perhaps significant that the leading divisions in the enemy’s assault were now more often motor-rifle than tank divisions, and powerful probing for weak points was tending more and more to replace the massive armoured assault of tanks in the first wave. The Allied tactic, at unit level, which was essentially a matter of striving wherever possible to separate the tanks from their supporting infantry, was clearly paying off.
Further south the anti-tank defences of VII US Corps, with strong artillery and increasing tactical air support, had just been sufficient to contain a major attempt to break through south-east of Frankfurt where pressure was again building up. From Nurnberg southwards the situation was confused, but what information was available suggested that the First French Army with II German Corps was still more or less in control along the Lech.
Over the next five days of bright, clear weather, as growing French strength in the south did much to stabilize the right flank, it became increasingly clear that the main effort would continue to be made in the north. The boundary between the two army groups had been moved up to give the Kassel area, with command of the much weakened I Belgian Corps, to CENTAG. After very hard fighting had held up a determined attempt to push down to Frankfurt through Giessen, COMCENTAG now believed that he had a good chance of holding an area whose forward edge would run from Kassel down through Alsfeld to south of Wurzburg. If the Soviet 3 Shock Army had been put in behind 1 Guards Tank Army the outlook would have been different, but it had been committed to the attack in the north.
By 7 August the continued enforcement of chemical defensive measures upon NORTHAG was beginning to cause concern, and pressure from field commanders for some form of retaliation grew. In theory a nuclear response had always been considered a possibility, at least by the British, but at this stage SACEUR was in no doubt that such a response would be an irrational risk. He was, however, prepared to see chemicals used in retaliation; indeed, authority for their use had already been delegated to local US commanders. SACEUR thus felt able to offer some chemical support to NORTHAG. It presented no problem to COMAAFCE to allot a squadron of US Air Force F-4
The
Refugees were posing an acute and growing problem in the south, as in the north. Large numbers of people from Augsburg and Ulm had moved in the direction of Stuttgart, and a rapidly increasing mass of frightened people was building up in the vicinity of Karlsruhe. The same sort of thing was also happening where crowds fleeing from Nurnberg and Wurzburg, augmented by refugees from smaller places, were bearing down on Mannheim. From the Frankfurt area there was a good deal of movement in the direction of Wiesbaden and Mainz. The general picture was one of a widespread and virtually uncontrollable flow from east to west, much of it on foot with possessions piled on vehicles drawn by animals or pushed or dragged by hand, with a chaotic jumble of motor vehicles of every description, more and more of them abandoned as petrol supplies gave out. At the Rhine crossings the pressure was tremendous; to keep the bridges open was putting increasing strain on Federal German police and territorial troops. Disorder was increased by determined Soviet air attack, both at low and medium levels, of which some at least always got through the defences. The importance of maintaining freedom of movement across the Rhine for the Allies, and of blocking it for the Warsaw Pact, was fully realized on both sides. By the fourth day some success began to attend the strenuous efforts of Federal German police and territorial troops to establish control over refugee movements and divert them into areas of open country east of the river. This did much to relieve pressure on the Rhine crossings but could not prevent serious interference with the movement of troops and other essential military traffic.
To the north of the Central Region AFNORTH was proving a tougher proposition for the Warsaw Pact than many in the West had expected, perhaps because few had much experience of the very great difficulty of movement from north to south in Norway. By 4 August the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force of seven battalions with supporting troops had been put in by air and deployed north of Narvik. A Royal Marine Commando came in from Britain by sea and other Allied reinforcements arrived by sea and air to strengthen and support Norwegian national forces deployed in north Norway.
Advanced elements of a Soviet motor-rifle division crossed into Norway from the Kola peninsula on 4 August. A second was already moving westwards through Finnish Lapland, directed on Narvik. The fact that the Soviet and Finnish railway systems were integrated meant that no movement problem hampered the early follow-on of eight to ten more Soviet divisions. Soviet air superiority was complete.
The relative strengths of ground troops in AFNORTH did not, however, give a true measure of the Warsaw Pact advantage. It was less than it looked. The strength of the defence lay in the very great difficulty of deployment for offensive action, even with a favourable air situation. It was, in fact, only the action of a Soviet amphibious force in effecting a landing south of Bodo on 10 August that was to compel a southward redeployment of Allied forces to protect the land line of communication through north Trondelag and Nordland. By 15 August a firm Allied defence was based on Trondheim, which was unlikely to be seriously threatened so long as a delaying action continued to be successfully fought in the north.
To the south of the Central Region, HQ AFSOUTH, with a hastily put together Italian government in exile, had moved on 6 and 7 August to Spain. The Italian peninsula was now entirely under Soviet control, though with no great strength in Red Army troops.
The Italian and US air elements based in Italy constituting 5 Allied Tactical Air Force, after their initial operations, found themselves overtaken by the virtual disintegration of the NATO Southern Region. The wings and squadrons were faced with a fleeting chance and those aircrew who had serviceable aircraft took it by flying to Spain and the south of France where they were subsequently used as a general reserve of tactical air power for the central battle, chiefly in the south of the Central Region.
Holland came under Soviet occupation as far south as the River Maas by 10 August, the seat of government having removed to Eindhoven. The last remnants of a Dutch defence of the frontier had been dispersed in an action near Lingen on the 8th, and thereafter only floods caused by the opening of the dykes and an active civilian resistance had stood in the invaders’ way.
On 10 August the right-hand corps of the Northern Army Group, I British, was still in being, though battered, in the area round Paderborn. Its anti-tank defences had been its salvation. The tactics of the ‘sponge’ had been highly successful. Small infantry detachments manning ATGW were still lying up in built-up or hilly country, waiting for the vulnerable flank, always trying to reduce the impetus of the enemy’s advance by hampering the follow-up and interfering with supply. The concentration of attack at all levels, by every means, on communications, command and control was paying off handsomely. One guided missile could destroy one tank. A single hit on a divisional command post could impose confusion and delay upon a hundred. Even where physical disruption was not possible (and, with the methods currently in use, nodal communication points could quite often be located and destroyed) interference with communication almost always was. It was remarkable how far such interference could reduce the effectiveness of an enemy accustomed to close control by superiors.
To the left of I British Corps, I German Corps was still established along the Teutoburger Wald, offering so great a threat to the enemy’s advance from east to west as to invite a major effort very soon to push it out. On its left, in turn, stood II British Corps, forced back to positions south and west of Munster, with one US brigade under command on the west bank of the Rhine. The remnants of I Netherlands Corps, which had taken very heavy
