provision and distribution of goods and services in natural form, without the social contrivances of property, markets, and prices, was not feasible, since rational collective control of economic activity requires calculations that cannot rely consistently on “natural unit” variables such as energy or labor amounts. It also became clear that the existing computing capabilities were inadequate for deriving a consistent economic plan from a general equilibrium problem. This led, in the Socialist Calculation Debate of the 1930s, to the suggestion (most notably by Oskar Lange) that a Socialist regime, assuming ownership of all means of production, could use markets to find relevant consumers’ prices and valuations while maintaining social and state control over production, income determination, investment, and economic development. Managers would be instructed to minimize costs, while the planning board would adjust producers’ prices to eliminate disequilibria in the markets for final goods. Thus, at a socialist market equilibrium, the classical marginal conditions of static efficiency would be maintained, while the State would ensure equitable distribution of incomes through its allocation of the surplus (profit) from efficient production and investment in socially desirable planned development.
Another version of market socialism arose as a result of the reform experiences in east-central Europe, particularly the labor-managed economic system of Yugoslavia that developed following Marshal Tito’s break with Josef Stalin in 1950. This gave rise to a large body of literature on the “Illyrian Firm” with decentralized, democratic control of production by workers’ collectives in a market economy subject to substantial macroeco-nomic planning and income redistribution through taxation and subsidies. The economic reforms in Hungary (1968), Poland (1981), China after 1978, and Gorbachev’s Russia (1987-1991) involved varying degrees of decentralization of State Socialism and its administrative command economy, providing partial approximations to the classical market socialist model of Oskar Lange. This experience highlighted the difficulties of planning for and controlling decentralized markets, and revealed the failure of market socialism to provide incentives for managers to follow the rules necessary for economic efficiency. Faced with these circumstances, proponents of market socialism moved beyond state ownership and control of property to various forms of economic democracy and collective property, accepting the necessity of real markets and market prices but maintaining the classical socialist rejection of fully private productive property. The early debates on market socialism are best seen in Friedrich A. von Hayek (1935), while the current state of the debate is presented in Pranab Bardhan and John E. Roemer (1993). See also: PERESTROIKA; PLANNERS’ PREFERENCE; SOCIALISM; STATE ORDERS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bardhan, Pranab, and Roemer, John E., eds. (1993). Market Socialism: The Current Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Granick, David. (1975). Enterprise Guidance in Eastern Europe: A Comparison of Four Socialist Economies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hayek, Friedrich A. von, ed. (1935). Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism. London: Routledge. Kornai, J?nos. (1992). The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lange, Oskar, and Taylor, Fred M. (1948). On the Economic Theory of Socialism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
As elsewhere in Europe, marriage and family life in Russia have varied across time and by social group, reflecting the complex interplay of competing ideals, changing patterns of social and economic organization, differing forms of political organization and levels of state intrusiveness, and the effects of cataclysmic events. If in the long run the outcome of this interplay of forces has been a family structure and dynamic that conform essentially with those found in modern European societies, the development of marriage and the family in Russia nevertheless has followed a distinctive path. This development can be divided into three broad periods: the centuries preceding the formation of the Russian Empire during the early eighteenth century, the imperial period (1698-1917), and the period following the Bolshevik Revolution and establishment of the Soviet state in October 1917. While the pace of development and change varied significantly between different social groups during each of these periods, each period nonetheless was characterized by a distinctive combination of forces that shaped marital and family life and family structures. In Russia’s successive empires, moreover, important differences also often existed between the many ethno-cultural and religious groups included in these empires. The discussion that follows therefore concerns principally the Slavic Christian population.
PRE-IMPERIAL RUSSIA
Although only limited sources are available for the reconstruction of marital and family life in medieval Russia, especially for nonelite social groups, there appears to have been broad continuity in the structure and functioning of the family throughout the medieval and early modern periods. Family structures and interpersonal relations within marriage and the family were strongly shaped by the forms of social organization and patterns of economic activity evolved to secure survival in a harsh natural as well as political environment. Hence, constituting the primary unit of production and reproduction, and providing the main source of welfare, personal status, and identity, families in most instances were multigenerational and structured hierarchically, with authority and economic and familial roles distributed within the family on the basis of gender and seniority. While scholars disagree over whether already by 1600 the nuclear family had begun to displace the multi-generational family among the urban population, this development did not affect the patriarchal character or the social and economic functions of either marriage or the family. Reflecting and reinforcing these structures and functions, the marriage of children was arranged by senior family members, with the economic, social, and political interests of the family taking precedence over individual preference. Land and other significant assets, too, generally were considered to belong to the family as a whole, with males enjoying preferential treatment in inheritance. Marriage appears to have been universal among all social groups, with children marrying at a young age, and for married women, childbirth was frequent.
After the conversion of Grand Prince Vladimir of Kievan Rus to Christianity in 988, normative rules governing marriage and the family also were shaped and enforced by the Orthodox Church, although the effective influence of the Church spread slowly from urban to rural areas. Granted extensive jurisdiction over marital and family matters first by Kievan and then by Muscovite grand princes, the Church used its authority to establish marriage as a religious institution and to attempt to bring marital and family life into conformity with its doctrines and canons. For example, the Church sought-with varying degrees of success- to limit the formation of marriages through restrictions based on consanguinity and age, to restrict marital dissolution to the instances defined by canon law, to limit the possibility of remarriage, and to confine sexual activity to relations between spouses within marriage for the purpose of procreation. At the same time, through its teachings, canonical rules, and ecclesiastical activities, the Church reinforced the patriarchal order within marriage and the family, thereby providing a religious sanction for established social structures and practices. Hence the extent to which the Church transformed or merely reinforced existing ideals of and relationships within marriage and the family remains disputed.
Although patriarchal attitudes and structures and a gendered division of labor also prevailed within elite households, the role of family and linMARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE eage in determining relative status within and between elite groups, access to beneficial appointments and the material rewards that followed from them, and the prospects for forming advantageous marriage alliances between families imparted distinctive characteristics to elite family life, especially after the late fifteenth century. The practice among the Muscovite elite of secluding women in separate quarters (the terem), for example, which reached its greatest intensity during the seventeenth century, appears to have been due largely to the desire to protect family honor and ensure the marriage utility of daughters in a context in which the elite was growing in size and complexity. Seclusion itself, however, considerably increased the politically important role of married women in arranging and maintaining family alliances. Similarly, the development of a system of service tenements in land to support the expansion especially of military servitors after the late fifteenth century led initially to a deterioration in the property and inheritance rights of elite women. Yet such women also often had principal responsibility for managing the estates and other affairs of husbands who frequently were away on military campaigns or carrying out other service assignments. Hence within the Muscovite elite, and quite likely among other social groups in pre-Petrine Russia as well, the normative ideal and legal rules supporting the patriarchal family often concealed a more complex reality. This ideal nonetheless provided a powerful metaphor that helped to legitimize and integrate the familial, social, and political orders.
IMPERIAL RUSSIA
