simple 'Send it' was all he needed to say to initiate the fire mission.
At the fire direction center of the 1st of the 66th Field Artillery battalion, the TACFIRE printed up the mission, giving the target location, a description of the target, recommendation as to the type of ammunition to be used and number of rounds to be fired, and which of the battalion's three batteries was to fire the mission. The officer on duty reviewed the information and recommendations. Deciding to accept the TACFIRE's recommendations, he hit a button that sent the necessary data to the battery it had selected to fire the mission.
Seven kilometers away from the battalion fire direction center, Battery B, 1st of the 66th Field Artillery, received the fire mission. The same data that had been displayed at battalion was displayed at Battery B. The executive officer of Battery B saw no need to change the orders to engage an enemy command post as a point target with two volleys of dual purpose improved conventional ammunition. Like the officers on duty at the other command posts, he accepted the mission and computer recommendations by simply hitting a button. Electronically, the battery's computer sent out the elevation and azimuth needed by each gun, information that it had already calculated and had ready.
Even at the guns, computers were standing by ready to work.
Upon receiving the elevation and azimuth from the battery's TACFIRE computer, the guns' own computers processed that information and translated it into action. Each gun commander ordered up the appropriate round of ammunition to be fired by reading it off of the computer's display. As the ammo bearers prepared and then passed the rounds to an assistant gunner who loaded the round, the gunner checked about the gun to ensure there was nothing in the turret of the M-109A5 howitzer that would get in the way when he fired. When the round and propellant were loaded and everyone was clear of the gun, the gunner hit the button that fed the elevation and azimuth into the howitzer's gun-turret drive. With quick, smooth movements, each of the eight guns of Battery B was laid on target. When all guns reported in that they were ready, the battery executive officer gave the order to commence firing.
The impact of those rounds across the river from Company C's position caught Kozak's attention, but she didn't bother herself with wondering who had fired them and what they had hit. As far as she was concerned, at that moment that artillery barrage wasn't important to her fight. Kozak had no idea how much the field artillery in her support had already begun shifting the odds of success back into her favor. In a span of minutes, before the first Ukrainian BMP had left its concealed position to commence the assault, the Ukrainians had lost their ability to bring indirect fire against her company. Equally important, the commander and much of his battle staff were also out of action. Although the initial American artillery fire missions had not touched any of the Ukrainian assault elements, when those elements came they would be without artillery support and would have no command and control element capable of directing the battle.
What was important to Kozak at that moment was the report that there were enemy tanks on her left flank taking her 1st Platoon under fire. There was also activity reported by her 2nd Platoon on the right. Kozak knew that there were enemy vehicles on both her flanks. Reports before the enemy attack of noise and numerous thermal hot spots in the woods across the river had alerted her to that. What she didn't know yet was whether the Ukrainians were trying to make a demonstration on one flank in order to keep her from shifting forces before the battle to the flank where the main attack was coming, or if they intended to hit both flanks with an attack.
From her position, Kozak could see the flashes of fire as enemy tanks on her left fired into the wood line where her 1st Platoon was located. Initial reports from Second Lieutenant Sylvester Ahern, platoon leader of that platoon, indicated that the Ukrainian tank fire was inaccurate and ineffective. They were, Kozak thought, firing blind. To her right, where the other enemy concentration had been reported, there was nothing. The platoon leader of her 2nd Platoon, Second Lieutenant Marc Gross, reported that while his dismounted infantry near the river line could hear numerous vehicles cranking up, they had no visual sightings yet and were not under fire. Although she didn't want to commit yet, Kozak was convinced in her heart that the action on the left was the demonstration and that the main attack would fall on her 2nd Platoon. Keying the radio, she ordered Ellerbee to stand by and be prepared to shift his entire platoon to the right in support of 2nd Platoon or as a counterattack.
When Ellerbee acknowledged, Kozak didn't bother to wonder why his radio transmission was so weak even though his tank was only thirty meters away. Instead, Kozak yelled to her crew, 'Okay, gang. Show time. We're going over to 2nd Platoon.'
Wolf, expecting that order, was going to make a comment, but didn't. Somehow, the gravity of the moment and the sudden welling of tension that one feels before entering battle made humor and glib remarks seem inappropriate. So Wolf, like the rest of C60's crew, remained silent as they responded to Kozak's orders and prepared to engage the enemy. Pulling back away from their position under Kozak's direction, Tish maneuvered C60 through the woods and down to where 2nd Platoon's dismounted infantry waited.
CHAPTER 5
When the first wave of Ukrainian BMP infantry fighting vehicles broke from their cover and began to rush down to the riverbank, Lieutenant Marc Gross and his 2nd Platoon were ready. From his position with the dismounted element of his platoon just inside the wood line along the river, the moonlight and shadows made the Ukrainian infantry fighting vehicles look more like crocodiles slipping into the water than fighting machines. He would wait, he decided, until they were in the water before he gave the order to fire.
Word that the attack had commenced caught C60 still halfway between Ellerbee's and Gross's position. Doing the best she could to steady herself in the open hatch of her Bradley as it bucked and bumped down the forest trail to the river's edge, Kozak began to issue orders to her company. After acknowledging Gross's initial report, she ordered her executive officer, First Lieutenant Patrick Goldak, to pass that report on to battalion. When Goldak acknowledged, Kozak called her fire support officer, Second Lieutenant Eugene Fong. She instructed him to request that the final protective fires plotted in front of 2nd Platoon, together with another mission into an area where they suspected the enemy tanks would be supporting the crossing, be fired immediately. When he gave her a 'Roger. Out,' Kozak called Ellerbee. Knowing that the bulk of his platoon could not engage the enemy vehicles from where he was, she ordered him to flex his platoon to the right, into 2nd Platoon's area as planned. Ellerbee, unlike the others, did not immediately respond. Repeating her orders to Ellerbee, Kozak finally got a response from Ellerbee's platoon sergeant, Sergeant First Class Rourk. Although she had no idea why Ellerbee had not responded himself, Kozak let the matter drop. As a final check, Kozak radioed Lieutenant Ahern to make sure that there was not an attack developing to the front of 1st Platoon. Ahern confirmed Kozak's assumption, reporting that enemy tank fire was continuing but that he saw no sign of an assault developing where he was.
Finished with her orders, Kozak looked about her to ensure that Tish was still headed in the right direction, then called back to Gross requesting an update on his engagement. His response was quick and short.
'CHARLIE SIX, THIS IS TWO SIX. WE HAVE TWO ZERO PLUS BMPS IN THE WATER. WE ARE ENGAGING NOW. OVER.' As if on cue, Kozak heard a series of muffled bangs over the roar of C60's engine as Gross's platoon fired their first volley of anti-tank rockets and TOW wire-guided anti-tank missiles.
Though they had anticipated some return fire during their assault, the rocket and missile fire startled most of the commanders of the assaulting BMP infantry fighting vehicles. Here and there, a BMP swerved a little to the right or left or slowed down slightly as the drivers also reacted to being taken under fire. Recovering their own composure, the commanders of the erring vehicles issued sharp reprimands to their drivers before turning to search for the source of the enemy fires.
As his BMP infantry fighting vehicle approached the river, the Ukrainian commander of the assaulting battalion was momentarily taken aback by the volume of enemy fire that had lit up the northern riverbank. He had been told by his brigade commander that they were being opposed by a single armored cavalry platoon equipped with tanks. The telltale signatures of rockets and anti-tank missiles coming from the wood line and high ground beyond told him different. Grabbing his radio hand mike, he called to inform his brigade commander of the true situation and request immediate artillery support. There was, however, no response to his calls. Neither his brigade commander nor his operations officer answered. Giving up, he tried to call the artillery support officer at brigade. That effort too met with failure. In frustration, he turned to his own artillery support officer and ordered him to
