specific needs of broadcasting media, continue to the present day. Other laws are On Procedure of Media Coverage of State
TEMPORARY REGULATIONS
Authorities by State Media (1994); On the Defense of Morality in Television and Radio Broadcasting (1999); On Licensing of Certain Activities (2001); and the Doctrine of the Information Security of the Russian Federation (2000), which links media autonomy with national security. Nerone, John C, and McChesney, Robert Waterman eds. (1995). Last Rights: Revisiting Four Theories of the Press. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
See also: PERESTROIKA
Aumente, Jerome, et al., eds. (1999). Eastern European Journalism: Before, during, and after Communism. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Belin, Laura. (1997). “Politicization and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media.” «http://www.rferl.org/nca/ special/rumediapaper». Casmir, Fred L., ed. (1995). Communication in Eastern Europe: The Role of History, Culture, and Media in Contemporary Conflicts. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. De Smaele, Hedwig. (1999). “The Applicability of Western Media Models on the Russian Media System.” European Journal of Communication 14:173-89. Dewhirst, Martin (2002). “Censorship in Russia, 1991 and 2001.” The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 18(1):21-34. European Audiovisual Observatory. (2003). “Television in the Russian Federation: Organisational Structure, Programme Production and Audience.” «http://www .obs.coe.int/online_publication/reports/internews .pdf». Jakubowicz, Karol. (1999). “The Genie Is Out of the Bottle. Measuring Media Change in Central and Eastern Europe.” Media Studies Journal 13(3):52-59. Krasnoboka, Natalya. (2003). “The Russian Media Landscape.” European Journalism Centre. «http://www .ejc.nl/jr/emland/russia.html». McCormack, Gillian, ed. (1999). Media in the CIS-A Study of the Political, Legislative and Socio-Economic Framework, 2nd ed. D?sseldorf: The European Institute for the Media. McNair, Brian. (1991). Glasnost, Perestroika, and the Soviet Media. London: Routledge. Michel, Lutz P., and Jankovski, Jaromir. (2000). “Russia.” In Radio and Television Systems in Europe, ed. European Audiovisual Observatory. Strasbourg. Mickiecz, Ellen, and Richter, Andrei. (1996). “Television, Campaigning and Elections in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia.” In Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy. An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and Their Consequences, eds. David L. Swanson and Paolo Mancini. Westport, CT: Praeger.
TEMPORARY REGULATIONS
In response to the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, Tsar Alexander III enacted a statute enabling the government to crack down on the political opposition by imposing emergency regulations more extensive than any that had previously been enforced. Although the statute was initially enacted as a temporary measure, it remained on the books until 1917 and has been regarded by historians as the real constitution of the country. Its implementation demonstrated, perhaps more than anything else, that Russia was not a state based on law.
The statute provided for two kinds of special measures, Reinforced Security (Usilennaya okhrana) and Extraordinary Security (Chrezvychaynaya okhrana). The first could be imposed by the Minister of Internal Affairs or a governor-general acting with the minister’s approval. The second could be imposed only with the approval of the tsar. Vague concerning what conditions could justify placing a region in a state of emergency, the statute gave the authorities in St. Petersburg and the provinces considerable leeway in applying it.
The arbitrary powers invested in local officials (governors-general, governors, and city governors) under the exceptional measures of 1881 were enormous. Under Reinforced Security, officials could keep citizens in prison for up to three months, impose fines, prohibit public gatherings, exile alleged offenders, transfer blocks of judicial cases from criminal to military courts, and dismiss zemstvo (regional assembly) employees. Under Extraordinary Security, a region was placed under the authority of a commander in chief, who could dismiss elected zemstvo deputies, suspend periodicals, and close universities and other centers of advanced study for up to one month. Implementation of the exceptional measures depended largely on the inclinations of local officials: in some provinces they acted with restraint, whereas in others they used their powers to the utmost. At times up to 69 percent of the provinces and regions of the Russian Empire were either completely or partially subjected to one of the various emergency codes.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY
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See also: ALEXANDER III; AUTOCRACY; CENSORSHIP; NICHOLAS II; ZEMSTVO
Daly, Jonathan W. (1998). Autocracy under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1866-1905. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Zuckerman, Frederic S. (1996). The Tsarist Secret Police in Russian Society, 1880-1917. London: Macmillan.
The separate living quarters of women in Muscovite Russia; also, the upper story of a palace, often with a pitched roof, as in the Terem Palace in the Moscow Kremlin.
Historians have generally used the word terem to denote the room or rooms to which Muscovite royal and boyar women were confined to separate them from men, both to underpin the custom of arranging marriages without the couple meeting in advance and to preserve women’s chastity before and after marriage. The Mongols are said to have introduced the terem between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, but this theory is questionable: The practice of female seclusion reached its height in the seventeenth century, long after the Mongol occupation of Russia ended. Recent reassessments also argue that the terem in the sense of apartments where women were imprisoned like slaves is partly a construct of foreign travelers, who were unlikely ever to have seen or entered one. It matched foreign expectations concerning Muscovite orientalism and servitude. Revisionist historians perceive the royal terem not as a sign of women’s helplessness and marginalization, but rather as the physical representation of a separate sphere of influence or power base, with its own extensive staff, finances and administrative structure. From within it, royal women dispensed charity, did business, dealt with petitions, and arranged marriages. These arrangements were replicated on a smaller scale in boyar households.
This does not mean that Muscovite elite women were not subjected to restrictions when compared with their Western counterparts. With the exception of weddings and funerals, they took no part in major court ceremonies and receptions, which were all-male affairs. Balls, masques, and other
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mixed-sex entertainments were out of the question, and the Muscovite court knew no official cult of beauty. Women used curtained recesses in church, traveled in carriages shielded by curtains, and wore concealing clothing. Married women always covered their hair. Girls were not to be seen by their fianc?s until their wedding. The taboos extended to portraits from life. Portraits of Muscovite men are rare, but those of women almost nonexistent. In the Kremlin the sense of exclusiveness and mystery cultivated by the tsar naturally extended to the women, whose quarters were out of bounds to all except designated noblewomen, priests, and family members. Attached to the terem, the Golden Hall of the Tsaritsy, decorated with frescoes featuring women rulers from Biblical and Byzantine history, provided a space for female receptions. Outside the Kremlin, in the few surviving boyars’ mansions, it is difficult to identify rooms specifically designated as a terem, but noblewomen were expected to behave modestly. Lower down the social scale segregation was impractical, but at all levels marriages were arranged by parents.
Peter I (r. 1682-1725) is credited with abolishing the terem, to the extent that he forced women to socialize and dance with men, take part in public ceremonies, and adopt Western fashions. Even so, as elsewhere in Europe, Russian royal palaces preserved the equivalents of the king’s and queen’s apartments, while in the provinces older traditions of female modesty survived. See also: MUSCOVY; PETER I, WESTERNIZERS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
