Like the other powers, Russia stumbled into the First World War. The tsarist government contributed its share to international alignments, tensions, and crises, and in the fateful summer of 1914 it decided to support Serbia and thus resort to arms. Yet its part of the celebrated 'war guilt' should not be exaggerated or singled out. Russian ambitions and eagerness for war were no greater than those of other countries, while Russian preparedness for an armed conflict proved to be less. The empire of the tsars took no part in the race for colonies overseas which constituted an important aspect of the background of the First World War. Russian interests and schemes in the Balkans and the Near East were paralleled by those of Austria-Hungary and eventually also to some extent by those of Germany. The Pan-Germans were authentic cousins of the Pan-Slavs; and - a point which Fay and many others failed to appreciate - it was the German government, not the Russian, which enjoyed widespread popular support in its own country for a strong national policy. The fatal conflict erupted first between Austria- Hungary and Serbia, and both states can be charged with a responsibility for its tragic outcome which preceded Russia's. Even the early Russian mobilization found its counterpart in the Austrian. Besides, it deserves to be noted that in the summer of 1914 only Austria-Hungary, of all the powers, desired war, although it thought merely of a quick destruction of Serbia, not of a continental conflagration.
In the course of a personal meeting shortly before the opening of the Portsmouth Peace Conference, Emperor William II of Germany talked Nicholas II into signing a defensive alliance, known as the Treaty of Bjorko. However, that agreement proved to be stillborn, because leading officials in both governments expressed strong objections to it and especially because France refused co-operation and held Russia to its obligations under the treaty of 1891-94. The years that followed the Russo-Japanese War witnessed an alienation of Russia from Germany, a virtual breakdown of Russo-Austrian relations, and at the same time a further
Britain, Great Britain in turn promising not to change the status of that country or interfere in its domestic affairs; both states recognized the suzerainty of China over Tibet. Because Great Britain and France had reached an agreement in 1904, the new accord marked the emergence of the Triple Entente of France, Russia, and Great Britain, poised against the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. On the Russian side, the Entente meant an effective military and political alliance with France and only a vague understanding with Great Britain. Yet, as already indicated, that understanding represented a major reorientation of Russian, as well as British, foreign policy, and it helped to group Europe into two camps. It should be added that the alignment with France and Great Britain gained in popularity in Russia in the years preceding the First World War. It attracted the support of liberals, of many radicals, of business circles closely linked to French and British capital, and also of numerous conservatives who veered toward Pan-Slavism or suffered from tariff wars with Germany and objected to tariff arrangements with that country as detrimental to Russian agriculture.
Alexander Izvolsky, the Russian minister of foreign affairs from 1906 to 1910, not only made an agreement with Great Britain, but also developed an active policy in the Balkans and the Near East. In fact he, his successor Serge Sazonov who headed the ministry from 1910 to 1916, and their various subordinates have been described as a new generation of Russian diplomats eager to advance Russian interests against Turkey and Austria-Hungary after a quarter-century of quiescence. To be sure, as early as 1896 the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, Alexander Nelidov, had proposed to his government that Russia seize the Straits, but that proposal was never implemented. Izvolsky devised a different scheme. In September 1908, in Buchlau, Moravia, he came to an agreement with the Austrian foreign minister, Count Alois von Aehrenthal: Russia would accept the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Austria had been administering according to a decision of the Congress of Berlin; Austria-Hungary in turn would not object to the opening of the Straits to Russian warships. Austria-Hungary proceeded to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina before Russia could prepare diplomatically the desired reconsideration of the status of the Straits - a betrayal of the mutual understanding, according to Izvolsky, but not according to Aehrenthal. Betrayed or not, Russia was left holding the bag, because other powers, especially Great Britain, proved unwilling to see Russian warships in the Straits. The tsarist government experienced further humiliation when it hesitated to endorse the Austrian coup but was finally forced to do so after receiving a near- ultimatum from Germany.
The years following the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina witnessed repeated tensions, crises, and conflicts in the Balkans and the Near East.
Like Austria-Hungary and Russia, Germany also pursued a forward policy in that area. William II visited Constantinople and made a point of declaring his friendly feelings for Turkey and the Moslems; German interests pushed the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad railway - a project they had initiated as early as 1898 - and more German military experts came in 1913 to reorganize the Ottoman army. Two important Balkan wars were fought in 1912 and 1913. First Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro combined to defeat Turkey and expand at Turkish expense. Next, the victors quarreled and the Bulgarians suffered a defeat by the Serbians, the Greeks, and the Montenegrins, as well as by the Rumanians and by the Turks, who resumed hostilities to regain some of their losses. The Balkan wars left a legacy of tensions behind them, in particular making Bulgaria a dissatisfied and revisionist state and further exacerbating the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
When the heir to the Habsburg throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, was assassinated by Serbian patriots on June 28, 1914, and Austria delivered a crushing ultimatum to Serbia, the Russian government decided to support Serbia - the alternative was another, and this time complete, defeat in the Balkans. With the alliances operating almost automatically, Germany backed Austria-Hungary, while France stood by Russia. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28, Germany on Russia on August 1 and on France on August 3. The German attack on Belgium brought Great Britain to the side of France and Russia on August 4. Europe entered the First World War.
From the summer of 1914 until its collapse during the months that followed the overthrow of the imperial regime in 1917, the Russian army fought tenaciously and desperately under most difficult circumstances. The improvised offensive into East Prussia, which opened the hostilities and helped France at the most critical moment, ended in a shattering defeat of the Russians in the battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes. This offensive, General Michael Alekseev's epic retreat in Poland in 1915, the repeated offensives and counteroffensives in Galicia, and heavy fighting in numerous other sectors of the huge and shifting Eastern front cost the Russians enormous casualties. Quickly the Russian army ran out of its supply of weapons and ammunition, and for a period of time in 1915 up to 25 per cent of Russian soldiers were sent to the front unarmed, with instructions to pick up what they could from the dead. Although later the Russian supply improved, the Russian forces remained vastly inferior to the German and the Austrian in artillery and other weapons.
The Allies could help little, for the German navy controlled the Baltic, and approaches through the Black Sea were cut off when Turkey joined the Central Powers in the autumn of 1914. The so-called Gallipoli campaign of the Allies, which aimed to break the Turkish hold on the Straits, failed in 1915. Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in October 1915 to help crush Serbia. The Rumanian entry into the war on the side of the Entente at the end of August 1916 led to a catastrophic defeat of the Rumanians and served to extend the Russian front. Yet the Russian troops went on fighting. In fact, they generally outfought the Austrians, and they also scored successes on the Caucasian front against Turkey. More important, in spite of many defeats and the necessity of retreating, they continued to force Germany to wage a major war on two fronts at the same time. As a British historian put it: 'Despite all defects and difficulties, the Russians fought heroically, and made a decisive contribution to the course of the war.' In the field of diplomacy, devoted during those years to the prosecution of the war and the formulation of war aims,
