of the Han. MacArthur insisted upon going personally up to the river to see the situation at firsthand. On the trip, he saw enough to tighten his lean face.
Thousands upon thousands of white-clad Korean refugees were fleeing south. Among them, completely disorganized, were thousands of ROK soldiers—also moving south.
MacArthur quietly told Church that in his opinion the situation called for the immediate commitment of American ground troops. He stated he would request the JCS for such action as soon as he returned to Tokyo.
At 1800 the
In New York, the Security Council of the United Nations convened again on the night of 27 June. By this time it had become obvious that the U.N. resolution calling for an end to hostilities was going to be ignored by the Communist nations, and also by this time the United States had become determined to halt the aggression in Korea.
The Russian delegate was still not in attendance.
In 1950 United States influence in the U.N. was still preponderant; the NATO allies and the Latin-American nations voted consistently with the Americans, and these votes could be counted on for a majority both on the Council and in the Assembly.
Now the Security Council passed a resolution commenting on its fruitless efforts to halt the war, and ending, at American urging, as folows:
Bespectacled, white-haired Warren Austin, the U.S. delegate, had in essence what he wanted. The United States, which had already decided to go to the aid of Korea, now had woven a U.N. cloak under which to carry out its national policy.
In the future, this 'cloak' would become both a help and a hindrance.
The Soviet Government, receiving information of this resolution, decided its own representative had better get back to minding the store. But it was already too late for effective Russian obstruction.
In Washington, as reports on the debacle of the ROK Army filtered in, tension increased. Before noon on the 29th, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson telephoned President Truman.
Of all the Cabinet, Johnson was probably the most shocked at the developments. Honestly believing that the United States would never again fight a ground war, Johnson had made it almost impossible for the U.S. Army to do so. But even Johnson did not fully understand the extent of American weakness to handle a situation of this kind— for in cutting the 'fat' from the ground forces, Johnson had—along with public opinion generally—not only cut deeply into their strength but also into their morale and effectiveness.
He and other leaders met with the President during the afternoon, and at this time a new directive was issued to the Far East commander:
MacArthur was authorized to use Army service forces in Korea to maintain communications and supply services for the ROK's;
to employ Army combat troops to ensure the retention of an air and naval base in the PusanChinhae area;
to use both naval and air forces against military targets in North Korea—but to stay well away from the Chinese and Russian frontiers;
to defend Taiwan from Chinese Communist invasion, but also to prevent any attack on the mainland by Chiang Kai-shek; and finally,
to send whatever supplies and munitions the ROK's might need to the Korean Government.
This directive also ended with a clear statement that there was no decision to engage in war with the Soviet Union, even if Soviet forces should intervene in Korea. Already, a firm determination to limit this engagement—if possible—had appeared in Washington.
Officials were still apprehensive of the role of the Soviet Union. No one could be sure that general war would not begin at any moment. Never before having accepted the idea of limited goals in war, Washington still found it difficult to follow Soviet reasoning. But as President Truman stated later, the United States Government saw absolutely no chance of forcing its will—as it had on Germany and Japan—upon the vast land masses of Russia and China, even by means of general war. They felt that such a war against these powers would solve nothing for the United States, and should as far as humanly possible be avoided. If the Communist powers held back from total war, the United States would follow suit.
But the Communists had made a strong move on the politico-military chessboard, and there was immediate determination that the Soviet gambit must not be allowed to proceed unchecked.
This directive had been out only hours when MacArthur's report of his personal reconnaissance to Korea hit Washington like a bomb. From the above directive it is obvious that the government felt that American troops would not become engaged on the peninsula except in the air or at sea, where the United States was well prepared to engage and where casualties could be expected to be light.
MacArthur's cable read:
'The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later the lost ground, is through the introduction of U.S. ground combat forces into the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize the forces of our Air and Navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive.'
MacArthur further asked for permission to move a regimental combat team into Korea, to be built up later into a two-division force as needed.
The message was too hot for General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, to handle. He called the Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace, and ordered a hot teletype connection set up with Tokyo.
Over the teletype, MacArthur reiterated that the authority he already had, to put troops into the Pusan area, would not fulfill the mission. He also asked Collins to make up his mind. 'Time is of the essence, and a clear-cut decision without delay is essential!'
Collins replied he would kick it upstairs, and would reply within thirty minutes. Then he got Pace on the wire and repeated the teletype conversation. As soon as Collins had hung up, Pace called Blair House.
It was 0457, on 30 June, Washington time, but Harry Truman was already up. He listened to Pace's report.
The United States, in effect, was already committed. Its air forces were shooting down North Korean planes and bombing North Korean airfields. But no one in Washington, either civilian or military, had understood the real extent of the Communist action, or the countermoves that would be required.
Already, the Korean incident was escalating into real war for the United States, step by step. But Truman still could not anticipate at this time the true measure of the difficulty the United States faced in stemming the North Korean invasion. He could only continue to anticipate that an American breakdown now, or a failure to carry through, might tip the balance of the world fatally by the loss of all Asia.
When Frank Pace had given him the substance of the MacArthur-Collins conversation, Truman without hesitation told Pace to go ahead with the regimental combat team. He would let Pace know within two hours on the matter of the two divisions.
The word flashed to MacArthur immediately.
Then, at midmorning 30 June, Truman met with important members of State and Defense. At this time, Truman agreed to two recommended moves: two Army infantry divisions should be sent into Korea from Japan, and North Korea should be blockaded by the Navy.
Now that the Communists had moved overtly and dramatically, and the U.N.—which ironically held the emotional support of the very elements who opposed containment of Communism on moral grounds—had provided a legal and moral cloak under which the U.S. might act, the tougher members of State and Defense felt that their hands were free. Many of them had long writhed under the mistaken attack of conservatives who did not understand the government's dilemma vis-a-vis its own intellectual elements and the American public. They were ready to fight.
