National Guard was now part.
All three men accepted their mission with a feeling of relief. By being in reserve, they and their company commanders would have more time to prepare their men and units for battle. Training in the marshaling area and the tactical assembly area, while limited, was better than none. The prospect of rolling off the ship right into combat had haunted them for the past three weeks. While they did not underestimate the difficulties they would face, at least they would not have to face a battle hardened Soviet army their first day in the country. Every day they had in which to prepare and train increased their odds of success.
Lieutenant General Weir reviewed the information papers and reports before going into the 1700 hours briefing. Shortly after he assumed control of the 13th Corps, he had been appointed overall commander of all ground forces in Iran by the Commander in Chief of CENT COM While this meant more work for Weir and his staff, it simplified the coordination of operations between the 1st Marine Corps in the east and the two Army corps in Kerman Province to the south.
The briefing that evening was an important one. Decisions made during it would shape the next round of operations. The corps G-3 was going to present the revised operations plan for the upcoming campaign. While the U.S. situation had improved tremendously in the past two weeks, they were still far from ready to assume offensive operations. All the reports pointed to the fact that the Soviets, despite the best efforts of the Air Force and Special Forces to interdict the flow of supplies, would be ready to commence their offensive before the 10th Corps was completely assembled. It was simply a matter of time, space and numbers. The Soviets, at the end of a shorter supply line, were able to make good their losses and deficiencies faster than the U.S. forces in Iran could. In addition, the number of heavy ground-combat units available to the 10th Corps was limited, while the Soviets had many. In fact, the Soviets had more heavy divisions in Iran at that moment than the U.S. Army had throughout the world.
With the writing on the wall, the 10th Corps had no choice but to accept the Soviet offensive before commencing their own. This, however, was not all bad. Properly done, the 10th Corps could channel the Soviets into those areas where Weir wanted the Soviets to go, bleeding them all the way and setting them up for a counter blow Once the Soviets' main effort was identified and contained, the 10th Corps could pile on and destroy it. With the Soviets broken and weak points uncovered, the 10th Corps could then launch its own offensive in conjunction with the 13th Corps, now recovering, and the newly formed 1st Marine Corps operating to the east.
Not all was bleak. Weir had a few aces up his sleeve. One of them was the British 33rd Armored Brigade. That brigade was ready for commitment.
Through a great deal of effort and deception, the brigade had been 'smuggled' into Iran. Though the world knew that the British were committed to send troops, a sham movement of forces and troops kept the media occupied while the 33rd Armored Brigade was brought into Iran on U.S. ships, then moved in small groups at night and assembled in the forward areas. Weir was betting that the psychological impact of the sudden and unexpected appearance in Iran of ground forces from a NATO ally would give the Soviets great concern and cause them to question their intelligence analysis. The French Airborne Division, operating with the 6th Marine Division, had, by accident, had that effect. Weir intended to hold the 33rd Armored Brigade back, using it at the right moment to kick off his counter blow the first step to the counteroffensive that would, with luck, smash the Soviet forces then facing them in the central area.
Weir's aide came in and told him the staff was ready. As Weir was leaving his office, he looked at the map on the wall. 'Well, Ted,' he said to the aide, 'what it all boils down to is that we've got to keep the enemy from breaking through and wear him out without him doing the same to the 10th Corps. Pretty neat trick if we can do it. I sure hope the 25th Armored can pull it off.'
The shock of returning from the front to Moscow was overpowering.
Colonel Sulvina had expected things to be different. He wasn't quite sure what should have changed, but surely something had to be different. After all, the Soviet Union was locked in battle with the United States. Yet as the Army sedan moved through the streets of the city, he saw no change.
People still came and went to work. Women queued up to buy everyday necessities.
Grandmothers walked babies and watched as children played in the parks.
Even the radio news, what little Sulvina heard, treated the war as just another news story.
Less than twenty-four hours before, Sulvina had been ordered to appear at the Moscow headquarters of STAVKA, the General Staff of the Red Army, concerning his written report on the operations of the 28th Combined Arms Army. That report, forwarded to Front Headquarters and STAVKA before the army's new commander had arrived, had been disturbing to both. It was to have been sent back to Sulvina to be rewritten. Instead, someone had forwarded a copy to a member of the Politburo. Rumors were that it was a STAVKA officer working for the KGB who had done that in an effort to discredit the Red Army and its conduct of operations in Iran. Now Sulvina, after a grueling session at STAVKA, was on his way to answer to the Politburo.
Colonel Sulvina was not politically naive. He understood the State and the system. He was, after all, part of 345 it. He was, however, a soldier, first and foremost.
Schooled in all aspects of military science, with years of command and general-staff experience, Sulvina believed that it was his duty to keep his commander and higher headquarters informed of the situation as it really existed, not as they wished it to be. He had been taught from his first year as a cadet that commanders can make the proper decisions only if they have good, accurate information. It was in that vein that he had written his report. Not to blame or condemn, or to record excuses. Sulvina wanted to record what had happened so that corrections could be made before the next offensive.
His debriefing at STAVKA that morning had been a rude shock. Only slowly had he realized that some saw his report as a threat to them and their position, while others saw it as 'the whimperings of a man unfit for a position of great responsibility.' When he was told personally by a Marshal of the Soviet Union to answer only yes or no to all questions of the Politburo, Sulvina knew he was on trial for telling the 'wrong' truth.
For two hours Sulvina sat in a chair in the center of a room. Before him sat the eleven Politburo members who ran the Soviet Union. They alone determined national policy. They alone decided how the Soviet Union would achieve its national goals, goals which they established.
Each member had before him a copy of the report. Each member, with the exception of the Foreign Minister, asked Sulvina questions, most of which skirted the real issues at hand. Diligently, Sulvina answered their questions with either yes or a no. The questioning was punctuated by discussions, sometimes heated, between the members as some of the senior members became annoyed at the cat-and-mouse game.
Finally, the Foreign Minister dropped the report, folded his hands before him and said, 'We have all read the report, Comrade Colonel. We have all asked you many questions. I want you now, Comrade Colonel, to tell me in your own words what happened.'
The General Secretary, visibly upset, leaned forward and glared at the Foreign Minister, but could not get his attention. Failing that, the General Secretary turned to face Sulvina.
Sweat ran down Sulvina's face. His eyes turned to the Minister of Defense.
The Minister of Defense returned the stare. Looking back to the Foreign Minister, Sulvina replied, 'Comrade, the report before you is my own words. It is what I believe to be the truth.' Sulvina did not look again at the Minister of Defense.
The Foreign Minister said after a moment, 'Yes, of course. Now, Comrade Colonel, what must we, the Politburo, do to prevent another disaster such as this from happening?'
Sulvirta was taken aback by the term 'disaster.' Without realizing it, he went into the attack. 'Comrade, there was no disaster. The actions of the commander of the 28th Combined Arms Army prevented a disaster. We merely withdrew so that we could regroup, resupply and reestablish conditions that favored the resumption of the offensive and the seizure of the Strait of Hormuz. A setback, yes. A disaster, no.'
For a long time, there was silence in the room. Then the Foreign Minister asked the question again, in a harsher tone this time. 'What must we do to prevent another disaster, Comrade Colonel?'
Sulvina considered the question before continuing. For a moment he wavered in his convictions. Then he decided that if there was nothing he could do to save himself, perhaps he could do something to help those who would soon have to face the same situation he had faced.
'First, Comrade, we must employ chemical weapons. The Americans have little in the way of retaliatory
