panic-depression similar to the one the Bank had created thirteen years earlier. This then could be blamed on Jackson's withdrawal of federal deposits, and the resulting backlash surely would cause Congress to override the President's veto. Remini tells us:
Biddle counterattacked. He initiated a general curtailment of loans throughout the entire banking system.... It marked the beginning of a bone-crushing struggle between a powerful financier and a determined and equally powerful politician. Biddle understood what he was about. He knew that if he brought enough pressure and agony to the money market, only then could he force the President to restore the deposits. He almost gloated. 'This worthy President thinks that because he has scalped Indians and imprisoned Judges, he is to have his way with the Bank. He is mistaken.'4...
'The ties of party allegiance can only be broken,' he declared, 'by the actual conviction of existing distress in the community.' And such distress, of course, would eventually put everything to rights.
'Nothing but widespread suffering will produce any effect on Congress.... Our only safety is in pursuing a steady course of firm restriction—and I have no doubt that such a course will ultimately lead to restoration of the currency and the recharter of the Bank.5... My 1. William J. Duane,
Quoted by Remini,
2. Quoted by Herman J. Viola,
3. A letter from Jackson to Van Buren, November 19, 1833,
4. Remini,
5. Remini,
A DEN OF VIPERS
355
own course is decided. All other banks and all the merchants may break, but the Bank of the United States shall not break.'1
Biddle, therefore, decided to use the American people as
sacrificial pawns in the giant chess match for the Bank's survival.
The resulting economic chaos is not difficult to imagine. Biddle's contraction of the money supply was executed at a particularly vulnerable moment. Business had been expanding as a result of the Bank's prior easy credit and now was dependent on it. Also, the tariff came due at precisely this time, placing still more demand for cash and credit. Losses were sustained everywhere, wages and prices sagged, men were put out of work, companies went bankrupt. By the time Congress reconvened in December, in what was called the 'Panic Session,' the nation was in an uproar. Newspapers editorialized with alarm, and letters of angry protest flooded into Washington.
As the pressure continued to build in Congress, it began to look as though Biddle's plan would work. In the public eye, it was Jackson who was solely responsible for the nation's woes. It was
JACKSON IS CENSURED BY THE SENATE
For one-hundred days, a 'phalanx of orators' daily excoriated the President for his arrogant and harmful conduct. At length, a resolution of censure was introduced into the Senate and, on March 28, 1834, it was passed by a vote of 26 to 20. This was the first time that a President had ever been censured by Congress, and it was a savage blow to Jackson's pride. Biddle, at last, had the upper hand.
The President rumbled around the White House in a fit of rage.
'You are a den of vipers,' he said to a delegation of the Bank's supporters. 'I intend to rout you out and by the Eternal God I will rout you out.'2
The censure was by no means indicative of popular sentiment.
Even in the Senate, which was a hotbed of pro-Bank support, a swing of only three votes would have defeated the measure.
1. Biddle to William Appleton, January 27, 1834, and to J.G. Watmough, February 8, 1834. Nicholas Biddle,
McGrane, ed. (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1919), pp. 219,221.
2. Quoted by Viola, p. 86.
356
THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND
During all this time, imperceptibly at first, but quickly growing, the public had been learning the truth. Jackson, of course, was doing everything within his power to hasten the process, but other factors also were at work, not the least of which was Biddle himself. So large was his ego that he could not keep from boasting in public about his plan to deliberately disrupt the economy. People heard these boasts and they
The Democrats wasted no time consolidating these unexpected gains. To test their strength on the issue, on April 4, 1834, they called for a vote in the House on a series of resolutions which were aimed at nullifying the censure in the Senate. In essence, the resolutions stated that the House totally approved the President's bank policy. The first resolution, passed by a vote of 134 to 82, declared that the Bank of the United States 'ought not to be rechartered.' The second, passed by a vote of 118 to 103, agreed that the deposits 'ought not to be restored.' And the third, passed by an overwhelming vote of 175 to 42, called for the establishment of a special committee of
