emphasis from international ecclesiastical politics to the internal history of the Kievan state and argued that the change under Iaroslav consisted in the transfer of the religious center of Russia, the seat of the metropolitan, from its original location in the city of Pereiaslavl, east of the Dnieper, to Kiev. At least until further evidence, it seems best to assume that Russia remained under the jurisdiction of the Byzantine Church and also had its own metropolitan, whether in Kiev or Pereiaslavl, from the time of the conversion. Whatever the interpretation of its pre-1037 development, Iaroslav did leave an impact on the Russian Church, changing or confirming its organization, having an able and educated Russian, Hilarion, serve as the first native metropolitan, and building and supporting churches and monasteries on a large scale. He has usually been credited with a major role in the dissemination and consolidation of Christianity in Russia.
Iaroslav the Wise has the reputation also of a lawgiver, for he has generally been considered responsible for the first Russian legal code,
Before his death Iaroslav assigned separate princedoms to his sons: Iziaslav, the eldest, received the Kiev and Novgorod areas; Sviatoslav, the second, the area centered on Chernigov; Vsevolod, the third, Pereiaslavl; Viacheslav, the fourth, Smolensk; and Igor, the fifth, Vladimir-in-Volynia - always with their surrounding territories. The princes, apparently, were expected to co-operate and to hold Kievan Russia together. Moreover, it would seem that when a vacancy occurred, they were to move up step by step, with the position in Kiev the summit. Some such moves did in fact take place, but the system - if indeed it can be called a system - quickly bogged down: Iaroslav's arrangement, based quite possibly on old clan concepts and relations still present in the ruling family, worked to break the natural link between a prince and his state, and it excluded sons from succession in favor of their uncles, their late father's brothers. Besides, with a constant increase in the number of princes, precise calculations of appropriate appointments became extremely difficult. At their meeting in Liubech in 1097 the princes agreed that the practice of succession from father to son should prevail. Yet the principle of rotation from brother to brother remained linked for a long time to the most important seat of all, that of the Grand Prince in Kiev.
The reigns of Iziaslav, Sviatoslav, and Vsevolod, the last of whom died in 1093, as well as that of Iziaslav's son Sviatopolk, who succeeded Vsevolod and ruled until his death in 1113, present a frightening record of virtually constant civil wars which failed to resolve with any degree of permanence the problem of political power in Kievan Russia. At the same time the Kievan state had to face a new major enemy, the Polovtsy, or the Cumans as they are known to Western authors. This latest wave of Turkic invaders from Asia had defeated the Pechenegs, pushing them toward the Danube, and had occupied the southeastern steppe. They attacked Kievan territory for the first time in 1061, and after that initial assault became a persistent threat to the security and even existence of Kievan Russia and a constant drain on its resources.
Although hard beset, the Kievan state had one more revival, under an outstanding ruler, Vladimir Monomakh. A son of Grand Prince Vsevolod, Vladimir Monomakh became prominent in the political life of the country long before he formally assumed the highest authority: he acted with and for his father in many matters and he took the lead at princely conferences, such as those of 1097 and 1100 to settle internecine disputes or that of 1103 to concert action in defense of the steppe border. Also, he played a major role in the actual fighting against the Polovtsy, obtaining perhaps his
greatest victory over them, in 1111 at Salnitsa, before his elevation to the Kievan seat. As Grand Prince, that is, from 1113 until his death in 1125, Vladimir Monomakh fought virtually all the time. He waged war in Livonia, Finland, the land of the Volga Bulgars, and the Danubian area, repulsing the Poles and the Hungarians among others; but above all he campaigned against the Polovtsy. His remarkable
Vladimir Monomakh was succeeded by his able and energetic son Mstislav (ruled 1125-32) and after him by another son, Iaropolk, who reigned until his death in 1139. But before long the Kievan seat became again the object of bitter contention and civil war which often followed the classic Kievan pattern of a struggle between uncles and nephews. In 1169 one of the contenders, Prince Andrew, or Andrei, Bogoliubskii of the northeastern principalities of Rostov and Suzdal, not only stormed and sacked Kiev but, after his victory in the civil war, transferred the capital to his favorite city of Vladimir. Andrew Bogoliubskii's action both represented the personal preference of the new grand prince and reflected a striking decline in importance of the city on the Dnieper. Kiev was sacked again in 1203. Finally, it suffered virtually complete destruction in 1240, at the hands of the Mongols.
The decline and collapse of Kievan Russia have been ascribed to a number of factors; but there is considerable controversy about the precise nature of these factors and no consensus concerning their relative weight. The most comprehensive general view, held by Soviet historians as a group and by some others, emphasizes the loose nature of the Kievan state and its evolution in the direction of further decentralization and feudalism. In fact, certain specialists raised the question of whether Kievan Russia could be called a state at all. Aside from this extreme opinion, it has been generally recognized that the Kievan state, very far from resembling its modern counterparts, represented in a sense a federation or association of a number of areas which could be effectively held together only for limited periods of time and by exceptionally able rulers. Huge distances and poor com-
munications made the issue of centralization especially acute. Moreover, it is argued that Russia, as well as Europe in general, evolved toward natural economy, particularism, and feudalism. Therefore, the relatively slender unifying bonds dissolved, and Russia emerged as an aggregate of ten or twelve separate areas. We shall return to this view when we discuss the question of feudalism in Russia, and on other occasions.
Soviet historians, as well as some other specialists, also pointed to social conflicts as a factor in the decline of Kiev. They refer in particular to the gradual enserfment of the peasants by the landlords and to the worsening position of the urban poor, as indicated by events at the time of Vladimir Monomakh. Slavery, which Kievan Russia inherited from earlier societies, has also been cited as an element of weakness.
Another essentially economic explanation of the fall of Kievan Russia stresses trade, or rather the destruction of trade. In its crude form it argues that the Kievan state arose on the great commercial route 'from the Varangians to the Greeks,' lived by it, and perished when it was cut. In a more limited and generally accepted version, the worsening of the Kievan position in international trade has been presented as one major factor in the decline of Kiev. The city on the Dnieper suffered from the change in trade routes which began in the eleventh century and resulted, largely through the activities of Italian merchants in the Mediterranean, in the establishment of closer connections between western and central Europe on the one hand and Byzantium and Asia Minor on the other, and a bypassing of Kiev. It was adversely affected by the Crusades, and in particular by the sacking of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204, as well as by the decline of the Caliphate of Bagdad. The fact that certain Russian towns and areas, such as Smolensk and especially Novgorod, profited by the rearrangement of the commercial map of Europe and the rise of Italian and German cities only tended to make Kievan control over them less secure. Finally, Kiev experienced tremendous difficulty, and ultimately failed, in protecting from the steppe peoples the commercial line across the southern steppe to the Black Sea.
In addition to the economic and social analyses, one can turn to the political. A number of historians have placed much stress on the failure of the Kievan system of government which they consider a major, possibly decisive, cause of the collapse of Kievan Russia, rather than merely a reflection of more fundamental economic and social difficulties. There is a consensus that the Kievan princely political system did not function well, but no agreement as to the exact nature of that system. Of the two main interpretations, one considers it simply to be confusion worse confounded and a rule of force without broad agreement on principle, while the other gives full credence and weight to the practice of joint clan rule and of