easterners. Having spent their formative years and early adulthood under communism, they had no great love for the Americans. Nor were they troubled by the conflict of duty versus conscience that had been hammered home into the minds of every officer of the old Bundeswehr, a handicap that now hamstrung them at the moment of truth. Even the turnout of reservists reflected this difference, with the 2nd Panzer Division boasting nine ground maneuver battalions, making it the largest German division in the field.
With the 2nd Brigade of the 4th Armored Division entering Kassel, and Scott Dixon's 1st Brigade still south of Fulda bringing up the rear, that left the 3rd Brigade the task of covering the division's eastern flank. Unable to cover every possible approach in strength, Colonel Andrew Bowman, commander of the 3rd Brigade, concentrated two of his three battalions to deal with an attack coming down Autobahn E40 running west from Erfurt to Bad Hersfeld, a city situated midway between Fulda and Kassel. The danger of this obvious avenue of approach made sense, for Autobahn E40 was the same road that Kiebler and his 10th Panzer Division were using as the axis for their advance from the southwest. To Dorsch, that approach was too obvious. Even before his own reconnaissance elements confirmed the information provided by the Luftwaffe and national-level intelligence agencies, Dorsch had already decided to use a more difficult but less obvious axis of advance into the flank of Tenth Corps. While holding the attention of the American 3rd Brigade with a supporting attack down the axis that the Americans expected the 2nd Panzer to use, Dorsch launched his main attack down Highway 84, which ran southwest from Eisenach into Highway 27 at Hunfeld. Six kilometers, or four and a half miles, to the west of Hunfeld lay Autobahn A7. In a single stroke Dorsch intended to push aside the Tenth Corps flank guard, inserting his 2nd Panzer Division between the American rear guard and lead elements while cutting both routes running north that the Tenth Corps so heavily depended upon.
By midmorning the series of sharp engagements that had begun with Sergeant Emerson's fight on Highway 84 just outside of Rasdorf left the tank battalion that Emerson belonged to battered and reeling back away from the relentless advance of the 2nd Panzer Division. Their line of retreat was toward the northwest and the 4th Armored Division's 3rd Brigade's center of mass. While this maneuver made sense to both the commander of the 3rd Brigade and the commander of Emerson's battalion, it opened Highway 84 all the way to Hunfeld.
Looking at his watch, Big Al decided that he could not wait for the briefing to continue as usual. His division commanders were waiting for orders from him. Although they were already reacting to the situation within their division areas of responsibilities, there was the danger that their decisions and actions, made independently, would handicap the corps' ability to deal with the twin threats effectively. When the G-2 finished his briefing, Big Al leaned over to his chief of staff, Brigadier General Buddy Bolin. 'Buddy, I know that this briefing is as much a benefit to the staff as it is to me, but they're just going to have to get it later. We have work to do. Now I want you, the G-2, the G-3, the fire support officer, air liaison officer, and the assistant G-4 to stay behind. We need a plan and we need one right now. Otherwise my two headstrong division commanders are going to go charging off in different directions and tear this corps apart.'
As the other staff officers left the expandable van, the G-2 grabbed a chair, seating himself facing Big Al with his back to the briefing map. Bolin, on Big Al's right, was joined by the corps assistant G-4, who took a seat to Bolin's right. On Big Al's left was Brigadier General Jerry Prentice, the corps G-3, with the corps fire support officer to Prentice's left and Colonel Tim 'Big Foot' MacHaffry, the Air Force liaison officer, to his left.
When everyone else had left and the van was quiet, Big Al looked at the map for a second. He glanced at the somber faces of his battle staff, then back at the map. He already knew what he was going to say about future operations. That was simple. What troubled him was how to say it. He, like his staff officers, was tired, depressed, and deeply concerned to the point of being pessimistic. Placing his hands on his hips, Big Al pretended to study the map while he searched for the right words and prepared himself to deliver them. For he as their senior commander would set the tone. Everyone would watch him, studying how he carried himself and listening for the conviction behind his words. If his presentation was gloom and doom, that attitude would be carried over into the corps order and would be parroted by his own staff as they talked to the staff's of the two divisions. Such a negative attitude would in turn be passed on down by the divisions, who, unable to physically see Big Al himself, would assume that they were engaged in a questionable operation. There was no time for Big Al to personally visit each command as he had done a week ago. During this operation he would depend on his staff to convey both his, the commander's, actual and the psychological messages. Big Al, recalling a scene in the movie
With that thought in mind, Big Al forced a scowl on his face and turned to his battle staff. 'As I see it, the real danger is the 2nd Panzer.' To a man, the assembled staff officers nodded their agreement. This observation was based just as much on Big Al's personal knowledge of the two German division commanders as it was on the current situation. During several joint NATO and American-German command post exercises run while Big Al commanded the Tenth Corps, General Kiebler's 10th Panzer Division had operated as part of the American Tenth Corps. Though these exercises had used computers instead of real soldiers to wargame various scenarios and contingencies to deal with them, Big Al had been able to observe and learn how Kiebler thought and reacted. As a result, Big Al concurred with the G-2's assessment that Kiebler, while being both steady and reliable, was cautious. The movement of the 10th Panzer from Frankfurt am Main through Giessen reinforced this perception. Though Big Al didn't know that Kiebler's normal caution was intensified by his troubled conscience, that didn't matter. What was important at that moment to the assembled men was that they were able to agree that the 10th Panzer Division was of secondary importance. The real danger to the corps for the next forty-eight hours would be the 2nd Panzer Division. Big Al's knowledge of the German commanders gained during both social gatherings and training exercises before this crisis again played a major part in his thinking. During two of the command post exercises that the Tenth Corps had run, Dorsch, the commander of the 2nd Panzer, had played the opposing force. Once, he had been the overall commander, and the other time he had played the role of a Polish armored division commander. In both roles, Big Al had been impressed with the manner with which Dorsch had combined the machinelike tactics of the former Red Army with the Teutonic precision that appeared to come as naturally to him as breathing. During meetings and social events associated with these exercises, Big Al had been equally struck by Dorsch's cold, standoffish manner. Both Big Al and other NATO commanders couldn't help but notice the aloof and cold manner with which he spoke to them. All agreed that this was the result of years of communist indoctrination and his early training, which had instilled into him the idea that the Americans were the real enemy of Germany. This factor, just like the decision to go through Bavaria, where the people viewed the Americans in more favorable terms, was not discounted by Big Al and his assembled staff officers when determining which of the German divisions presented the greatest danger.
With that issue decided, how best to use this insight and knowledge to deal with the current situation was now discussed. Actually, a discussion per se never took place. The same men who were now assembled had already played out a series of 'what if scenarios over the past forty-eight hours collectively and within their own staff sections as soon as the danger posed by the two panzer divisions had been identified. Instead, Big Al stood up, moved over to the map, and looked at it for a moment before speaking, while the G-2 moved his chair around next to the assistant G-4. Turning to his staff officers, Big Al, using his finger as a pointer, began to talk. 'With the 4th Armored's 3rd Brigade pulling back to the northwest, we're leaving the door open for the 2nd Panzer. It's too late to stop that maneuver, and even if we did, pressure from the supporting attack coming down Autobahn E40 as well as the main German effort would be too much for that brigade to handle. So for the time being we'll let the 3rd Brigade, 4th Armored, stand fast and cover Bad Hersfeld.'
Big Al paused, turning to the map. When he continued, he remained facing the map, but still used his finger to indicate the units he was talking about, and ran his finger along the map to indicate where he wanted them to go. 'Now, that decision leaves a big gap between the 4th Armored's 1st Brigade here, in Fulda, and the 3rd Brigade here, south of Bad Hersfeld. We could encourage the 4th Armored Division to hurry the 1st Brigade north in an effort to close the gap, but I don't think they'd make it. We could order the 1st Brigade to move directly north and hit the 2nd Panzer in the flank, but Dorsch would be expecting that. In this terrain the 1st Brigade would be easily blocked by a couple of German panzergrenadier companies. We would in short order find ourselves engaged in a slugfest here in the south and a standoff in the north, while Dorsch's lead brigade ran riot through our logistic areas. And that, gentlemen, would spell the end to this corps and our great gamble.'
Big Al paused, stepped back slightly, moved his head about as he looked at the entire map, then turned to his staff officers. With his hands on his hips and a firm, determined expression on his face, Big Al made it known in his indomitable style that he intended to throw caution to the winds. 'We knew from the beginning that this was a
