brother to brother rotation with such further provisions as the equation of the claims of the elder son of a prince to those of his father's third brother, his third uncle. In any case, the system did collapse in constant disputes and endemic internal strife. Pogodin calculated that of the 170 years following the death of Iaroslav the Wise 80 witnessed civil war. Kievan princes have also been blamed for various faults and deficiencies and in particular for being too militant and adventurous and often lacking the more solid attributes of rulers. On this point it would seem, however, that their qualities in general were well suited to the age.
Towns added further complications to princely rule and princely relations. Towns in Kievan Russia had existed before princely authority appeared, and they represented, so to speak, a more fundamental level of political organization. As princely disputes increased and princely power declined, the towns proceeded to play an increasingly significant role in Kievan politics, especially in determining what prince would rule in a given town and area. The later evolution of Novgorod represents an extreme case of this Kievan political tendency.
At least one other factor must be mentioned: foreign pressure. While it can well be argued that Kievan economics, social relations, and politics all led to the collapse of the state, the fall of Kiev can also - perhaps paradoxically - be explained primarily in terms of outside aggression. For Kiev had to fight countless exhausting wars on many fronts, but above all in the southeast against the inhabitants of the steppe. The Pechenegs replaced the Khazars, and the Polovtsy the Pechenegs, but the fighting continued. After the Polovtsy and the Kievan Russians virtually knocked each other out, the Mongols came to give the
V
KIEVAN RUSSIA: ECONOMICS, SOCIETY, INSTITUTIONS
… merry-go-round, moving harmoniously and melodiously, full of joy… This spirit permeates, this form marks everything that comes from Russia; such is our song itself, such is its tune, such is the organization of our Land.
The decisive factor in the process of feudalization proved to be the emergence of private ownership in land and the expropriation of the small farmer, who was turned into a feudal 'tenant' of privately owned land, and his exploitation by economic or extra-economic compulsion.
the traditional view of Kievan economy stresses the role of trade. Its classic document is an account of the activities of the Rus composed by the tenth-century Byzantine emperor and scholar Constantine Porphyro-genitus. Every November, writes Constantine Porphyrogenitus, the Kievan princes and their retainers went on a tour of the territories of different tributary Slavic tribes and lived on the fat of those lands during the winter. In April, after the ice on the Dnieper had broken, they returned, with the tribute, down the river to Kiev. In the meantime, Slavs, subject to the Rus, would fell trees, build boats, and in the spring, when rivers became navigable, take them to Kiev and sell them to the prince and his retinue. Having outfitted and loaded the boats, the Rus next moved down the Dnieper to Vitichev where they waited for more boats carrying goods from Novgorod, Smolensk, Liubech, Chernigov, and Vyshgorod to join them. Finally, the entire expedition proceeded down the Dnieper toward the Black Sea and Constantinople.
Kliuchevsky and other historians have expounded how this brief Byzantine narrative summarizes some of the most essential characteristics of Kievan Russia, and even, so to speak, its life cycle. The main concern of the prince and his retainers was to gather tribute from subject territories, either, as described above, by visiting the different parts of the realm during the winter - a process called
continuous expansion of the Kievan state connected with repeated wars enabled the prince constantly to acquire human chattels for foreign markets. The Kievan ruler thus acted as a merchant-prince on a grand scale. His retainers, the druzhina, emulated him as best they could: they helped him gather tribute in winter, and received their share of it, which they took for sale abroad with the great summer expedition of the Rus. Many other merchants from different parts of Kievan Russia with their merchandise joined the princely train to secure protection on the way and support for their interests at the end of the journey. The gathering of tribute, the construction of boats and their sale each spring near Kiev, the organization of the commercial convoy, and finally the expedition itself linked the entire population of the Dnieper basin, and even of Kievan Russia in the large, and constituted the indispensable economic foundation of the Kievan state. With regularity, coins from Byzantium or Bagdad found their way to the banks of the Oka or the Volkhov rivers.
Constantine Porphyrogenitus' account, it is further argued, explains also the foreign policy of the Rus which followed logically from their economic interests. The rulers in Kiev strove to gain foreign markets and to protect the lifelines of trade leading to those markets. The Kievan state depended above all on the great north-south commercial route 'from the Varangians to the Greeks' which formed its main economic and political
axis, and it perished with the blocking of this route. The famous Russian campaigns against Constantinople, in 860, under Oleg in 907, under Igor in 941 and 944, under Sviatoslav in 970, and in the reign of Iaroslav the Wise in 1043, demonstrate in an especially striking manner this synthesis between trade and foreign policy. Typically, wars began over such incidents as attacks on Russian merchants in Constantinople and ended with trade pacts. All the Russo-Byzantine treaties which have come down to us exhibit a commercial character. Furthermore, their provisions dealing with trade are both extremely detailed and juridically highly developed, constituting in fact an engaging chapter in the history of international relations and international law. Russian commercial interests, it may well be noted, obtained various advantages from these agreements; and they were considered in Constantinople not as private enterprise but as trade missions of the allied Kievan court.
Full evidence for a history of Kievan commerce goes, of course, far beyond Constantine Porphyrogenitus' narration and even beyond the significant story of Russo-Byzantine relations. Its main points include trade routes and activities in southern Russia prior to the formation of the Kievan state, a subject expertly treated by Rostovtzeff and some other specialists. Attention must also be drawn to the widespread commercial enterprises of the East Slavs themselves long before the time of Oleg, as well as to the fact that at the dawn of Kievan history they already possessed many towns. Saveliev, for instance, estimates that the trade of the East Slavs with Oriental countries, which extended to the borders of China, dates at least from the seventh century a.D. Some Russian weights and measures were borrowed from the east, notably from Mesopotamia, while others came originally from Rome. Similarly, to the west at an early date the East Slavs established trade relations with their closer neighbors and also with some more remote European countries, like Scandinavia. With the flowering of the Kievan state, Russian trade continued to grow, and on an impressive scale. Its complexity and high degree of development find strong reflection, for example, in the eleventh-century legal code,
Whereas the traditional estimate of Kievan economy stresses commerce, a different interpretation