Warday

-	PERCENTAGE OF RECOVERY IN AREA CAPACITY TO DATE	PERCENTAGE OF CAPACITY NONRECOVERABLE
Computer/information systems	24%	55%
Defense industry	27	57
Electronics/telecommunications	37	72
Financial industry	21	60
Government (all levels)	32	45
Heavy industry	15	40
Manufacturing	15	57
Petrochemical	39	46
Power/utilities	42	37
Service industry	18	69
Transportation	26	59

4.0 SUMMARY

Prewar estimates of EMP effects have proven to be vastly understated and to some extent unforeseen. EMP effects are centered on microelectronic components, and all levels of both military and civilian populations were affected. Prewar efforts to shield sensitive systems were, to an unfortunate degree, ineffective. Only large-scale prewar efforts to stockpile critical components have permitted the constrained recovery which has occurred to date. There remains a severe shortage of these components and systems, which only accelerated Allied imports and long-term rebuilding can overcome.

* * *

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT D-8072

SUMMARY REPORT OF CRITICAL MINERALS NEEDS, 1991–1995

TASK FORCE ON CRITICAL MATERIALS

MARCH 31, 1991

There is at present a severe shortage of materials, especially minerals, necessary for reestablishing the defense capability of the United States. While many factors impact recovery, including the necessary commitment of resources by the government, no progress can be made in the production of many microelectronic components of aircraft and weapons systems without necessary supplies of certain critical minerals. Prewar stockpiles have been nearly exhausted and imports are at present minimal because of present conditions in the world trade system and breakdown of prewar alliances.

This task force has identified eleven minerals, or mineral groups, that are crucial to defense needs and are unavailable in any quantity in this country.

Table One outlines these materials and the location of major reserves outside the United States. It should be pointed out that while reserves of these critical materials may exist, they may not be available to our industries. Recent political and economic postures put forth by the NATO countries, for example, suggest that internal restrictions may have been put on certain strategic materials. While it is not the purpose of this report to examine the rationale of these restrictions, they will no doubt further impede U.S. defense recovery.

TABLE ONE

PRINCIPAL SUPPLIERS OF CRITICAL DEFENSE MATERIALS

MINERAL	COUNTRIES WITH MAJOR RESERVES AND PERCENT OF WORLD TOTAL
BAUXITE	Guinea 28%