would be sent to Persia and the East, with foreign competition foreclosed by prohibition on transit routes. Nonetheless, in 1913 fully sixty percent of Russian exports were foodstuffs and animals, another third lumber, petroleum, and other materials. Scarcely six percent were textiles, much of it from tsarist Poland. Russian imports were luxury consumer goods (including coffee and tea), equipment, and cotton fiber. Spurred by railroads, industrialization, and a convertible currency, foreign trade during the tsarist period reached a peak just before World War I with a turnover of $1.5 billion in prices of the time. This total was not matched after the Communist Revolution until the wartime imports of 1943, paid for largely by loans. Exports were approximately one-tenth of gross domestic product in 1913, a proportion hardly approached since. They were only four percent of GDP in 1977, for example.
Under the Bolsheviks, Russia conducted an off-and-on policy of self-sufficiency or autarky. According to Michael Kaser’s figures, export volumes rose steadily from five percent of the 1913 level in 1922 to sixty-one percent by 1931. When Britain signed a trade agreement in 1922 and others followed, the Soviet government began to buy consumer goods to provide incentives for the workers. They also bought locomotives, farm machinery, and other equipment to replace those lost in the long war years. Exports also rose smartly.
With the beginnings of planning at the end of the 1920s, however, trade fell off throughout the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s, reflecting extreme trade aversion and suspicions of western intentions on Josef Stalin’s part, as well as the general world depression, which adversely affected Russia’s terms of trade. Russia wanted to be as self-sufficient as possible in case war cut off its supplies, as indeed occurred from 1939 to 1945. Imports of consumer goods fell precipitously, but so did some important industrial materials that were now produced domestically. Since 1928, Russian exports have averaged only about one to two percent of its national income, as compared with six to seven percent of that of the United States in a comparable period. Imports showed a similarly mixed pattern, with imports much exceeding exports during the long war years.
After World War II, Russia no longer pursued such an extreme policy of autarky. Export volumes rose every year, reaching 4.6 times the 1913 level by 1967. But they were still less than four percent of output. The statistical breakdown of Soviet trade was often censored. Its deficits on merchandise trade account and invisibles were financed in unknown part by sales of gold and by borrowings in hard currency. The latter resulted in a growing hard-currency debt to western creditors from 1970 onward, amounting to an estimated $11.2 billion by 1978. Neglect of comparative advantage and international specialization has probably been negative for economic growth and consumer welfare.
During the post-World War II period, most Soviet merchandise imports and exports were traded with the other Communist countries in bilateral deals concluded under the auspices of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Even though trade with the developed capitalist countries of the West and with less developed countries increased throughout this era, USSR trade with other “socialist” states still exceeded fifty percent of the total in 1979, while the share of the West was about one-third. Trade with COMECON members was nearly balanced year by year, but when it was not, the difference was credited in “transferable rubles,” a book entry that hardly committed either side to future shipments. Franklyn Holzman termed this feature of Soviet trade “commodity inconvertibility,” as distinct from currency inconvertibility, which also characterized intra-bloc trade and finance.
Trade with the developed western capitalist countries was always impeded by the deficient quality of Soviet manufactured goods, including poor merchandising and after-sales service. Furthermore, western countries also discriminated against Soviet exports by their tariff and strategic goods policies. Even so, some Russian-produced articles, like watches produced in military factories and tractors, entered a few markets. More significantly, the USSR was able to export tremendous quantities of oil, gas, timber, and nonferrous metals such as platinum and manganese, as well as some heavy chemicals. Notable imports included whole plants for the production of automobiles, tropical foodstuffs, and grain during periods of harvest failure.
Foreign trade was always a state monopoly in the USSR, even during the New Economic Policy (NEP). Under the control of the Minister of Foreign Trade, foreign-trade “corporations” conducted the buying and selling, though industrial ministries and even republic authorities could be involved in the negotiations. Barter deals at the frontiers and
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tourist traffic provide trivial exceptions to the rule. The object of the monopoly was to fit imports and exports into the overall plan regardless of changes in world prices and availabilities. Foreign trade corporations are not responsible for profits or losses caused by the difference between the prices they negotiate and the corresponding ruble price, given the arbitrary exchange rate. Exports must be planned to cover the cost of necessary imports- notably petroleum, timber, and natural gas during the last decades in exchange for materials, equipment, and foodstuffs during poor harvest years. Hence enterprise managers were told what to produce for export and what may be available from foreign sources. Thus, they had little or no knowledge of foreign conditions, nor interest in adjusting their activities to suit the international situation of the USSR. With internal prices unrelated to international scarcities, the planning agencies could not allow ministries or chief administration, still less enterprises, to decide on their own what to buy or sell abroad. Tariffs were strictly for revenue purposes. For instance, when the world market price of oil quadrupled in 1973-1974, the internal Soviet price did not change for nearly a decade. But trade with the outside world is conducted in convertible currencies, their volumes then translated into valyuta rubles at an arbitrary, overvalued rate for the statistics. Prices charged to or by COMECON partners were determined in many different ways, all subject to negotiation and dispute. Some effort was made during the 1970s to calculate a more efficient pattern of foreign trade for investment purposes, but in practice these calculations were little applied.
Given the shortage of foreign currency and underdeveloped trading facilities, Soviet trade corporations often engaged in “counterpart-trade,” a kind of barter, where would-be western sellers were asked to take Soviet goods in return for possible resale. For instance, the sale of large-diameter gas pipes for West European customers would be repaid in gas over time. Obviously, these practices were awkward, and Soviet leaders tried a number of organizational measures to interest producers in increased exports, with little success.
One of the changes instituted under Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership was permission for Soviet enterprises to deal directly with foreign suppliers and customers. Given the short time perestroika had to work, it is impossible to tell whether these direct ties alone would have improved Soviet penetration of choosy markets in the developed world. After all, Soviet manufactures suffered from poor design, unreliability, and insufficient incentives, as well as substandard distribution and service.
During the years immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian ruble became convertible for trade and tourist purposes, but exporters were required to rebate part of their earnings to the state for repayment of foreign debts. Further handicapping Russian exporters was the appreciating real rate of exchange, owing to continued inflation. The IMF also supported the overvalued ruble. By 1996 the ruble became fully convertible. All this made dollars cheap for Russians to accumulate and stimulated capital flight estimated at around $20 billion per year throughout the 1990s. It also made imports of food and luxuries unusually inexpensive, while making Russian exports uncompetitive. What is more, the former East European CMEA partner countries and most Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members now preferred to trade with the advanced western countries, rather than Russia. When in mid-1998 the government could no longer defend the overvalued ruble, it accepted a sixty percent depreciation to eliminate the large current account deficit in the balance of payments. This stimulated a recovery of Russian industry, particularly those firms producing import substitutes. Russian exports of oil and gas (which furnish about one-third of tax revenues) also recovered during the late 1990s. Rising energy prices likewise allowed the government to accumulate foreign exchange reserves, pay off much of its foreign debt, and finance still quite extensive central government operations. However, absent private investment, prospects for diversifying Russian exports beyond raw materials and arms were still unclear in the early twenty-first century. See also: COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE; ECONOMIC GROWTH, IMPERIAL; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; FOREIGN DEBT; TRADE ROUTES; TRADE STATUTES OF 1653 AND 1667
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Erickson, P.G., and Miller, R.S. (1979). “Soviet Foreign Economic Behavior: A Balance of Payments
