carefully typed in the code 74NW on the computer. The machine hummed for several seconds, then asked for Hood's authorization code. He punched in PASHA, which stood for Paul, Alexander, Sharon, Harleigh, and Ann — his mother's name — and then he waited again.
The screen went from blue to red. He clicked the mouse on the white letters OP in the upper left corner.
'Warner,' Hood said as the file opened, 'I think you'd better have a look at this as well.'
Bicking leaned over as Hood began scrolling through the file:
Op-Center Projection 74NW/Red
1. Subject: First-Stage Syrian Response to Turkish Mobilization.
2. Provocation Scenario: Syrian and Turkish Kurds jointly strike inside Turkey.
3. Response Scenario: Turkey moves five-six hundred thousand troops to Syrian border to prevent further incursions. (Access 75NW/Red for larger Turkish response.)
4. Result: Syria mobilizes.
5. Likely Composition of Syrian Force: Available manpower is 300,000, distributed between Syrian Army, Syrian Navy, Syrian Air Force, and Syrian Air Defense Forces. Police and Security Forces consisting of 2,000 troops would be assigned to defend Damascus and the President. Additional conscripts would be culled from workforce within the first three days of mobilization. Total additional force of 100,000 wen between the ages of 15–49 would be fielded within two weeks. Inadequately trained, the conscripts would probably suffer casualties of 40–45 % within the next two weeks. Syria would be betting on the fact that wars in the region tend to be brief.
6. Turkish Diplomatic Efforts: Intensive. Would not want war.
7. Syrian Diplomatic Efforts: Moderate. Given highly secular Turkish government, Syria's ninety% Muslim population (11.3 million of 13 million) would accept a conflagration as a jihad or holy war.
8. Time Frame for Initial Conflict: Given an emotionally charged environment created by terrorist activities, there is an 88 % chance that hostilities would occur within the first forty-eight hours. As reactions cool, there is a 7 % chance that hostilities would occur in the next twenty-four hours and a 5 % chance that hostilities would occur thereafter.
9. First Wave Initial Conflict: Turkey will not want to be the aggressor for fear of triggering Greek response. However, current policy permits the pursuit of terrorists by strike force if 'the nature of the crime is of such a nature to warrant pursuit. (Access Turkish Military White Papers 1995– 1997, file 566-05/Green.) To discourage internal discord resulting from inactivity or perceived weakness, a measured Turkish response is deemed extremely likely. Syrian response to a Turkish incursion will be swift and absolute. A multi-force retaliation is likely within and without Syrian borders. (Access Syrian Military White Papers 1995–1997, file 566-87/Green.)
10. Second Wave Initial Conflict: Turkey will attack any Syrian troops within its borders but almost certainly will not move into Syria. That would surely arouse Muslims living within Turkey. At that point, both sides will have shown sufficient muscle to withdraw and stand only to lose from further hostilities. Diplomatic efforts will intensify and are considered likely to prevail. The small uncertainty factor will be influenced largely by concomitant response from neighboring nations (see 11., below).
11. Projected Response from Surrounding Countries: It is expected that all nations in the region will assume some form of defensive military posture. Several are likely to take offensive steps.
A. Armenia: The government will support Turkey unless Turkey supports Azerbaijan. In either case, a military response is unlikely against any target but Azerbaijan. Government security forces will watch the Kurdish minority very closely but will not be likely to take military measures against them. (Access Armenian White Paper, file 364-2120/S/White, for U.S. response to Armenian situations.)
B. Bulgaria: Of the 210,000 active soldiers, only the Frontier Troops are likely to be mobilized. The population is 8.5 % Turkish. There is no reason why Turkish forces should cross the border. Unless they do so, the Bulgarian troops will avoid confrontations.
C. Georgia: The government will back Turkey but make no military gestures.
D. Greece: Mediterranean patrols by the Hellenic Navy will be increased. Confrontations may erupt if Turkish patrols are encountered. If a second wave of hostilities erupts between Turkey And Syria, Greece will most likely remain neutral while moving against Aegean territory claimed by both Ankara and Athens. (Access Imia Islet file, 645/E/Red.)
E. Iran: Iran will almost certainly remain militarily inactive. Fifth column activity will certainly increase.
F. Iraq: During any first-wave hostilities, Baghdad will increase attacks on Iraqi Kurds to prevent them from joining with Turkish and Syrian Kurds. During a second wave, Baghdad may seek to press old claims against Kuwait. (Access Wadi al Batin file 335/NW/Red.)
G. Israel: Israel's partnership with Turkey covers only mutual military maneuvers. It is not a mutual defense pact, though Israeli intelligence resources will be placed at Turkey's disposal. If a second wave of hostilities erupts, Israel may agree to flying limited sorties.
H. Jordan: Jordan exercises joint air force maneuvers with Israel. While they would remain neutral in an Israeli war with Arabs, they will join a Turkish war against Syria if the United States permits them to.
Hood cleared the screen. 'Any chances the weather will change again?' he asked Martha.
'It looks like the front at 11F-Frank is not happening,' she replied.
Hood scrolled back. He repeated what Martha had said for Bicking's benefit. Iraq hadn't moved against the Kurds, but he knew that wouldn't last. Recent intelligence reports put the Iraqi military at over two million strong. Many of those men were young newcomers, untested in battle and probably scared. Others were veterans, many of them itching to avenge their humiliation during the Persian Gulf War.
'We're also thinking that 11D-David and 11G-George may move in sooner than expected,' Martha said.
Hood was not surprised by either of those. With elections coming up, the Greek President needed to do something blazingly patriotic to win the right wing. Taking long-disputed lands from an embattled Turkey would accomplish that. As for Israel, the hardline government would love the opportunity to strike at an enemy under the auspices of defending an ally.
'What're things like on the home, front?' Hood asked.
'The meteorologists are watching and talking,' Martha said. 'A few picnics have been called off in the area, but only one umbrella has been broken out.'
That meant military leave in the region had been canceled and U.S. troops were on a low-level Defcon One alert.
'I'll keep you up to date,' Martha said, 'but I can tell you there are a lot of long faces at the weather headquarters.'
The weather headquarters was the White House. 'They're worried about storms, I'm sure,' Hood said, 'and they'll probably get a few.'
'They can live with a few,' Martha said. 'It's a big one they're worried about.'
Hood thanked her and hung up. He turned to Bicking. The spindly twenty-nine-year-old was a former associate professor of social sciences at Georgetown University. His area of expertise was Political Islam, and he was one of four political experts recently added to the Op-Center team to advise Paul Hood on foreign affairs.
'What's your take on this?' Hood asked.
Biking twirled a longish lock of black hair around his index finger. It was a habit he had whenever he was thinking. 'There's a very, very good chance that it'll all blow up. And when it does, it could well drag the rest of the world along with it. From Turkey it can move up through Greece and Bulgaria into Romania and Bosnia. With the Iranian presence there, they can drop-kick this thing up into Hungary, Austria, and straight into Germany. There are two million Turks living in Germany. Of those, half a million are Kurds. They'll pop for sure. At the same time it can move from Turkey in the other direction, up through southern Russia.'
