to estimate precisely how close to the geographic center of the Russian people Moscow was situated, noting also such circumstances as its proximity to the line dividing the two main dialects of the Great Russian language. Central location within Russia, to make an additional point, cushioned Moscow from outside invaders. Thus, for example, it was Novgorod, not Moscow, that continuously had to meet enemies from the northwest, while in the southeast Riazan absorbed the first blows, a most helpful situation in the case of Tamerlane's invasion and on some other occasions. All in all, the considerable significance of the location of Moscow for the expansion of the Muscovite state cannot be denied, although this geographic factor certainly is not the only one and indeed has generally been assigned less relative weight by recent scholars.
The economic argument is linked in part to the geographic. The Moscow river served as an important trade artery, and as the Muscovite principality expanded along its waterways it profited by and in turn helped to promote increasing economic intercourse. Soviet historians in particular treated the expansion of Moscow largely in terms of the growth of a common market. Another economic approach emphasizes the success of the Muscovite princes in developing agriculture in their domains and supporting colonization. These princes, it is asserted, clearly outdistanced their rivals in obtaining peasants to settle on their lands, their energetic activities ranging from various inducements to free farmers to the purchase of prisoners from the Mongols. As a further advantage, they managed to maintain in their realm a relative peace and security highly beneficial to economic life.
The last view introduces another key factor in the problem of the Muscovite rise: the role of the rulers of Moscow. Moscow has generally been considered fortunate in its princes, and in a number of ways. Sheer luck constituted a part of the picture. For several generations the princes of Moscow, like the Capetian kings who united France, had the advantage of continuous male succession without interruption or conflict. In particular, for a long time the sons of the princes of Moscow were lucky not to have uncles competing for the Muscovite seat. When the classic struggle between 'the uncles' and 'the nephews' finally erupted in the reign of Basil II, direct succession from father to son possessed sufficient standing and support in the principality of Moscow to overcome the challenge. The princedom has also been considered fortunate because its early rulers, descending from the youngest son of Alexander Nevskii and thus representing a junior princely branch, found it expedient to devote themselves to their small appanage instead of neglecting it for more ambitious undertakings elsewhere.
It is generally believed that the policies of the Muscovite princes made a major and massive contribution to the rise of Moscow. From Ivan Kalita to Ivan III and Basil III these rulers stood out as 'the gatherers of the
Russian land,' as skillful landlords, managers, and businessmen, as well as warriors and diplomats. They all acted effectively even though, for a long time, on a petty scale. Kliuchevsky distinguishes five main Muscovite methods of obtaining territory: purchase, armed seizure, diplomatic seizure with the aid of the Golden Horde, service agreements with appanage princes, and the settlement by Muscovite population of the lands beyond the Volga. The relative prosperity, good government, peace, and order prevalent in the Muscovite principality attracted increasingly not only peasants but also, a fact of great importance, boyars, as well as members of other classes, to the growing grand princedom.
To be sure, not every policy of the Muscovite rulers contributed to the rise of Moscow. For example, they followed the practice of the appanage period in dividing their principality among their sons. Yet in this respect too they gained by comparison with other princedoms. In the Muscovite practice the eldest son of a grand prince received a comparatively larger share of the inheritance, and his share grew relatively, as well as absolutely, with time. Thus, Dmitrii Donskoi left his eldest son one-third of his total possessions, Basil II left his eldest one-half, and Ivan III left his eldest three-fourths. Furthermore, the eldest son became, of course, grand prince and thus had a stronger position in relation to his brothers than was the case with other appanage rulers. Gradually the right to coin money and to negotiate with foreign powers came to be restricted to the grand prince.
The development of the Muscovite state followed the pattern mentioned earlier in our general discussion of the northeast: in a relatively primitive society and a generally fluid and shifting situation, the prince became increasingly important as organizer and owner as well as ruler - with little distinction among his various capacities - while other elements of the Kievan political system declined and even atrophied. We know, for instance, that Basil Veliaminov, the last Muscovite tysiatskii, died in 1374 and that thenceforth that office was abolished. The Muscovite 'gathering of Russia,' while it was certainly a remarkable achievement, also reflected the trend of the time. The very extent of the division of Russia in the appanage period paved the way for the reverse process, because most principalities proved to be too small and weak to offer effective resistance to a centralizing force. After Moscow triumphed in the northeast, in the old principality of Vladimir-Suzdal, it had to deal with only two other major Russian lands, those of Novgorod and of Riazan, the rest having already been absorbed by the expanding Lithuanian-Russian state.
To appreciate better the success of the princes of Moscow, it is necessary to give special attention to one aspect of their policy: relations with the Mongols. In their dealings with the Golden Horde, the Muscovite rulers managed to eat the proverbial cake and to have it too. The key to their
remarkable performance lay in good timing. For a long time, while the Mongols retained their strength, the princes of Moscow demonstrated complete obedience to the khans, and indeed eager co-operation with them. In this manner they became established as grand princes after helping the Mongols to devastate the more impatient and heroic Tver and some other Russian lands to their own advantage. In addition, they collected tribute for the Mongols, thus acquiring some financial and, indirectly, judicial authority over other Russian princes. 'The gathering of the Russian land' was also greatly facilitated by this connection with the Golden Horde: Liubavsky and other historians have stressed the fact that the khans handed over to the Muscovite princes entire appanages which were unable to pay their tribute, while, for that reason, rulers of other principalities preferred to sell their lands directly to Moscow in order to save something for themselves. But, as the Golden Horde declined and the Muscovite power rose, it was a grand prince of Moscow, Dmitrii Donskoi, who led the Russian forces against the Mongol oppressors on the field of Kulikovo. The victory of Kulikovo and the final lifting of the Mongol yoke by Ivan III represented milestones in the rise of the princedom of Moscow from a northeastern appanage principality to a national Russian state.
Yet another major factor in that rise was the role of the Church. To estimate its significance one should bear in mind the strongly religious character of the age, which was similar to the Middle Ages in the West. Moscow became the seat of the metropolitan and thus the religious capital of Russia in 1326 or 1328, long before it could claim any effective political domination over most of the country. It became, further, the city of St. Alexis and especially St. Sergius, whose monastery, the Holy Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery north of Moscow, was a fountainhead of a broad monastic movement and quickly became a most important religious center, rivaled in all Russian history only by the Monastery of the Caves near Kiev. Religious leadership, very valuable in itself, also affected politics. St. Alexis, as we saw, acted as one of the most important statesmen of the princedom of Moscow; and the metropolitans in general, linked to Moscow and at least dimly conscious of broader Russian interests, favored the Muscovite 'gathering of Russia.' Their greatest service to this cause consisted probably in their frequent intervention in princely quarrels and struggles, through advice, admonition, and occasionally even excommunication; this intervention was usually in favor of Moscow.
Judgments of the nature and import of the rise of Moscow are even more controversial than descriptions and explanations of that process. Most pre-revolutionary Russian historians praised it as a great and necessary achievement of the princes of Moscow and of the Russian people, who had to unite to survive outside aggression and to play their part in history. Soviet his-
torians came to share the same view. On the other hand, some Russian doubters, for example, Presniakov, together with many scholars in other traditions, such as the Polish, the Lithuanian, or the nationalist Ukrainian, have argued on the other side: they have emphasized in particular that the vaunted 'gathering of Russia' consisted, above all, in a skillful aggression by the Muscovite princes against both Russians, such as the inhabitants of Novgorod and Pskov, and eventually various non-Russian nationalities, which deprived them of their liberties, subjugating everyone to Muscovite despotism. As is frequently the case in major historical controversies, both schools are substantially correct, stressing as they do different aspects of the same complicated phenomenon. Without necessarily taking sides on this or other related issues, we shall appreciate a little better the complexity and the problems of the period after devoting some attention to the economic, social, and cultural life of appanage
