'Hundred Days' and has superseded the First Treaty of Paris - and in particular to prevent the return of Napoleon or his dynasty to the French throne. The alliance was to last for twenty years. Moreover, its sixth article provided for periodic consultations among the signatory powers and resulted in the so-called 'government by conference,' also known as the Congress System or Confederation of Europe. Conferences took place at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, Troppau and Laibach in 1820-21, and Verona in 1822. At Aix-la-Chapelle, with the payment of the indemnity and the withdrawal of allied occupation troops, France shed its status as a defeated nation and joined the other four great European powers in the Quintuple Alliance. The congresses of Troppau and Laibach considered revolutions in Spain and Italy. Finally, the meeting in Verona dealt again with Spain and also with the Greek struggle against the Turks, to which we shall return in the chapter on the reign of Nicholas I.
After an impressive start, highlighted by the harmony and success of the Aix-la-Chapelle meeting, the Congress System failed to work. A fundamental split developed between Great Britain, which, as the British state paper of May 5, 1820, made plain, opposed intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states, and Austria, Prussia, and Russia, who, as the Protocol of Troppau spelled out, were determined to suppress revolution, no matter where it raised its head. France occupied something of an intermediate position, although it did invade Spain to crush the liberal regime there. Metternich tended to dominate the joint policies of the eastern European monarchies, especially in the crucial years of 1820-22 when Alexander I, frightened by a mutiny in the elite Semenovskii guard regiment and other events, followed the Austrian chancellor in his eagerness to combat revolution everywhere. The Semenovskii uprising, it might be added, really resulted from the conflict between the regiment and its commanding officer, not from any liberal conspiracy.
The reactionary powers succeeded in defeating liberal revolutions on the continent of Europe, except in Greece, where Christians fought their Moslem masters and the complexity of the issues involved upset the usual diplomatic attitudes and alignments. To be sure, these victories of reaction proved to be short-lived, as the subsequent history of Europe in the nineteenth century was to demonstrate. Also, the British navy prevented their possible extension across the seas, thus barring reactionary Spain and its allies from any attempt to subdue the former Spanish colonies in the new world that had won their independence. The Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed on December
The Congress System has been roundly condemned by many historians as a tool of reaction, both noxious and essentially ineffective in maintaining order and stability in Europe. Yet at least one more positive aspect of that unusual political phenomenon and of Alexander I's role in it deserves notice. The architects of the Congress System, including the Russian emperor, created what was at its best more than a diplomatic alliance. In the enthusiastic words of a British scholar writing about the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle:
It is clear that at this period the Alliance was looked upon even by British statesmen as something more than a mere union of the Great Powers for preserving peace on the basis of the treaties; and in effect, during its short session the Conference acted, not only as a European representative body, but as a sort of European Supreme Court, which heard appeals and received petitions of all kinds from sovereigns and their subjects alike.
To be sure, this European harmony did not last, and 'the Confederation of Europe' seems too ambitious a designation for the alliance following the Congress of Vienna. Yet, if a true Confederation of Europe ever emerges, the Congress System will have to be accepted as its early, in a sense prophetic, predecessor. And it was Alexander I who, more than any other European leader, emphasized the broad construction of the Quadruple and the Quintuple alliances and tried to develop co-operation and unity in Europe. Although Austrian troops intervened in the Italian states and French troops in Spain, the Russian ruler was also eager to contribute his men to enforce the decisions of the powers. In fact, he proposed forming a permanent international army to guarantee the European settlement and
offered his troops for that purpose, but the suggestion was speedily rejected by Castlereagh and Metternich. He also proposed, and again unsuccessfully, disarmament.
While 'the emperor of Europe' attended international meetings and occupied himself with the affairs of foreign countries, events in Russia took a turn for the worse. The second half of Alexander's reign, that is, the period after 1812, saw virtually no progressive legislation and few plans in that direction; Novosiltsev's constitutional project formed a notable exception. In Poland the constitutional regime, impressive on paper, did not function well, largely because Alexander I proved to be a poor constitutional monarch because he quickly became irritated by criticism or opposition and repeatedly disregarded the law. Serfs were emancipated in the Baltic provinces, but, because they were freed without land, the change turned out to be a doubtful blessing for them. Serfdom remained undiminished and unchallenged in Russia proper, although apparently to the last the sovereign considered emancipating the serfs.
While Speransky was Alexander I's outstanding assistant in the first half of the reign, General Alexis Arakcheev came to occupy that position in the second half - and the difference between the two men tells us much about the course of Russian history in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Arakcheev, once a faithful servant of Emperor Paul and a distinguished specialist in artillery and military matters in general, was brutal, rude, and a martinet of the worst sort. He became Alexander's minister of war and eventually prime minister, without the title, reporting to the sovereign on almost everything of importance in the internal affairs of Russia and entrusted with every kind of responsibility. Yet the rather common image of the evil genius Arakcheev imposing his will on the emperor badly distorts the relationship. In fact, it was precisely the general's unquestioning and prompt execution of Alexander's orders that made him indispensable to the monarch, who was increasingly peremptory and at the same time had lost interest in the complexities of home affairs.
Although Arakcheev left his imprint on many aspects of Russian life during the second half of the reign, his name came to be connected especially with the so-called 'military settlements.' That project apparently originated with Alexander, but it was executed by Arakcheev. The basic idea of military settlements was suggested perhaps by Turkish practices, a book by a French general, or the wonderful precision and order which reigned on Arakcheev's estates - where, among other regulations, every married woman was commanded to bear a child every year - and it had the appeal of simplicity. The idea was to combine military service with farming and thus reduce drastically the cost of the army and enable its
men to lead a normal family life. Indeed, in one of their aspects the military settlements could be considered among the emperor's humanitarian endeavors. The reform began in 1810, was interrupted by war, and attained its greatest impetus and scope between 1816 and 1821, with about one-third of the peacetime Russian army established in military settlements. Troubles and uprisings in the settlements, however, checked their growth. After the rebellion of 1831 Nicholas I turned definitely against the reform, but the last settlements were abolished only much later. Alexander I's and Arakcheev's scheme failed principally because of the extreme regimentation and minute despotism that it entailed, which became unbearable and resulted in revolts and most cruel punishments. In addition - as Pipes has forcefully pointed out - Russian soldiers proved to be very poor material for this venture in state direction and paternalism, resenting even useful sanitary regulations. Arakcheev himself, it may be noted, lost his position with the accession of a new ruler.
Until 1824 two important areas of Russian life, religion and education, remained outside Arakcheev's reach because they formed the domain of another favorite of Alexander's later years, Prince Alexander Golitsyn. Very different from the brutal general, that aristocrat, philanthropist, and president of the important Bible Society in Russia nevertheless had disastrous effects on his country. Like the emperor, Golitsyn was affected by certain mystical and pietistic currents then widespread in Europe - the favorite's eventual fall resulted from allegations of insufficient Orthodoxy. He believed that the Bible contained all essential knowledge and distrusted other kinds of education. It was during Golitsyn's service as minister of education that extreme, aggressive obscurantists, such as Michael Magnitsky and Dmitrii Runich, purged several universities. Magnitsky in particular made of the University of Kazan a peculiar kind of monastic barracks: he purged the faculty and the library of the pernicious influences of the
