The British were in an odd position. It seems that even they were unsure how resolved they were. They were uncertain not only about others, but apparently even about themselves, about what they should or would do. That, presumably, is why the Austrians and the Germans did not read British diplomacy as signaling real commitment to defend Serbia. We also know that when the Russians—believing they were facing an imminent attack—mobilized, this prompted the Germans to do the same, and war began. The Russian mobilization certainly showed their commitment, but it did nothing to improve the prospects of a negotiated settlement. Their mobilization was a very costly “costly signal.” Would British mobilization have had the same dangerous consequences, or could it have broken the impasse?
The data going into the model treat Britain as highly committed to finding terms that all sides can accept. They were assigned a value of 90 out of a possible 100 on “flexibility/commitment,” indicating they really wanted to negotiate and were prepared to live with a major compromise to avoid war. I have repeated my earlier simulation of the crisis, but with one change. I shifted Britain’s commitment to compromise from 90 to 50. A value of 50 signals a balanced approach. A value of 50 means the player actively pursues a settlement but is sufficiently resolved that it will not make a deal very far from its desired outcome. By placing Britain at 50 I am, in essence, trying to test Niall Ferguson’s insight (and that of other historians too) that the wishy-washy British message contributed to the war. I am simulating an approach that the British leaders probably would have seen as a bluff intended to shake up the situation and promote a war-avoiding deal.
What concrete actions might the British have taken to send the message, “We are serious about defending Serbia’s sovereignty”? I am not a military expert, so my speculation will be just that. I am sure a military specialist or historian of British policy in the run-up to World War I would find countless other ways for the British to send the right message. Here is one:
Britain was the world’s greatest sea power (although the Germans were certainly challenging that claim at the time). They could have filled several of their navy’s ships with a few thousand British troops to be transported to the Adriatic, taking them just a short distance from Serbia. Maybe they could have sent some other ships into the Bosporus, roughly flanking landlocked Serbia from either side. This would have served several potentially advantageous purposes. It is very much, in game-theory lingo, a costly signal. Talk is cheap, but sending a fleet into a prospective combat zone is putting your money where your mouth is.
The Germans and Austrians probably would have taken more seriously the prospect that Britain meant business. As we will see, the model indicates just that. Additionally, a naval mobilization of this sort has none of the grave risks associated with the Russian mobilization of ground forces. Russia could move troops quickly to and across the German frontier. Understandably, that made the Germans more than a little jittery. British ships filled with soldiers would have taken a long time to get into position. Finally, the ships would not have been directly in the path on which initial fighting was expected. Thus the shiploads of troops would very much have been a signal of what was to come without precipitating immediate military action. In reality, British ships under French command headed for the Adriatic a few days after war had been declared: too little too late.
When I simulated the prewar 1914 crisis with the British at 90 as their “flexibility” variable, the model indicated that the Austrians and Germans were as uncertain about Britain’s true intentions as they could be. But when I place Britain’s score on this one factor at 50, the model shows that the Germans and the Austrians are convinced that the British will fight. More tellingly, Austria-Hungary’s and Britain’s pattern of interactions change. When Britain shows little resolve, Austria-Hungary anticipates coercing the British into accepting their position. When Britain shows stronger, but not extreme, resolve (50), the Austrians seek a negotiated compromise with the United Kingdom even as they perceive that if Britain is allowed to move first it will mean war. Not, mind you, the little war that Austria sought with Serbia, but the big war that nobody wanted.
Have a look at figure 9.2. Here we see the scenario in which Britain shows more resolve (50 instead of 90). By simulating a tougher British signal, we uncover the sort of intelligence about an adversary’s thinking that would be a lifetime coup for a real-world spy. We discover that with British ships heading for the Adriatic shortly after the start of the crisis, well before war is declared, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and the U.K. perceive the possibility of settling their differences quickly. The Austrians and Germans saw no such prospect (or reason for it) in the simulation of the actual situation. But with the U.K. showing more resolve, the strategic environment is greatly altered. The Austrians and Germans believe that they can and should make a deal with the U.K. in a matter of days after the start of the crisis.
The model says that the Austrians and Germans recognize that they should give up their demand for utter Serbian capitulation. They see an opportunity to persuade the Triple Entente to agree that Austria-Hungary should have real, but not controlling, influence over Serbia’s foreign policy.
Of course, change begets change. The members of the Triple Entente don’t immediately embrace the new offer that (according to the model’s logic) would have been put on the table if the British had sent navy ships to the Adriatic right away. While not caving in to this simulated proposal, the Triple Entente’s diplomats certainly sit up and take notice. The diplomats remain in charge, keeping the generals on the sidelines. While the negotiators hold out for a few weeks, thinking they can extract more concessions from Austria-Hungary, by early August they realize (in the model’s logic—remember, none of this was actually done in 1914) that the Austrians and Germans are highly reluctant to give more. So they take a deal located at about 75 on the 100-point issue scale. That would have given the Austrians more than was put on the table in the real 1914 crisis, but a lot less than the surrender of Serbian sovereignty. It would have more or less split the difference between the British position and the Aus-tro-Hungarian demand. The simulation under these conditions shows that the French and the Russians would have quickly acceded to this compromise. The war to end all wars would have been avoided.
FIG. 9.2. Engineering Successful Negotiations During the 1914 Crisis
Had there but been a thousand mathematicians crunching numbers in London in June 1914, we might not need to ask the next and final question of this chapter: Could World War II have been prevented by the judicious use of a predictioneer’s skills?
NO MORE MISTER HITLER?
The rise to power of Adolf Hitler is a strange and horrendous tale that could have been nipped in the bud sometime between November 1932 and March 1933, if not sooner. It is a tale worth heeding. Whatever else can be said of Hitler, it must be admitted that he was honest and open about his intentions. Not only did his biography,
In one campaign stop after another—several per day, as Hitler was the first German politician to take advantage of air travel to cover vast amounts of ground—Hitler declared his intention to ban political parties and suspend the Reichstag, Germany’s parliament, if he came to power. Now, when a campaigner promises peace and prosperity, motherhood and apple pie, we don’t really learn anything about what they plan to do. Being for hope or change or a thousand points of light says nothing. When a politician promises to overturn democracy, that’s a different matter. You don’t lose votes by promising peace and prosperity. I suppose being denied freedom of choice appeals to some people, but certainly not all and probably not many. So when a politician makes such outrageous
