down the hill. The landing zone would be clearly within the range of the mortars, and the fight would be uphill all the way.
The 1st Battalion, 504th Airborne Infantry, lifted off from Torrijos-Tocumen at 8:00 A.M., preceded by two Apaches and an OH-58 helicopter to overwatch the landing zone. During their initial survey of the area, the fire support element took no ground fire, but as they broke off to lead the approaching lift ships to the LZ, they crossed over San Miguelito and received heavy and effective ground fire. Rather than risk collateral damage to civilians, they did not return the fire, but reported it to the air assault task force commander, then flew to Howard Air Force Base to check the damage.
An escort Apache immediately flew to San Miguelito, located the enemy position, and received permission to engage the target, which was neutralized by salvos of 30mm fire from a distance of 2,800 meters, leaving ten dead PDF soldiers.
The landing zone at Tinajitas turned out to be the hottest encountered by 82nd units. The delay brought on by the ice storm had given the PDF time to set up defenses and inflict casualties. (One Blackhawk took twenty-eight hits but still remained airborne, thanks to its redundant systems.)
As they approached the LZ, the first lift came under automatic-weapons and 81 mm mortar fire from PDF soldiers positioned in buildings to their west and southwest. After landing, as they were deploying in their attack formation, the paratroopers came again under heavy fire, this time from the hilltop and the surrounding barrio. These troops, supported by fire from the two Apaches, attacked the PDF position; heavy fire continued as the second and third lifts came in.
The battalion then fought up the hill, but when they reached the top, the garrison turned out to be abandoned. The PDF had left a stay-behind element to counter the attack, while the rest of the company had withdrawn into the barrio to fight alongside the Dignity Battalion. The stay-behinds slipped away before the paratroopers reached the top.
The battalion later moved into the barrio and neutralized organized resistance.
The battalion commander declared the position secure at 2:30 P.M.
FORT CIMARRON
As of noon on D Day, only one major target remained to be taken — Battalion 2000. But with three companies, eight V-300 armored cars, fourteen mortars, and four 107mm rocket launchers (somewhat attrited during the attempt to cross the Pacora River bridge the night before), it was one of the most demanding targets of the twenty-seven.
At 12:05 P.M., Lieutenant Colonel John Vines, Commander of 4th Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry, departed for Fort Cimarron in eleven Blackhawks, escorted by Cobra gunships. The assault required two lifts.
After landing, paratroops fanned out into the villages outside the encampment, where they encountered heavy PDF resistance (another consequence of the ice storm delay); five PDF soldiers were killed in the resulting firefights.
When they reached Fort Cimarron, the battalion PSYOPs team broadcast a surrender message; in reply, the PDF inside the cuartel fired on the paratroopers. The battalion commander directed an AC-130 gunship attack on the barracks complex. The gunship fired at the barracks area almost continuously for four hours.
At daylight, when the paratroopers conducted a sweep through the garrison compound, they found it empty. They prepared for a counterattack, but it never came. The survivors of Battalion 2000 had abandoned the garrison, put on their Levi's, and made their way into the city.
Battalion 2000 casualties were heavy.
STABILITY OPERATIONS
U.S. forces broke the PDF — and Noriega's ability to control his forces — during the first hour of combat. By the end of D Day, most of the fighting was over — though Panama was by no means safe. Many of the PDF had changed into Levi's and slipped into the city, where they banded together to continue making trouble.
There was no law and order.
Have-nots, armed bands of hoodlums, Dignity Battalions, and PDF displaced by the fighting — and sometimes a mix of all the above — started looting and causing mayhem.
This had been anticipated by American planners; the Task Force Atlantic and Task Force Pacific division commanders had orders to move into the city and begin stability operations to secure key facilities and mop up resistance.
By dawn of the twentieth, there were already 3,000 refugees in the Balboa High School athletic field, including many PDF who had infiltrated in civilian clothes. There were also 1,500 detainees in a camp being established on a rifle range halfway up the Canal — a number that grew to 4,600 within a week, as more detainees were brought in from the combat units.
Meanwhile, hospitals had to be reopened and sanitation services restarted.
A CBS News poll later determined that 93 percent of the Panamanian people supported U.S. operations — yet the same people had instant expectations that their new government could not soon fulfill, since the removal of Noriega's appointees had decapitated most of the vital institutions.
Though additional units from the 7th Special Forces Group and civil affairs were being brought in to handle these needs, the demand was now, and it could only be satisfied in the near term by the military personnel already on the ground.
The immediate tasks were:
• Mopping up and bringing security to the major cities, particularly Panama City and Colon.
• Neutralizing the PDF and Dignity Battalions in the remainder of Panama.
• Reestablishing law and order.
• Taking care of refugees and displaced persons.
Meanwhile, all major military objectives had been achieved: The PDF had been neutralized, the PDF command and control no longer functioned, Noriega was no longer in control, and the new government had been installed.
On the downside, Noriega had not been captured, and U.S. forces had no idea where to find him.
MA BELL
Throughout D Day, heavy-lift transports had been landing at Howard Air Force Base and Torrijos-Tocumen, bringing in Major General Carmen Cavezza and two additional brigades from the 7th Infantry Division, as well as the 16th MP Brigade from Fort Bragg, to bring stability to Panama City and Colon, while extending operations to the west to neutralize the remaining PDF main force units. The 75th Ranger Regiment could now be 'freed up' to join in liberating the west and clearing the area north of Panama City.
On December 20, the new government asked General Thurman to send a force to liberate political prisoners at Penomone Prison, sixty-five miles southwest of Panama City.
Wayne Downing got the call. That morning, he had flown to Rio Hato to visit Buck Kernan and his Rangers. Later that day, Stiner called him: 'I want you and Kernan's rangers to conduct a battalion-size air assault tonight to liberate the political prisoners.'
Meanwhile, A Company 1st Battalion, 7th SFG, which was already stationed in Panama, was to operate toward the west with the Rangers and the 2nd Brigade of the 7th Division. Later that afternoon, Major Gilberto Perez, the commander, flew his company to Rio Hato, where it would stage for these operations.
