Levi Burton, Randy Hadeed, Reed Bergman, Keith Delucia, Maurice Freedman, Gary and Kevin Vernon, Adam Weinbrenner, Ben Madden, Joe Mangione, Dana, Ray, Diane, Ryan, Jay, and Sabrina Benedict, Andy Olson, Clint Walker, Jeff Suratt, and Monica Johnson. One look at those names and you can see that I am truly blessed.

And thank you to all who have donated to the Dakota Meyer Scholarship (www.dakotameyer.com). So far we have raised more than one million dollars for the education of the children of the wounded.

Every word in this book is what I remember to the best of my ability. I’ve been over this book time and again, separately with Bing, with our editor, Will Murphy, with Dean Schmidt, and with Toby and Ann. Will Swenson was also a great help. Perhaps writing the narrative will help me come to terms with what happened. I hope so.

To the families of Lt. Mike Johnson, Staff Sgt. Aaron Kenefick, Doc Layton, and Edwin Johnson, I offer my everlasting and profound regret. The Marine Corps teaches you not about trying, but about doing, and I didn’t get there in time. I will forever miss my team.

Appendix 1

GANJIGAL TIMELINE

(EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 8, 2009)

TIMELINE

0100-0400 — Numerous enemy groups moving toward Ganjigal.

0330 — Embedded training team (ETT) 2-8 and Askars link with Highlander 5 and border police; in a file of vehicles, they turn off main road and head east into Ganjigal Valley.

0400 — One mile inside the valley, they stop at operational release point (ORP); they dismount and proceed on foot.

0530 — Afghan National Army (ANA) observation post to north above the wash leading into Ganjigal (Marines on the outpost [OP] were Miller and Valadez).

0530 — Kaplan and Cpl. Norman and twelve ANA set up southern OP with a 240 Golf machine gun.

0530 — 1-32 scout-sniper team called Shadow 4 on OP farther back on south side, 1,200 meters away—too far to apply direct fire, but in excellent position to relay radio messages from the valley to the tactical operations center (TOC) at Joyce.

0530 (0100 Zulu) — Contact reported to TOC of Battalion 1-32 at Camp Joyce.

0530 — Lt. Johnson four-man party (Team Monti) 100 meters in front of TAC/Command Group when firing begins; Swenson runs 100 meters forward to join Lt. Johnson’s TAC (tactical command post) and calls suppression artillery fire.

0537 — Shadow (Staff Sgt. Summers and Staff Sgt. Alvarez) reports first 120-millimeter mission KE 3070.

0545 — ANA soldiers disperse among terraces.

0545 — Rodriguez-Chavez on radio hears Lt. Johnson tell Fabayo he needs fires to get out of a house.

0545 — Meyer’s requests to enter wash are denied via Fox 7 (Valadez radio relay).

0546 — Call for fire KE 3345.

0547 — Meyer, Valadez, and Rodriguez-Chavez in discussions.

0550 — Splash KE 3345 four HE 120s fire from Joyce; Garza testified this was effective fire.

0551 — Swenson requests air—told air is coming in fifteen mikes (minutes).

0556 — Call for fire KE 3365.

0557-0630 — Kaplan calls/relays seven smoke missions; denied because too close to civilians.

0600 — Splash 3070 four HE 155s from Asadabad (A-Bad).

0600 — Staff Sgt. Kenefick tries to give grid.

0600 — Meyer and Rodriguez-Chavez disobey orders and drive toward the battle.

0600 — TOC via Shadow again assures Highlander (Swenson) that CCA (close combat aviation) helo support is “fifteen minutes away.”

0605 — Splash KE 3365 eight HE 120s; Garza testified this had no effect, even when adjusted.

0605 — Swenson and Fabayo agree to pull back.

0610 — Meyer and Rodriguez-Chavez signal to five ANA soldiers to get into their truck.

0615 — Staff Sgt. Lantz, NCO in charge in TOC at Joyce (Hammer), contacts 7-17 Cav (Pale Horse) in direct support of 4/4 BCT in Op Lethal Storm in Shuriak Valley, 5 kilometers to the north of Ganjigal; Lantz requests re- tasking two OH-58 (Kiowas) Scout Weapons Team (SWT) 1.

0615 — TOC directs Dog platoon to prepare to go forward.

0616 — In TOC, joint terminal attack controller (JTAC)-qualified Tech Sgt. Matzke asks officer on watch to declare an air TIC (troops in contact) to bring in fixed-wing CAS (close air support), but request is denied.

0618 — Swenson calls for fire for smoke at grid 902 515 to cover withdrawal; denied.

0620 — 7-17 ops center denies Lantz’s request on procedural grounds “not routed through brigade”; 7-17 declares SWT 1 is “in support of higher-priority mission.”

0620 — Villagers join attack.

0625 — Shadow reports to TOC that the ANA (Askars) are under fire from the north, east, and south—eight to ten enemy positions with rocket-propelled grenades, PKM machine guns, and mortars deployed in a horseshoe around Ganjigal village. (Note: battle captain [senior watch officer] was located in southwest corner of TOC, could not hear radio transmissions, and relied on others to tell him what was said.)

0625 — Command Group in wash falling back toward the west.

0630 — Maj. Williams and Maj. Talib request help; Talib calls Afghan battalion commander via cell phone.

0630 — TOC orders Dog to move forward; platoon leader complains he has no grid for link-up or LOA.

0633 — Will Swenson throws grenade and kills three insurgents in ANA gear.

0634 — TOC requests CCA via Task Force Pale Horse 7-17 ops center; again, this creates hesitation because it is out of the normal request pattern, but 4/4 Brigade Ops Center intervenes and backs up 1-32 request.

0635 — Shadow reports Dog platoon breaking down its TCP (traffic control point) to move to support.

0635 — Command Group forced to fall farther back; reporter does not move with the group.

0639 — Splash white phosphorus four rounds from 120mm mortars to east of village, too far away to provide concealment for Team Monti.

0639 — TOC denies any more artillery support, citing garbled communication, lack of situational awareness on part of Shadow, and incomplete fire mission procedures; no more arty fired until 1615 of that same day.

0644 — Swenson sends his initials for polar fire mission—denied; Capt. Ray Kaplan doing same.

0650-0700 — Westbrook hit; Garza and reporter, who has rejoined the group, help him; Garza concussed; Afghan interpreter killed; Williams nicked; Swenson applies first aid to Westbrook.

0655 — Fabayo and Swenson continue to cover short retreat sprints over dirt furrows; Lt. Rhula shot in groin/upper thigh.

0700 — TOC battle captain asks Tech Sgt. Matzke, a JTAC, what CAS is available, but tells Matzke not to open air TIC.

0702 — Last comm with Team Monti.

0703 — Swenson alerts Shadow he will send nine-line helo medevac for Westbrook.

0707 — Shadow relays Swenson’s request to TOC.

0709 — Dog platoon reports its limit of advance to TOC.

0710 — CCA approved by Task Force Mountain Warrior (brigade level).

0710 — Shadow takes fire from the south, calls for immediate suppression fire mission 957 493 1 kilometer to their rear on higher ground.

0715 — Swenson alerted that helos are inbound.

0720 — Werth/Hooker investigation: Team Monti estimated as “likely dead” by this time.

0720 — Shadow fire mission request is posted in TOC.

0721 — A-Bad PTDS (blimp cameras) reports muzzle flashes at 983 511.

0723 — Two Kiowas test-fire their guns into Kunar River as they approach Ganjigal.

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