the years that followed.
The basic idea behind the 1957 White Paper was that American strategic nuclear power was to be the primary guardian of peace in Europe. Britain contributed her own nuclear bomber force, but beyond that all she was called upon to do was help provide a conventional trip-wire to identify a major incursion, which would then be answered by massive nuclear retaliation from the United States. A very great saving in cost would result as well as a great saving in manpower. This is, in fact, what happened. The political party in power at the time was able to go to the country at the next general election as the party which had freed the nation from military conscription in peacetime.
The baleful spirit of the 1957 White Paper brooded over British defence policy for twenty years. When the USSR achieved rough parity in strategic nuclear power with the United States the US moved from the somewhat implausible concept of deterrence extended over her allies by the threat of massive nuclear retaliation, if any of her allies were attacked, to a rather more realistic concept of defence at any level of attack — the concept of flexible response.
To this, which became the accepted policy of NATO, successive British governments paid lip service, but little more. It was clear that what they relied upon to prevent the Soviet Union from attacking the West, even with conventional means alone, was the threat of very early escalation into a strategic nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States. Delivery systems for battlefield nuclear weapons, for which the warheads (numbering some 7,000 in the European theatre by 1977) remained under US control, were integrated into the British-commanded Northern Army Group in NATO, as they were elsewhere in Allied Command Europe. What was emerging as the basis of Allied defence planning was the concept of the ‘Triad’ — the combination of conventional defence, battlefield nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear action in closely coupled sequence. This was as fully endorsed in the United Kingdom as anywhere else in the Alliance. How far it was taken seriously anywhere is open to argument. There is little evidence that it was ever taken seriously in the UK.
The NATO concept of the ‘Triad’ envisaged the development of sufficient conventional forces in the forward areas to identify a major aggression and slow it down, while posing the threat of an early introduction of battlefield nuclear weapons if it did not come to a halt, followed, if necessary, by strategic nuclear action. No one knew exactly what would happen when battlefield nuclear weapons were released, but it was widely accepted within the Alliance that a tactical nuclear battle could hardly be expected to proceed for long without escalation into a strategic nuclear exchange. On the other hand, an observer of the British Army’s deployment, equipment and training policy could scarcely fail to conclude that, whatever happened, the British did not expect to have to take part in a tactical nuclear battle at all, or indeed, it may be added (to judge by the dismantling of their civil defences), in any form of nuclear action whatsoever.
It has been pointed out elsewhere in this book that the policy of the ‘forward defence’ of the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, to which more and more attention had to be paid as the stature of the FRG among its allies grew, required, if it implied no surrender of West German soil, either enormously strong conventional forces deployed along the frontier or an immediate nuclear response. The first was impossible: Allied governments made it quite clear that they were not prepared to furnish the necessary troops. The second, an immediate nuclear release, was highly unlikely.
This dilemma in planning the defence of the Federal Republic was of not very great consequence in the southern half of it, where difficult terrain gave the Allied forces available there (under American command in the Central Army Group (CENTAG)) some chance of holding a stronger enemy. For the weaker forces deployed in easier and more open country, under British command, in the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), there was far less hope of this. Many would say there was none, and that the only hope of countering an invasion in the north by conventional means lay in abandoning what was described as ‘forward defence’ (which looked uncomfortably linear) and fighting instead a battle of manoeuvre in depth.
Observance of West German susceptibilities over surrender of territory, however, obliged NORTHAG to plan for a forward battle. If the troops (some of whom were stationed a long way back in their home countries, in Belgium and Holland) could be got up in time the attack, under this concept, would be met on, or near, the Demarcation Line with East Germany. With much greater weight on the other side, as well as the initiative in choice of time and place, there could hardly be any chance of holding it there. However it began, the battle was bound to develop in depth, with the outcome being determined by the action of reserves held further back for counter- penetration operations in the first place and then for a counter-offensive.
Such reserves did not exist, even on paper. Why not? Because, the answer would run, when it became clear that the available conventional forces could not hold the enemy the situation would be restored by the use of battlefield nuclear weapons. There was therefore no great need for conventional forces deployed in depth.
Though the forward location of special weapon stores (in which nuclear warheads were kept) meant that some would be overrun before the weapons could be used, there would still be plenty left. Delay in securing their release, however, was inevitable, even supposing a very early resolution of the agonizing dilemma which impaled the FRG, in whose territory very many of these warheads, if not most, would land. The Allied rubric, moreover, enjoined that no release could be expected before all conventional means had already been tried and exhausted — that is, in effect, before the conventional battle had been lost, leaving a situation which could almost certainly no longer be ‘restored’.
The wisdom of locating stores of nuclear warheads in vulnerable forward areas was brought in question in 1977, when it was pointed out that nuclear attack was much more likely on fixed, static concentrations than on troop formations in the field, and that in consequence missile attack from submarine launchers might be more sensible than from launchers on the battlefield. By 1984 there had been some reduction in forward holdings but these were still considerable.
Accepting the declared NATO concept of the ‘Triad’, however, and assuming that tactical nuclear weapons were introduced, a nuclear battle would result. For this the Russians were equipped and trained. The British (and most of the other Allies) were not. No major British weapon system in use in 1978, even the newest, offered plausible protection to crewmen fighting in a nuclear environment. Training in movement over contaminated ground was rudimentary, equipment for decontamination and provision for its practice — and even for the acquisition and dissemination of radiation intelligence — was far from adequate. British defence policy, in contra-distinction to that of the Soviet Union, clearly embodied no real requirement to fight on a nuclear battlefield. It even seemed that the British contribution to the defence of Europe in the Central Region of the Allied Command contained a deliberate insufficiency, whose purpose was to force on the United States not so much an early release of battlefield nuclear weapons as an almost immediate movement into strategic nuclear attack, perhaps on the USSR itself. There could be no doubt, the argument ran, that the Soviet Union realized this too. It was here, the British seemed to think, that true deterrence lay.
To British politicians in the seventies, under pressure from some of their supporters to cut the defence vote at almost any cost, the approach was an attractive one. It was, in essence, indistinguishable from that of the 1957 White Paper. Whatever it might now be called, British defence policy was still that of trip-wire and massive retaliation, disfigured somewhat by claims that economies, which left front-line troops less capable of fighting, were in fact contributions to military efficiency. Whether this would remain indefinitely acceptable to the United States, which was clearly expected to hold the baby, was another matter.
Professional military men in the parliamentary democracies of the West are generally honest people, loyal to those they serve and reluctant to take part in politics. Many were anxious and deeply disturbed over the situation here described. But as long as the public demanded of their politicians nothing more, and showed little inclination to put up the money for anything better, there was not much that the military men could do. The difficulty was compounded in Britain where, although the Civil Service had been allowed greater freedom of political expression during the late seventies, the tradition that the military must not debate government defence policy in public was still rigorously applied. It was paradoxical that in a country where free speech was so cherished the military remained so firmly muzzled. Nevertheless, in institutes and societies devoted to the debate of public affairs, with which Britain abounded, some awareness grew up among responsible people of the real situation and, in particular, of the dangerously changed character of the air threat to the British Isles and the urgent need to repair its air defences.
The heart and core of the Alliance remained, as it always had been, the United States. There, in the mid- seventies, four tendencies began to converge. First, there was a growing awareness of the true dimensions of the threat. It was accompanied by none of the hysteria occasionally evident in the early fifties but was nonetheless
