Enemy at the Gates

icy east wind and very low temperatures, we need a considerable increase of rations, otherwise we will have numerous men on the sick list from exhaustion and frostbite. We cannot manage with an air supply of 120 tons daily. Measures must therefore be taken to increase our supply rapidly or else you might just as well forget about the Sixth Army right away. Is [Hoth] still in the Mishkova section?

Schulz still refused to admit that the bridgehead over the Mishkova River had been abandoned:

+++ [Hoth] holds the Aksai section with small bridgeheads north of this area.

At this point, Schmidt indulged himself in some sarcasm:

+++ According to information we received today, some of the aircraft which were intended for our supply were again ordered to fly combat missions. In the opinion of the Commander in chief [Paulus] this is very unwise. Please do not regard our supply situation too optimistically. We suggest that the Luftwaffe should rather supply us with bread than drop a few and not always effective bombs before the Tatsinskaya front. I have nothing else.

Schulz hastened to reassure him of Army Group’s continued interest:

+++ Believe me, your supply situation is our greatest concern. I shall immediately and again report to the field marshal on the situation and he is in constant contact with Richthofen and the Supreme Command of the Army, with the aim of increasing your supplies. We are aware of your desperate situation and shall do our very best to improve it. I have nothing else. Please give my regards to the Commander in chief. Until tomorrow.

[Schmidt:] +++ I have nothing else either, greetings—ending.

As General Schmidt signed off it was finally clear to him that the German High Command had lost control of events in southern Russia. The entry in Sixth Army’s War Diary for December 25, 1942, reflected that fact: “Forty- eight hours without food supplies. Food and fuel near their end… the strength of the men is rapidly decreasing because of the biting cold… we hope for food soon…. No decision as yet on battle plan for the Sixth Army….”

Lonely German soldiers spent the last hours of Christmas twirling radio dials to pick up shortwave broadcasts from home. On Christmas Eve, many had listened to the popular singer, Lale Anderson, as she sang special requests for the troops. Now, on Christmas night, the men of Stalingrad were treated to Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels’s “Ring Broadcast,” supposedly originating from the frontiers of the Third Reich. It was aimed primarily at the civilian population.

While Goebbels chanted the names of conquered cities, the German people toured the battlefronts.

“And now from Narvik,” he announced grandly amid a rising chorus of male singers stationed at that Norwegian port. “And in Tunisia,” brought forth another strident rendition, this time of “Stille Nacht, Heilege Nacht,” from soldiers holding American and British troops away from Bizerte and Tunis. “And from Stalingrad!” Goebbels suddenly said. While thousands of soldiers inside the Kessel stared at each other in disbelief, a joyous melody burst from the radio to assure the homefront that all was well at the Volga River.

Goebbels continued with his fabricated broadcast, and his voice shrilled out the impressive boundaries of the Nazi empire. But most of his countrymen trapped on the Russian steppe had already turned off their radios.

Chapter Twenty-four

Buoyed up by the false hope that Manstein was coming, the soldiers of the Sixth Army had endured the rationing and freezing weather with a remarkable stoicism and elan. However, when Christmas brought the sobering realization that the Kessel was probably going to become their grave, physical and moral defenses began to crumble and the gaunt occupants of Fortress Stalingrad started to lose their ability to hold out. Drastic measures instituted by Paulus to preserve the food supply only added to the decline. The beleaguered general had no choice. Once again, the airlift had failed to step up deliveries beyond a hundred tons a day.

The teletype that night recorded the bleak facts:

+++ Today [December 26], by 5:00 P.M., we received 38 Ju and 3 He [transports], carrying seventy tons, among them food, mainly bread. We have only enough bread for two days, edible food for one day, fat is gone already. Complete food supplies must be flown in immediately, in balanced proportions, for 250,000 men….We depend only on what arrives by air…we are also out of fuel, tomorrow we will give out the last 20 cubic meters….I beg you by all means to see to it that tomorrow 200 tons be flown in, 150 of which is food, 50 cubic meters in fuel. Otherwise we shall not make it.

+++ We shall do our utmost.

Colonel von Kunowski, Paulus’s chief quartermaster, added a final comment: “No more from here. I never sat so deep in shit. Kind regards.”

Paulus had known for several days that he would have to cut rations again. But he had waited for Christmas to pass before announcing a near-starvation diet: bread, two ounces per day per man (a piece the size of a man’s thumb); soup without fat (one portion) for lunch; one can of tinned meat when available for dinner; otherwise, more watery soup.

The stringent rations struck a mortal blow at the stamina of his men. Painfully aware of that fact, Paulus, attempted once more to remind his superiors that an entire army was on the brink of extinction.

Erich von Manstein received his chilling words and passed them on to Hitler.

+++ Bloody losses, cold and inadequate supplies have recently made inroads on divisions’ fighting strength. I must therefore report the following:

1. Army can continue to ward off small-scale attacks and deal with local crises for some time yet, always providing that supply improves.

2. If enemy draws off forces in any strength from Hoth’s front and uses these…on Stalingrad Fortress, latter cannot hold out for long.

3. No longer possible to execute breakout unless corridor is cut in advance and army replenished….

I therefore request representations at highest level [Hitler] to ensure energetic measures for speedy relief, unless overall situation compels sacrifice of army….

For the first time, Paulus mentioned the nagging possibility that Sixth Army might be used as a sacrificial pawn in this maniacal game of chess in order to tie down as many Soviet units as possible while Manstein tried to stabilize his other fronts.

One of Paulus’s aides, Capt. Winrich Behr, broached the same opinion in a remarkable letter to Maj. Nikolaus von Below, who was Hitler’s adjutant at Rastenburg. The two men were old friends and were married to sisters. They had always been honest with each other and Behr now provided his comrade with a uniquely frank and intimate glimpse of the atmosphere at Sixth Army Headquarters in Gumrak:

Dear Klaus:

At the moment we feel somewhat betrayed and sold out….To wait and to persevere is a matter which goes without saying, even if no further orders come through. I just want to tell you quite simply that there is nothing here to eat, with the exception of a few thousand horses, which may last until January, but with which one cannot alone feed an army of 250,000 men. Now there is only bread for tomorrow…. With my knowledge of the German soldier we have to foresee…that their physical resistance will be lowered so much… the moment will come where each