CYPRUS

The arrival of darkness also meant that JSOTF aircraft had started landing on Cyprus. We instantly raced into action.

Based on an intelligence guess that the Achille Lauro might not be headed for Egypt but for Larnaca, in Cyprus, which was not far away, we clandestinely rushed forces into position for a takedown, just in case the ship did show up.

Things did not in fact work out that way.

At about daylight, Wednesday, October 9, an Israeli patrol boat spotted the Achille Lauro off the Israeli-Lebanese border heading south — for Egypt.

Even so, the ship was still in international waters and a good distance from Egypt. Earlier we had requested two Navy ships from the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) for platforms from which to launch our helicopters. Meanwhile, three U.S. Navy ships had arrived in the vicinity of the Achille Lauro and were shadowing it from over the horizon. Plans had already been made for positioning the SEAL assault forces onboard the two U.S. Navy platforms. The plan was to conduct a ship takedown just after darkness at 2100 hours, Wednesday night.

Back at Cyprus shortly after daylight, I was finalizing last-minute details for the assault with my commanders when a helicopter landed just outside our hangar. Colonel 'Lou' quickly responded, 'It's not one of ours; they were all back before daylight.' Lou's helicopters had been conducting test flights after reassembly following offloading.

I said, 'Sergeant Major, find out who that is. No one else around here has a helo that makes that sound.'

The sergeant major rushed outside and quickly returned. 'Sir,' he said, 'we have a couple of guests.' Standing there with the sergeant major were two Italian officers, a lieutenant colonel and a major, in flight suits and wearing survival equipment and weapons.

'What are you two up to?' I asked them.

'We are here to recover our ship,' the lieutenant colonel said.

'You gotta be shitting me,' I said. 'Where is the rest of your force?'

'Well, we've had a few maintenance problems on the way,' he answered, 'and some of my force is broken down on islands between here and our home base, and they will be coming in a little later.'

Knowing that whatever he might eventually be able to gather up would be totally inadequate and untrained for ship takedown operations, I said, 'We can't wait, we are up against a time crunch.'

'I do have a diagram of the ship,' he offered, 'if that will help any.'

Would it! Boy! this was welcome news. Up to that moment, we had had no clear idea of the layout of the Achille Lauro.

For this operation, we had drawn sketches for planning, using other ships as models, but we'd had to guess where the towers, antennas, masses, and the bridge were located on the Achille Lauro. Although we had the best pilots in the world, it is still risky business flying helicopters at night in an assault into the structures of a ship, placing shooters exactly where they ought to be — all under night-vision goggles — and especially on a ship that is likely to be blacked out.

'I'll make you an offer,' I said. 'You give us that diagram, and we'll take you along on this operation, but keep you out of harm's way. We'll recover your ship, and turn it over to you. No one will ever know that you didn't do it… unless you tell them. You can have all the credit.'

He was ecstatic, thinking that he had made the best deal of his life, and he promptly handed me the diagram. What he didn't know was that should Captain de Rosa and his ship drivers be killed during the assault, he could have ended up driving the ship…. You can't just let one float by itself. Of course, we would not have let this actually happen before loaning him a trained ship driver. Yes, our SEALs had people trained for driving ships.

The diagram was a godsend. It was about four feet by eight feet and showed in detail where all the structures were that could cause us problems in darkness. Within an hour, with its help, all our assault forces were able to tweak their plans and brief their troops.

CAIRO

In Cairo, Egypt's Foreign Minister Abdel Meguid was asking the ambassadors of the various countries involved for advice: Would it be best to negotiate or refuse to negotiate? Meanwhile, Yasir Arafat sent Abu Abbas to Cairo to deal with the hijackers.

Yasir Arafat already had a working relationship with the Italian prime minister, as he did with the Egyptian government. In those days, the PLO leader had developed several 'under the table agreements — especially with governments that lay within what might be called the PLO area of influence. These governments were afraid that the PLO could bring down their governments if they did not cooperate. These agreements permitted the PLO to operate within those countries.

By Wednesday morning, Arafat claimed to have everything under control. 'We have succeeded in bringing the ship back into the waters off Egypt,' he announced. '1 can reveal to you that we have a high degree of confidence regarding a positive conclusion to the affair.'

Meanwhile, neither the Egyptians nor the Italians were eager to pursue the terrorists once they had arrived in Egypt. For various diplomatic and internal political reasons, they hoped the terrorists on Achille Lauro would simply disappear and the whole affair would go away unnoticed.

As far as the United States was concerned, this was not an option. To the United States, like Israel, a terrorist attack was no different from any other military attack. It could not be met by appeasement. The only option was military action.

Neither position was, strictly speaking, unreasonable, given the needs and premises from which each side started. But compromise and appeasement are not a wise long-term approach to terrorism.

By late Wednesday afternoon, actions were well under way for positioning the assault force of Navy SEALs aboard a Navy ship just out of sight of the Achille Lauro. Four hijackers were not enough to guard hostages, control the crew and the bridge, and maintain a watch over the entire ship. There was every likelihood the SEALs would reach the ship without detection by the terrorists. Come night, they would launch their strike. Once they were aboard, they had no doubt of the outcome.

As the rescue force prepared to strike, events were taking place in Cairo that would make the attack unnecessary.

That evening the Egyptian government announced: 'At four-twenty P.M., the hijackers, whose number is four, agreed to surrender without preconditions. They surrendered at five P.M.' The statement was soon amplified by the Egyptian Foreign Minister: 'The four hijackers have left the ship and are heading out of Egypt.' These statements had a subtext: that no harm had been done to any of the passengers. Up until this point, the murder of Leon Klinghoffer had been concealed, based on statements Captain de Rosa had been forced to make over the radio as the liner neared Egypt. 'I am the captain,' he had said. 'I am speaking from my office; and everybody [aboard] is in good health.'

As it happened, each of those statements was false. First, the Egyptian government had agreed to preconditions. They had promised the terrorists safe passage out of Egypt. Second, the hijackers were not yet heading out of Egypt, and would not do so until the next day. Finally, the terrorists had blood very much on their hands.

Even before these facts emerged, the Reagan administration was furious. As far as they were concerned, it was a lousy deal. It's not acceptable for terrorists to take Americans hostage and get away with it. In the words of White House spokesman Larry Speakes: 'We believe those responsible should be prosecuted to the maximum extent possible.'

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