firms. More narrowly, the techpromfinplan specified the scope of the firm’s operations for the year.
The production component of the annual enterprise plan identified the quantity, ruble value (valovaia produktsia), and commodity assortment of output to be produced. Input allocations, supply schedules, capacity and resource utilization norms, as well as other technical indicators, were devised to support the firm’s ability to fulfill the production targets. Current production targets were typically based on a percentage increase in the firm’s past performance, adjusted for quality-improvement targets. The process of planning from the achieved level meant that Soviet enterprises were subject to a “ratchet effect” in terms of quantity targets.
The financial component of the enterprise plan consisted of profitability norms, planned cost reductions, credit plans for purchasing inputs, a wage bill, and other financial indicators. The comprehensive nature of the financial plan paralleled the production plan, allowing planners to monitor the firm’s monthly and quarterly output performance. Moreover, through the financial plan, ministerial officials exercised ruble control (kontrol’ rublem) over the enterprise by restricting access to financial resources, as well as by redistributing profits. Unlike managers of firms in market economies, however, whose performance is measured in terms of financial indicators, Soviet manENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY
TELEOLOGICAL PLANNING
agers placed highest priority on fulfilling the production plan targets.
In addition to production, financial, and distribution components, the techpromfinplan also specified a variety of labor staffing targets, including the distribution of labor force by wage classifications, the total amount of wages that the firm could pay, average wages by occupational category, and planned increases in labor productivity, but left the manager with some discretion over staffing issues within these constraints.
Legally obligated to fulfill the techpromfinplan and motivated by large monetary bonuses paid for fulfilling output targets, Soviet enterprise managers nonetheless exhibited a significant degree of flexibility in both the production and distribution activities of the firm. See also: CENTRAL PLANNING; PLANNERS PREFERENCES
Dyker, David. (1984). The Future of the Soviet Economic Planning System. Beckenham-Kent: Croom Helm. Kushnirsky, Fyodor. (1982). Soviet Economic Planning, 1965-1980. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Zaleski, Eugene. (1980). Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
SUSAN J. LINZ
of relief for the Red Army was a major victory. Considerable discussion of the question of Poland’s postwar boundaries produced no definitive solution, though there was a consensus that Poland’s eastern boundary would be the Curzon line and that Poland would be compensated in the West with territories to be taken from Germany. Stalin successfully pressed for confirmation of Soviet gains as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1939. In turn Stalin agreed to engage Japanese forces in the Pacific theater after the defeat of Germany. There was also agreement to cooperate in a postwar United Nations organization to maintain peace. In a separate protocol the Big Three agreed to maintain the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran. See also: NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; POTSDAM CONFERENCE; WORLD WAR II; YALTA CONFERENCE
Mayle, Paul D. (1987). Eureka Summit: Agreement in Principle and the Big Three at Teheran, 1943. Newark: University of Delaware Press. Sainsbury, Keith. (1985). The Turning Point: Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, and Chiang- Kai-Shek: the Moscow, Cairo and Teheran Conferences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
JOSEPH L. NOGEE
The Teheran Conference was the first summit meeting between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Josef Stalin. It met from November 28 through December l, 1943, in Teheran, Iran. The general purpose of the conference was to strengthen the cooperation between the Big Three allies in the conduct of the Second World War and to determine the outlines of a postwar global order. Though the Western allies-particularly Roosevelt-sought to conciliate the Soviet dictator, the conference was marked by underlying tension over differences among the allied leaders. The major agreement reached was the decision to launch the long-awaited invasion of Europe (Operation Overlord) as a cross-channel invasion of France in May 1944 (later changed to June). For Stalin, this promise
The concept of teleological planning refers to national economic planning that is directive in character (planners determine plan directives), as opposed to genetical planning, indicative in character, in which plan targets are influenced by market (demand) forces.
The discussion of alternative approaches to national economic planning was an important component of the early development of planning in the Soviet Union. The teleological school was represented by major economists such as S. Strumilin, G. L. Pytatakov, V. V. Kuibyshev, and P. A. Fel’d-man, while the geneticists were represented by N. D. Kondratiev, V. A. Bazarov, and V. G. Groman, all well-known economists. The debate ended with Stalin’s adoption of the teleological approach.
The distinction between the two different approaches remains important. The teleological concept
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implies that planners’ preferences prevail; that is, planners determine the objective function of the economy (e.g., the mix of output by sector or product) with consumer preferences being passive. The genetical approach, on the other hand, has important implications for planning in a pluralistic political setting, in that consumer preferences can prevail and serve as the basis for plan directives. The geneticist view is effectively the foundation for the contemporary development of indicative planning. See also: CENTRAL PLANNING; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET
Carr, Edward Hallett, and Davies, R. W. (1969). Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929, vols. 1-2. London: Macmillan. Gregory, Paul R., and Stuart, Robert C. (2001). Russian and Soviet Economic Structure and Performance. 7th ed. New York: Addison Wesley Longman. Spulber, Nicolas. (1964). Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
TELEVISION AND RADIO
Present-day Russian television and radio have come a long way. Today’s domestic news and entertainment broadcasts can hardly be told from their Western counterparts. The successors of Soviet television and radio are characterized by a state-of-the-art style of presentation, modern advertising, and professional journalism. The Russian mass media have undergone a series of profound transformations, notably since the end of the Soviet era, but they continue to be under the influence of powerful interest groups.
Journalism, especially news coverage, is subject to various restrictions. There is a wide gap between the official policy, its provision for the freedom of the media, and the actual situation. The regulation of television and radio in the Russian Federation has shown indications reminiscent of the centralized media control during the Soviet regime. But economic influences and the opinion-leading value of television both create a competitive environment considered irrevocable and therefore immune to attempts to reinstate a Soviet-like authoritarian rule
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over the media, mainly due to Russia’s matter-of-fact accession to international politics, and liberal values.
In 2002 the Ministry of Press, Broadcasting, and Mass Communications (MPTR) registered 3,267 television channels and 2,378 radio stations, more than half wholly or partly state owned. Almost every Russian household owns at least one television set, whereas a radio can be found in four out of five households. Many listeners still rely on the old wire radio through which state-run Radio Mayak and Radio Rossiya have been broadcasting their
