The Third World War: August 1985

d’etat, and the ‘new class’ of government technocrats live in constant fear of these.

4 The only Moscow-communist countries left in the poor South of the world are now in the Caribbean — led by Jamaica and Cuba. But some of the ‘unstable left’ countries — of which the most important is Egypt — seem to be moving towards Moscow. The former communist small countries in East Asia (Vietnam, North Korea, etc.) still call themselves communist — as does Chairman Hua’s China — but with the Japanese-Chinese rapprochement they are merging into the East Asian co-prosperity sphere.

Significantly, the Asian republics of the Soviet Union itself are showing some signs of restlessness. Their peoples would gain if they could forge more independent ties with the China-Japan co-prosperity sphere and loosen their ties with Moscow, just as the states of the disintegrating Indian Union and former Union of South Africa have loosened their ties with Delhi and Pretoria.

The real GNP of countries in these four groups and their growth since 1977 clearly indicate that the ‘breakthrough’ and ‘unstable right-wing’ governments have made their peoples much more prosperous in the period 1977-84. In economic terms, the ‘unstable left’ countries (wholly) and the Moscow-communist countries (partly) have failed. It would be better for all the peoples of the world if more countries could be lifted out of the ‘unstable left’ class into either of the first two categories.

Yet the four most likely flashpoints of trouble in the poor two-thirds of the world, at this beginning of your presidency, are connected with possible attempts by either ‘unstable left’ or Moscow-communist countries to seize or subvert power in ‘unstable right’ countries. We would judge that these four most probable flashpoints are:

1 In the Middle East. The conclusion of peace with Israel, under the Geneva settlement during Mr Carter’s presidency, has allowed the Arabs even more freedom for their internal quarrels. Since the new unstable left government in Egypt remembers the food riots with which its own supporters overthrew the former President Samdi, there is a strong temptation for Egypt to go for the oil of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. This could be by means of internal subversion followed by proclamation of a new and immensely rich United Arab Republic (including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) which would sponsor a new hard line in OPEC. Egypt has been angling for some time for Soviet support for such coups d’etat in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, but so far this has been refused. It is quite possible that a ‘United Arab’ coup d’etat would win popular support among young men in the Gulf, since many of them regard their free-spending sheikhs as effete pooves, like the rulers of the old Ottoman Empire. If a new UAR of this kind were ever proclaimed, some people would say that the consequent threat to world oil supplies would, of itself, justify US military intervention in the area. We would not advocate this, but the choice between peace and war, even nuclear war, might conceivably lie outside American hands. The only stable right-wing (indeed, ‘breakthrough’) country in the area — the Shah’s Iran — might not sit idly by. And Iran now probably has a nuclear capability based on French technology, even though it has never tested a weapon.

2 The communist Caribbean (in which Jamaica is now the leader, rather than Cuba) and unstable governments of Central America might try to initiate a coup d’etat in Mexico, whose dynamic new president deserves US support.

3 Black African forces from the ‘unstable left’ countries of Zimbabwe and Namibia, supported by Cuban and Jamaican and maybe even Soviet ‘volunteers’ landed in Angola and Mozambique, might attack those states of the former Union of South Africa which have developed right-wing governments, sometimes ‘unstable right-wing’ ones. By far the richest of these states are, of course, the three ‘white tribes’ homelands’ of Southern Cape Province, Eastern Natal and Krugerland (Pretoria-Johannesburg). But a real prosperity is also being attained by those black-ruled states and cantons of the former Union of South Africa who have struck up successful (although so-called ‘Uncle Tom’) economic relations with the three White homelands. If there is an actual invasion of this area from the north, the dilemmas set for your Administration will be: (a) economic, because benign growth spreading from the dynamic area of former South Africa appears to be Africa’s only hope for a non-oil economic growth area this century; and (b) military- moral, because the white tribes in South Africa agreed under the Treaty of Pretoria of 1982 that neither they nor the black tribes in former South Africa should have substantial military forces, but that there would be reliance on UN troops on the northern border (most awkwardly, now Mexican, Polish and Indian troops) and perhaps some hopes, however ill based, of intervention by US troops.

4 Rival factions and states in the former Indian Union may start appealing separately to the Soviet Union and China. There might be civil war again in this whole area of India-Pakistan- Bangladesh.

But the biggest threat to peace may lie in the troubles of the Soviet Union and its satellites. This is discussed in the Ex-Secretary’s report on the rich North of the world.

President-elect Thompson received the Think-Tank’s report at the same time as he was presented with the Ex-Secretary’s report, which dealt with subjects closer to his heart.

THE EX-SECRETARY’S REPORT ON THE ‘RICH NORTH’, NOVEMBER 1984

The principal instabilities in the rich North of the world between 1977 and 1984 have come in old-fashioned countries or blocs which have failed to adapt in time to the new basis of survival. Soviet Russia has shown the least ability to adapt to a changing world, and Moscow is now beset by crises to its west, east and south.

Poland and Yugoslavia, for different reasons, are the two most dangerous flashpoints in the West.

Poland has diverged significantly from the norms of communist society. Comecon-decreed exports to the USSR are interfering with its standard of living, while political dogma is preventing the introduction of free enterprise systems in Polish industry. Polish workers much prefer employment by multi-national companies, when these operate in their country, to employment by the Polish state. The state, though the most powerful employer, is also the most disliked. As Poland goes tomorrow, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are liable to go the day after.

East Germany is bound to seek a greater political role, proportionate to its economic superiority in Eastern Europe. East Germany now has a gnp per head of $4,000 a year, twice European Russia’s $2,000 a year. Neighbouring West Germany has a GNP per head of $11,000 a year, and the East Germans know they could have something like this too if they could ever throw off the yoke of the USSR.

The successful participation by the Italian communists in government since 1982, and a Popular Front government in France, have frustrated further advance towards European union and have weakened NATO. But the Italian experience has also bred unexpected dangers for the Soviet Union, because it has shown in practice the success of other roads to ‘socialism’, and thus provided encouragement for Poland.

This is a model more likely to be followed than that of the weak new regime in post-Tito Yugoslavia, which has not been able to resist the establishment of pro-Soviet cells in Serbia. But Yugoslavia is another very possible flashpoint, precisely because it is so weak. If there are near-revolts in Poland or East Germany, I do not think the Soviet Union will be eager to send in its own troops to put them down. But they might well engineer (and accept) an invitation from communist cells in Serbia to put down a so-called capitalist counter-revolution in Slovenia or Croatia.

This would be the cheapest Soviet intervention, designed to show the Poles and others that the Red Army still can, and will, move quickly and aggressively when it must. It is therefore all the more dangerous that NATO has left its policy towards Yugoslavia so vague. At present the Russians probably feel that a re-assertion of their power in Poland might lead to reaction from the West (perhaps from West Germany?), but that a new assertion of power over Yugoslavia would probably bring no Western response more powerful than protests.

West Germany has been somewhat disillusioned by the disappointing progress of the EEC and of NATO. The CDU-led opposition is playing for power in Bonn by reviving hopes of reunification with East Germany. Internal revolts in Poland and East Germany might now bring a more positive response from Bonn — a prospect which fills the Soviet Union with alarm.

The Soviet Union itself is ruled by the last of the Second World War generation, believing in power for the regime, austerity for the masses and a foreign bogey to encourage obedience. The government in Moscow is said to be beginning to be somewhat worried about the possibility of disaffection in the Red Army; the present generation of educated youth has no great enthusiasm for three years’ conscripted service under arms.

Moscow is even more worried about the growth of nationalism in the Asian republics of the Soviet Union, which are looking enviously at the increasing prosperity of Japan and China.

The fastest economic growth in the years 1977-84 has occurred in Japan, China and the countries with close