In spite of the great importance of the flanks the critical area of NATO on land was clearly the Central Region, covering the Federal Republic of Germany up to (but excluding) Schleswig-Holstein and the Federal frontier with the Low Countries. It was in the Central Region that NATO’s greatest concentration of ground and tactical air forces was gathered, facing those of the Warsaw Pact across the Demarcation Line which separated West and East Germany, then followed the Czechoslovak frontier down to neutral Austria on the south-eastern flank.

All the regular forces of the Federal Republic (organized in three corps and twelve divisions, with sixteen armoured and fifteen armoured infantry, two mountain and three airborne brigades) were assigned to NATO in peacetime. The six Territorial Army brigade-sized groups established for Home Defence were not, until a lengthy argument came to an end in 1985; then these too, with the three Territorial Commands of five Military Districts, came under SACEUR. They were to play an important part in the war, though they could have been even more effectively used if they had come under Allied command rather earlier. Two German corps (II German and III German) were under command to CENTAG, the other (I German) to NORTHAG. About half the Federal German Army (the Bundeswehr) of some 350,000 were conscripts on a fifteen-month term of service.

Germany had, however, paid considerable attention to the problems of mobilization and of making reinforcements speedily effective. In the mid-1970s a Standby Reserve had been created, which the Defence Minister could call up in emergency without prior recourse to Parliament, and plans had been made for a number of cadre formations to be quickly expanded to war strength. The Territorial Army of about half a million men not only provided the Territorial Commands referred to above, but also defensive, support and communications units throughout the country, relieving the regular forces of all but the forward tasks. The training of reserves was reasonably good, taking advantage of the local and professional knowledge possessed by reservists and of the fact that the more difficult combat posts requiring highly skilled men could be filled by regular personnel, with reservists to assist them. Equipment was also good. Over half the Bundeswehr’s tanks were the new Leopard II with Chobham-type armour, giving much better protection against ATGW, and the advanced, smooth-bore, 120 mm gun. New ATGW were issued widely, to the Territorial Army as well as to regular forces. Artillery was modernized, and included new US SP (self-propelled) guns and the FH-70 medium gun jointly developed with Britain and Italy, thus providing for largely standardized ammunition. Helicopters provided ATGW support and battlefield mobility. New multiple rocket launchers enabled minelets to be sown in the face of advancing enemy tanks. All in all, the Bundeswehr was a well-found force, with the advantage of being on its own ground and highly motivated to defend its own homes.

The United States Army in Europe numbered some 200,000 men, all but 10,000 of these in the US Seventh Army in Germany, whose C-in-C was also COMCENTAG. The reintroduction of the draft in the United States, to which reference is made elsewhere (see Chapter 14), had by 1985 rescued the US Army from a highly dangerous position in relation to reserve manpower. If we do not count the Berlin Brigade the US Seventh Army was organized in two corps, V US and VII US. The four divisions and three additional brigades on station in the late seventies had been augmented by two more brigades, upon each of which the balance of a complete division could be built up in an emergency. The tank strength available to US forces in the Central Region (including tanks in the stockpile) approached 3,000, of which the greater part was by early 1985 the new XM-1, a remarkable tank, with a low silhouette, Chobham armour and advanced new armour-piercing ammunition.

As early as 1978 the United States had taken steps to build up its air reinforcement capacity, so that by 1983 five divisions (two to be built on the brigades mentioned above) could be airlifted to Europe within ten days, to join up there with their already stockpiled equipment. Plans were put into operation at about that time to disperse stockpiles, so as to reduce their vulnerability and make ammunition and other stores more quickly available to forward troops.

The XM-1 was typical of the advanced equipment that began to reach the US troops in Germany in the late seventies and early eighties. At the same time new ATGW began to come into service, including ‘fire and forget’ missiles, with fully automatic terminal guidance, for use from helicopters. The US Army had always laid great emphasis on the use of helicopters, which fulfilled a variety of roles, not least the provision of battlefield mobility. Artillery had been strengthened by the introduction (if only in small numbers) of the cannon-launched guided projectile (CLGP), which gave it a real anti-tank capacity. To the greatly increased firepower were added improvements in target acquisition through the use of RPV (remotely-piloted vehicles) giving instantaneous information. Close air support, with the emphasis on anti-tank action, was much improved with the deployment of the A-10, which began in 1978. The equipment of other tactical aircraft with PGM (precision-guided missiles) gave a much enhanced stand-off capability against land targets. Finally, the air defence of troops in the field was steadily thickened with the introduction of new SAM (surface-to-air missiles) and automatic guns.

The British forces assigned to NATO and stationed in Germany were embodied in the British Army of the Rhine, whose C-in-C was also COMNORTHAG. Excluding the 3,000-strong force in Berlin, they numbered 52,000 at full peacetime strength and were now organized in four armoured and one artillery division with an additional brigade-sized formation (5 Field Force), all under I British Corps. Earmarked for deployment from the UK in an emergency was the newly formed II British Corps, adding another 30,000 men.[4] Main battle tanks, including those in stockpile, now numbered 1,000, all Chieftain with the improved engine, though not all with Chobham armour.

Other equipment, though initially introduced very slowly, enabled most major weapons to be modernized by the early 1980s. ATGW, built jointly with France and Germany, spread throughout the regular and TAVR forces of the UK after a rather hesitant beginning. At long last the air defences of British troops in the field became as good as those of the Bundeswehr and US forces in Europe. Improved reinforcement arrangements, made possible by the increase in the availability of equipment and reserves, gave commanders the additional advantage of being able to replace battle casualties quickly.

With the new equipment and new organizations and tactics to match, morale in the British Army of the Rhine, not at its highest in the 1970s, was now fully restored.

Of the Dutch forces in the Northern Army Group (I Ne Corps) only one armoured brigade and one tank and one reconnaissance battalion were located in Germany, the rest being held back in Holland. Of the 75,000 men which constituted the whole strength of the Dutch Army, more than half (43,000) were conscripts, doing no more than fourteen months’ service. It had long been hoped in NATO that the Netherlands would be persuaded to station more of its assigned forces further forward, nearer to their emergency defence positions. The international tensions of late 1984 succeeded where previous arguments had failed and, though the false detente of the following spring tended to put the movement into reverse, the centre of gravity in the deployment of I Netherlands Corps in the summer of 1985 was further forward than it had ever been before.

The position of the Belgians was not dissimilar, though the conscripted element in the army (23,000 out of 62,000) did only eight months’ service if posted to the Federal Republic of Germany, where there were stationed in peacetime one corps and two divisional headquarters, with one armoured and two infantry brigades, as opposed to ten months if serving in Belgium. I Belgian (I Be) Corps, with some 300 Leopard I tanks, like I Netherlands Corps, with some 450, was under command to NORTHAG. Both corps had received a good deal of new equipment, notably APC, ATGW and air defence weapons. In both cases, however, the supply of new weapons to the reserve formations and battalions that would reinforce them was limited, as was the training carried out by reservists.

In addition to the major national formations Allied Command Europe also included the Canadian Brigade Group which had become by late July the equivalent almost of a small division.[5] An all-regular force, its quality was high. Old hands in other Allied countries (particularly among the British), who recalled their experience with Canadian troops in the last world war, saw with satisfaction that in their technical skills and their robust and disciplined approach they were, in the changed circumstances of today, as good as ever. The Group was stationed in the CENTAG area, not far from the French divisions.

Though France had not been a member of NATO since 1966 II French Corps, of two divisions, with corps and some army troops nearly 50,000 strong, continued to be stationed in Germany, with close military liaison with CENTAG. Three mechanized divisions in France formed the balance of the First French Army, to which the French divisions in Germany belonged. The equipment of the five divisions in the First French Army was modern and good and included battlefield nuclear weapons held inside France, under French control. Little of the equipment was standardized with NATO however, raising potential problems in supply. In addition to the Forces de Manoeuvre, of which the First French Army was part, France disposed of Territorial Defence Forces

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