attention to its legal characteristics, would not be applicable to Russian society. Yet, on the other hand, many developments in Russia, whether we think of the division of power and authority in the appanage period, the economy of large landed estates, or even the later pomestie system of state service, bear important resemblances to the feudal West. As already indicated, Russian social forms often appear to be rudimentary, or at least simpler and cruder, versions of Western models. Therefore, a number of scholars speak of the social organization of medieval Russia as incipient or undeveloped feudalism. That feudalism proved to be particularly weak when faced with the rising power of the grand princes and, especially, of the autocratic tsars.
Soviet historians require an additional note. Starting from the Marxist emphasis on similarities in the development of different societies and basing their periodization on economic factors, they offered an extremely broad definition of feudalism in terms of manorial economy, disregarding the usual stress on the distribution of power and legal authority. Thus, they considered Russia as feudal from the later Kievan period to the second half of the nineteenth century. The Soviet approach, it may be readily seen, did little to differentiate between the appanage period of Russian history and the preceding and succeeding epochs.
The social structure of appanage Russia represented, of course, a continuation and a further evolution of the society of the Kievan period, with no sharp break between the two. The princes occupied the highest rung on the social ladder. The already huge Kievan princely family proliferated and differentiated further during the centuries which followed the collapse of a unitary state. The appanage period naturally proved to be the heyday of princes and princelings, ranging from grand princes to rulers of tiny principalities and even to princes who had nothing to rule and were forced to find service with their relatives. It might be added that in addition to the grand princes 'of Moscow and all Russia,' grand princes emerged in several other regional centers, notably Tver and Riazan, where the lesser members of a particular branch of the princely family paid a certain homage to their more powerful elder. The expansion of Moscow ended this anarchy of princes, and with it the appanage period.
Next came the boyars, followed by the less aristocratic 'free servants' of a prince who performed a similar function. The boyars and the free servants made contracts with their prince, and they were at liberty to leave him and seek another master. The boyars had their own retinues, sometimes quite numerous. For instance, in 1332 a boyar with a following of 1,700 persons entered the service of the grand prince of Moscow, while shortly
after his arrival another boyar with a retinue of 1,300 left it. As already emphasized, members of the upper classes of appanage Russia were landlords. They acted as virtual rulers of their large estates, levying taxes and administering justice, although it is worth noting that, as Moscow rose, the immunities which they received to govern their lands no longer extended to jurisdiction in cases of major crimes. Votchiny, that is, hereditary land- holdings, prevailed in the appanage period. However, with the rise of Moscow, the pomestie, that is, an estate granted by a prince to a servitor during the term of his personal service, became common. The earliest extant reference to a pomestie goes back to Ivan Kalita's testament, but the pomestie system developed on a large scale only in the fifteenth and subsequent centuries. We shall meet it again when we discuss Muscovite Russia.
Traders, artisans, and the middle class as a whole experienced a decline during the appanage period. Except in Novgorod and a few other centers, members of that layer of society were relatively few in number and politically ineffective.
Peasants constituted the bulk of the population. It is generally believed that their position worsened during the centuries which followed the collapse of the Kievan state. Political division, invasions, and general insecurity increased the peasant's dependence on the landlord and consequently his bondage, thus accelerating a trend which had already become pronounced in the days of Kiev. While serfdom remained incomplete even at the end of the appanage period - for the peasant could still leave his master once a year, around St. George's day in late autumn, provided his accounts had been settled - it grew in a variety of forms. Principal peasant obligations were of two types: the as yet relatively little developed
The slaves,
In the period which followed the fall of Kiev, the Church in Russia maintained and developed its strong and privileged position. In a time of division it profited from the best and the most widespread organization in the country, and it enjoyed the benevolence of the khans and the protection of Rus-
sian, especially Muscovite, princes. Ecclesiastical lands received exemptions from taxation and sweeping immunities; also, as in the West - although this is a controversial point - they probably proved to be more attractive to the peasants than other estates because of their relative peace, good management, and stability. The Church, or rather individual monasteries and monks, often led the Russian penetration into the northeastern wilderness. Disciples of St. Sergius alone founded more than thirty monasteries on or beyond the frontier of settlement. But the greatest addition to ecclesiastical possessions came from continuous donations, in particular the bequeathing of estates or parts of estates in return for prayers for one's soul, a practice similar to the granting of land in free alms to the Catholic Church in the feudal West. It has been estimated that at the end of the appanage period the Church in Russia owned over 25 per cent of all cultivated land in the country. As we shall see, these enormous ecclesiastical, particularly monastic, holdings created major problems both for the religious conscience and for the state.
The unification of Russia under Moscow meant a victory for a northeastern political system, characterized by the dominant position of the prince. Princes, of course, played a major part in the appanage period. It was during that time that they acted largely as managers and even proprietors of their principalities, as illustrated in the celebrated princely wills and testaments which deal indiscriminately with villages and winter coats. Princely activities became more and more petty; public rights and interests became almost indistinguishable from private. With the rise of Moscow, the process was reversed. The rulers 'of Moscow and all Russia' gained in importance until, at about the time of Ivan III, they instituted a new era of autocratic tsardom. Yet, for all their exalted majesty, the tsars retained much from their northeastern princeling ancestry, combining in a formidable manner sweeping authority with petty despotism and public goals with proprietary instincts. Their power proved to be all the more dangerous because it went virtually unopposed. After the absorption of Novgorod, Pskov, and Viatka, the veche disappeared from Russian politics. The third element of the Kievan system of government, the boyar duma, it is true, continued to exist side by side with the princes and with the tsars. However, as will be indicated in later chapters, the duma in Muscovite Russia supported rather than effectively circumscribed the authority of the ruler. The evolution of Russia in the appanage period led to autocracy.
XIII
The Mongol yoke, which dealt a heavy blow to the manufactures of the Russian people in general, could not but be reflected, in a most grievous manner, in the artistic production and technique closely related to manufacturing… The second half of the thirteenth and the entire fourteenth century were an epoch 'of oppression of the life of the people, of despair among the leaders, of an impoverishment of the land, of a decline of trades and crafts, of a disappearance of many technical skills.'
