The Vietnam War had been a useful distraction. There had been advantage in the existence of some movement in the United States towards a degree of disengagement in Europe; in the financial and economic difficulties of the United Kingdom, particularly where balance of payments and budgetary difficulties had combined to reduce troop deployments in continental Europe — and also, peripheralists might say, in the British withdrawal from the East; in the strong growth of left-wing elements in the politics of every one of the Atlantic Allies; in a general decline among Western democracies in public interest in defence; and in certain other developments. The pursuit of detente had been helpful to the Soviet interest, and negotiations on arms limitation and force reductions had brought small but useful gains.
A very highly classified planning document, given a strictly limited circulation in the Kremlin in October 1983, which fell into Allied hands after the fighting was over, throws a sufficiently clear light on Soviet policy in relation to NATO to justify the inclusion of a summary of it here.
Subject:
This could be achieved in the following way.
Rapid military defeat of AFCENT, with the simultaneous elimination of AFNORTH and AFSOUTH, followed by an advance to a voluntary stop-line: Hook of Holland-Nijmegen-Maastricht-Saarbrucken-Trier-the Rhine-Basel. The intention of the USSR to stop on this line without entering French territory will have been made abundantly clear worldwide. It is assumed that a government of the Popular Front will continue to be in power in France when the action takes place and that, in spite of not unimportant differences between France and the USSR, there will be sufficient reluctance on the part of the French to become involved in hostilities with the Soviet Union to ensure an adequate response to the pressures that can be brought to bear. It can therefore be expected, though of course not guaranteed, that French forces will not participate in these operations.
Once the FRG has been totally occupied its neutralization can be put in hand on the usual lines under accepted procedures. The complete collapse of the North Atlantic Alliance can be confidently expected to follow from its failure to prevent this from happening. Bilateral negotiations can then be opened with the USA. Other ex- allies can for the time being be ignored.
A firm decision to act along these lines will only be taken in the light of the prevailing situation and in relation to all other relevant developments, though complete military plans will be kept up to date for this contingency in itself. Nevertheless, certain factors bearing on choice of time should be kept in mind.
A resounding military victory over the West, followed by the dismantling of the FRG and the collapse of the Atlantic Alliance, will reinforce Soviet hegemony within the Warsaw Pact and weaken divergent national socialist movements outside it. Current tendencies suggest the advisability of achieving this fairly soon. It might be unwise to delay it beyond 1987.
NATO countries have recently initiated some improvements in ‘defensive’ preparedness. These are at present modest, but the maintenance of the same rate of expansion will in time set constraints on Soviet freedom of action. In five years’ time the achievement of the military objective will be considerably more difficult.
Although it has been consistently and warmly denied in the West, we think there are plans to open offensive operations at some time against the Warsaw Pact with an attack on the German Democratic Republic. The Federal Republic is clearly having considerable difficulty in overcoming the reluctance of some of the Allies but might still succeed in staging an attack not later than 1986. The policy of ‘forward defence’ makes no sense from a military point of view unless it involves action well to the east of the frontier, and it can be taken as no more than a cloak for the planning of an invasion of the GDR, possibly already far advanced.[1]
China does not yet present the major military threat which can be certainly expected to develop later. NATO must be reduced before this. What requires urgent attention now, however, is the Chinese action, with powerful US support, to stimulate dissidence in the Asiatic republics. This is sharply on the increase. It would appear that unless the question of NATO can be resolved before the autumn of 1986 a deteriorating security situation in the Military Districts of Central Asia and the Far East, and possibly in those of Siberia and the Trans-Baikal as well, might offer distraction from Europe and considerable temptation to the FRG to exploit the position.
There would thus clearly be advantage in action to eliminate the FRG and ensure the collapse of the Atlantic Alliance not later than the summer of 1986. The course of events, particularly in the light of a possible requirement to intervene in Yugoslavia, may compel earlier action, and arrangements for mobilization will, of course, be kept under constant review.
The greatest relative advantage to the West, as NATO studies confirm, will be if the Warsaw Pact can spend fourteen days in the mobilization process as against seven days for NATO. It should not be difficult to use summer exercises to conceal the first seven days. The utmost use will have to be made of deception arrangements, nevertheless, to indicate, once we are seen to be mobilizing for a possible attack, a date for it later than any that might be chosen.
In spite of some recent improvement in NATO’s state of readiness, including arrangements to deploy two to four additional divisions in an emergency, further reinforcing formations cannot be expected to arrive in the European theatre, once hostilities have started, before D+16 at the earliest. Naval and air interdiction can be expected to reduce, but not entirely destroy, their effectiveness. It will be important to secure the stop-line before the arrival of major reinforcements.
Even more important, in the matter of duration of operations, is the question of nuclear release. The USSR will make it clear beyond any possible doubt that use of radiation to any significant degree in offensive weapons of war will be regarded as an open invitation to discard all restraints on nuclear warfare. Escalation into strategic exchange, to use the Western mode of expression, will certainly follow battlefield applications.
There will unquestionably be doubts and hesitations in the Alliance over the initiation of nuclear release. Widespread unwillingness to allow the use of battlefield weapons on Federal territory can be counted on in the FRG, for the effect of battlefield weapons there would only differ in degree from that of strategic attack on the homelands of the USSR and USA. The USSR can count at the outset on a high superiority in non-nuclear capability. This would be largely offset if battlefield nuclear weapons were introduced. It would therefore be foolish in the extreme for the USSR to resolve NATO’s doubts on their introduction by introducing them first.
The earlier that military operations in Europe can be brought to a successful conclusion the lower will be the probability of the neutralization of Warsaw Pact conventional superiority by the arrival of major reinforcements or the introduction of nuclear weapons. The conclusion from a close study of all these considerations is that the stop- line should be reached not later than the evening of D + 9. The military plan will be framed accordingly.
The essence of the military plan to implement this policy, which can now be recognized as of quite unique importance in the study of the Third World War, has been distilled from captured documents and is summarized below. It deserves careful consideration.
Invasion from a standing start from normal locations, though attractive, is for ground forces of the Warsaw Pact not practicable. Even with exercise cover, and with an excuse for military movement in the shape of real or imaginary internal security difficulties in satellite countries, it would not be possible to count on complete surprise. Some degree of precautionary preparation on the part of NATO would have to be counted on. This could be expected to include the flying-in of the personnel of certainly one heavy division from the United States to marry up with its pre-positioned equipment, and possibly of two, and the partial deployment to its emergency positions of much of AFCENT, including the Dutch and Belgian corps in NORTHAG and some of the entirely new II British Corps. It would also include the alerting of air defences. NORTHAG continues to offer the most attractive point of decisive entry, in spite of the lack of depth in the CENTAG sector, because of the inadequacy of reserves to fight the battle in depth which will inevitably develop in the NORTHAG sector. Forward deployment (adopted in the FRG for purely political reasons) has made a main thrust against NORTHAG particularly inviting.
The cover plan must firmly indicate a date for the opening of the offensive not earlier than D + 9 or 10. The actual offensive on D-day will thus catch the defence not yet prepared for it.
On the night D — 1 there would be widespread attacks by undercover forces (some 400 KGB-controlled cells are already deployed) on suitable targets in the FRG, stiffened by expendable Soviet airborne units. Shortly before first light on D-day airborne formations, making the best use of undercover forces, would seal Hamburg, make good Bremen airfield and seize crossings over the Weser; if possible, over the Rhine as well. The securing of Bremen airfield as an airhead would be indispensable. The success of other airborne operations would be a bonus.
