6
The U.N. Cloak
— From the German of Karl von Clausewitz, ON WAR.
AT THE UNITED NATIONS, Secretary-General Tryve Lie had already established a tradition that was to last and that perhaps would eventually allow the world body to survive. As the first man to hold the office of Secretary- General, the Norwegian Lie considered that he was no mere lackey of the member powers, great or small, nor even an executive agent at the Council's beck and call. He considered himself an executive, much as the President of the United States is an executive, and as such, he might place questions in consideration before his legislature, composed of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Like the President, his power must stem from those legislatures' consent—but like the President, also, he could propose, direct, and ask for support.
From the moment he was informed of the Communist assault upon the Republic of Korea, Trygve Lie saw the immediate crisis and inherent danger to the future of the U.N. A body like the U.N. had been formed to keep the peace of the world—perhaps a hopelessly ambitious gesture—and each breach of peace inevitably carried it to the edge of the abyss. If the U.N. succeeded, it merely bought a little more time. But if it failed completely, then it was dead in the hearts of men, and its formal death, like that of the League of Nations, was only a matter of time.
A native of a small and powerless nation that in his lifetime had been brutally treated by a more powerful neighbor, Trygve Lie believed deeply in the purposes and necessity of the United Nations. If the U.N. proved it could not offer at least some protection to the weak, then it was useless, and would disappear.
And Lie, who as Secretary-General had helped set up the U.N. Commission on Korea, which had brought the Taehan Minkuk into vigorous life, also took the bald Communist assault as a personal affront.
Moving swiftly, and with the complete backing of the United States—whose own feelings were affronted—Lie convened an emergency meeting of the Security Council at 2:00 P.M. 25 June, New York time. With unprecedented swiftness—for there was only one 'neutral' on the Council in 1950—that body proposed, debated, revised, and adopted a resolution on the Korean crisis.
But for all his determination and swiftness of action, only one fact allowed Lie to succeed: the Soviet Union, which with the other four great powers enjoyed the veto, was not in attendance. On 10 January 1950, the Soviet delegate had not only pulled one of the now famous Soviet walkouts but had also continued to boycott the Council meetings over the issue of seating Red China.
If Andrei Gromyko or his ilk had been in New York on Sunday afternoon, the U.N. would not have taken action on the Korean question. And the U.N. might not have enjoyed another dozen years of life.
Taking advantage of the Soviets' tactical mistake, Lie and the Western powers passed a strong resolution stating that the armed assault upon the Republic of Korea constituted a breach of the peace. The resolution called for:
an immediate cessation of hostilities, and
the authorities of North Korea to withdraw their forces back to the 38th parallel, and
all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.
Voting for the resolution were Nationalist China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, India, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. At the time both Cuba and Egypt, untroubled by revolution, were in the Western bloc. Only Communist Yugoslavia, which hated Americans because they were capitalists and Russians because they were Russians abstained.
Shortly after 6:00 P.M. the resolution was released.
A few hours afterward, in Blair House across from the White House—which was undergoing repairs— President Truman met with the 'guts' of his Administration, the important members of Defense and State.
Here, by 10:30 P.M. American policy in the Far East had solidified. The real, if uneulogized, foreign policy of the Truman Administration was the containment of Communism, and there was general agreement that the United States had better begin containing.
While the immediate security of the United States was not threatened, its political order in the world was. China had disappeared into the hostile camp, provoking great unease not only among Americans but also among many of the Cabinet who had not dared act, for with its loss the balance of power in Asia had shifted. Now, if Korea were lost, Japan would hang by a thread—and if Japan went, America would be back where it was after Pearl Harbor.
By teletype, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized General MacArthur, Commanding General, FECOM, to send ammunition and military equipment to Korea to prevent the loss of the Seoul-Kimpo area, and to provide requisite air and naval cover to assure its arrival, to provide ships and aircraft to evacuate American civilians from the peninsula, and finally to dispatch a survey party to see the situation at firsthand and to decide what aid the Republic of Korea might require.
At the same time orders were received by the Seventh Fleet to sail from its bases in the Philippines and Okinawa to Sasebo, Japan, there to come under the operational control of Commander United States Naval Forces, Far East.
MacArthur immediately sent his radiogram to Colonel Wright, KMAG Chief, at the time on the road from Seoul to Sihung, telling him to be of 'good cheer.'
A few hours later three Russian-built YAK fighters, sighting American Air Force planes over Inch'on, opened fire on them. The Americans were over Korea only to provide air cover against attack on the evacuating civilians and dependents—but with the bullet holes in their wings, the American pilots declared open season. They shot down all three YAK's.
A few hours later, four more YAK's were shot out of the skies over Seoul. That day the 68th and 339th All- Weather Fighter Squadrons, and the 35th Fighter-Bomber Squadron, Fifth Air Force, flew 163 sorties from Japan. The ancient YAK fighters of the Inmun Gun proved no match for the F-80 and F-82 jets.
Americans, unknown to the public at home, were already engaged.
The interests of the United States demanded action, and now two things had occurred that would permit the Administration to act: the United Nations had taken a hand, which gave the United States an international sanction it could not have had otherwise in protecting its own interests—and the Communists had this time used overt, brutal armed force against a peaceful people, provoking immediate disapproval among the American public, among liberals, leftists, conservatives, and mugwumps alike.
Truman, who liked to say, pointing to his desk, 'The buck stops here,' was not a man to shirk a decision. He had acted—not intemperately or rashly, no matter how intemperate or rash he might be on other things—on the decision to drop the nuclear bomb. He had bought the Marshall Plan, and proclaimed the Truman Doctrine in Greece and Turkey. Harry Truman, however confused his ideas on domestic matters might become, never passed the buck or dropped the ball.
The Government of the United States, realizing completely the importance of halting Communist encroachment not only in Europe but everywhere in the world, resolved to assist the Republic of Korea. For whatever the truth might be, the world regarded Korea as an American protege, and American prestige in Asia hung in the balance.
But at 10:30 P.M. on 25 June 1950, Washington time, no one knew how hard it was going to be to help the Taehan Minkuk.
In Seoul, in the early hours of 28 June, even while 'Momentous decisions were in the offing,' Colonel William H. S. Wright, KMAG Chief of Staff, was having his difficulties.
Since 0100, when the ROK's decided to blow the Han bridges, officers on duty at ROK HQ had tried to reach
