be willing to work with Lebanese army officials.
The message from General Tannous indicated a slight change of position: Though he desired more time to ready his units, he was now willing to risk an earlier employment in order to prevent a dangerous void that would likely occur after an Israeli pullout.
During the next meeting in Tel Aviv, Labroni seemed pleased that we were working with the Israeli officers to develop a plan for relief, but he was still not aware of a timetable. He did have something new to present, however: The Israeli government had decided to provide its own security force to man the buffer zone on the Lebanese side or the border. A mainly Jewish and Christian militia was already in the process of being formed, and it was headed by a former lieutenant colonel of the Israeli Defense Forces.
This was not exactly the news the Lebanese wanted to hear, but I could understand Israel's position relative to its own security. The Lebanese army was untested at this particular point. I communicated all this to my superiors.
Back in Beirut, Tannous was disappointed that Israel would not trust the Lebanese army to guard its northern border, but the news was not all bad. The Israeli decision would now free up another brigade for Beirut.
Around August 20, meetings with Israeli officers produced a detailed plan to position Lebanese army units to support the Israeli withdrawal. These meetings took place in the field along the route that most of the Israeli forces would be using in their withdrawal from the Chouf Mountains, and they concluded with an understanding that the plan was acceptable. Again, no definite timetable had been established for the withdrawal, but Lebanese army officials were to be notified when a date was set.
On September 2, 1983, General Tannous hosted a dinner for General Levy, the Israeli chief of staff, and General Ehud Barak, Israel's chief of military intelligence, to request more time to ready his forces and get his troops into position before a pullout by the Israelis.
It was at this meeting that Tannous learned that the Israeli government had reached a final decision on a pullout timetable: The withdrawal was to begin immediately, starting the night of September 3. According to Levy, the decision was a political one, and there would be no delay. Tannous himself was shocked and deeply humiliated. He felt he had been let down by the Israelis.
The following morning, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens met with Richard Fairbanks, a senior member of the U.S. national security staff. Fairbanks requested a delay, but Arens indicated that the decision had already been made, and the withdrawal would begin as scheduled.
Around midnight, the rumble of tanks and heavy vehicles could be heard from Beirut and the Chouf Mountains. The Israelis were pulling back to Israel.
They had left the dangerous void that Tannous feared.
Chaos soon followed.
Because Lebanon had become a high-threat situation, Tannous became concerned about my personal security. I reluctantly mentioned this to General Vessey in one of my daily situation reports and was given an intelligence major to help me with my duties. He was a godsend; I already had about as much as I could handle — and besides, two have a better chance of surviving than one. Every two or three days, we moved, always at night, to a different sleeping location. And during the periods of heaviest fighting and shelling, we stayed with Tannous in the underground operations center at the Ministry of Defense — not just for safety. I could best fulfill my responsibility there. Twice, my major and I were caught in ambushes, and both times his driving skills and ability to do bootlegger spins saved us.
