Stalin: A Biography

distinction. They deluded themselves. Scarcely any leading figure in the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party made an original intellectual contribution. Plekhanov, Lenin and Trotski were brilliant synthesisers of the ideas of others — and not all of those others were Marxists. Each took his personal synthesis to an idiosyncratic extreme. This was also true of Bukharin, who tried his hardest to effect a deepening of the Marxist perspective in the light of contemporary philosophy, sociology and economics. Only Bogdanov can be categorised as an original thinker. Bogdanov’s amalgam of Marx and Engels with the epistemology of Ernst Mach led him to reject economic determinism in favour of a dynamic interplay of objective and subjective factors in social ‘science’. He made a serious contribution through his work on the importance of ideas for the control of societies by their elites across the course of human history. Bogdanov’s Empiriomonism was a tour de force.¹

Yet the other leading figures succeeded in persuading their comrades that they too were of exceptional cultural significance. Stalin before the Great War made no such claim for himself. Nor in subsequent years did he suggest that he had made an original contribution. He always claimed to have been merely a loyal Leninist.² He called himself a praktik, meaning that he was more a practical revolutionary than a theoretician. When he published ‘Anarchism or Socialism’ in 1906–7, many readers thought he could hardly have been the authentic author. His school friend Davrishevi assumed that another Bolshevik, perhaps Dzhughash-vili’s comrade Suren Spandaryan, had written it. But Spandaryan put Davrishevi right. It really was Stalin’s article.³ ‘Anarchism or Socialism’ was not a coruscating work. Stalin privately admitted this after the Second World War (when his comment was treated as extraordinarily modest).⁴ It was nevertheless a work of practical importance at the time of publication. This has been overlooked by his biographers, who have ignored the fact that anarchists were active in Tbilisi after the turn of the century. Georgia was recognised as a place where a fundamental challenge to the Imperial monarchy would take place. emigre anarchist leaders had sent propagandists on missions to Tbilisi. Stalin flung himself on the available literature on Marxism before writing his urgent reply.⁵

In fact he kept to Bolshevism’s general line before the Great War. He endorsed the precepts of strict party discipline as formulated in Lenin’s What Is To Be Done?; he also shared the Leninist viewpoint on revolutionary stages, dictatorship and class alliances in 1905. Rival versions of Marxism in the Russian Empire, he declared, were betrayals of the faith. He accentuated the need for leadership and a revolutionary vanguard and for the avoidance of ‘tailism’. The vanguard should organise insurrection and seize power. He was also unafraid to oppose projects put forward by Lenin himself and to do this in open debate. On most matters, though, he agreed with Lenin; and Lenin for his own part badly needed Dzhughashvili’s contributions on the national question. Whereas the Mensheviks had several theorists who wrote about the nationalities in the empire, the Bolsheviks had only Dzhughashvili (or Stalin, as he was invariably known in public from this period onwards). No wonder Lenin warmed to him.

Although several aspects of his thought surfaced only in his years of power, it is unlikely that they did not already exist. Stalin had grown up when imperial countries around the world were applying naked military force. Force based upon technological and organisational superiority ruled supreme. The British Empire covered a fifth of the world’s land surface. The age of blood and steel had arrived. Capitalism was triumphant. Marxists believed that socialism would achieve a further victory and that capitalism itself was destined for defeat. A new stage in the history of humankind was believed imminent. Radical Marxists anticipated civil war between the middle classes and the working classes on a global scale. From such conflict there would come good for following generations. Marxism justified the sacrifice of millions of human beings in the pursuit of revolution.

The perfect society was anticipated once the military conflict was ended. The poor would inherit the earth. This would be achieved through ‘proletarian dictatorship’. The need for repressive methods would persist until the resistance of the old propertied classes had been crushed. Although the dictatorship would be ruthless, Stalin and other Bolsheviks expected little trouble. The numerical and organisational weight of the proletariat, they believed, would soon crush all opposition. The old society would be eliminated and class privileges would be eradicated. The state would embed ‘modernity’ in all sectors of life, and it would be a modernity superior to the existing capitalist variants.⁶ Universal free schooling would be established. Material production would be standardised; the wastefulness of capitalism would be surmounted. Every citizen would enjoy access to work, food, shelter, healthcare and education. This militant set of ideas suited Stalin. He lived for conflict. He constantly wanted to dominate those around him. He had also found an ideology that suited this inclination. Everything about Bolshevism fitted his purposes: struggle, repression, proletarian hegemony, internal party rivalry, leadership and modernity; and already he saw himself as a true leader within a party which itself sought to lead the ‘proletarian masses’ into the brave new world.

Yet Stalin was not a blindly obedient Leninist. On several important questions he thought Lenin to be misguided and said so. At the Bolshevik Conference in the Finnish industrial city of Tampere in December 1905 he had objected to Lenin’s plan for the party to put up candidates in the forthcoming elections to the First State Duma. Like most delegates, Stalin thought it a waste of time for the Bolshevik faction to participate in the electoral campaign — only later, like many Bolsheviks, did he come over to Lenin’s idea.⁷ He did not change his mind, however, on the ‘agrarian question’. Lenin advocated that the ‘revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry’, after the monarchy’s overthrow, should turn all agricultural land into state property. Stalin continued to reckon this naive and unrealisable. He proposed instead that the dictatorship should let the peasants grab the land and do with it whatever they wanted.⁸ He also believed that Lenin’s demand for a radical break with Mensheviks in the State Duma would simply confuse and annoy the Duma’s Bolsheviks. Both Lenin and Stalin were zealots and pragmatists. In important instances they disagreed about where zeal should end and pragmatism begin. Their mutual dissent touched on matters of operational judgement, not on revolutionary principles. Yet such matters were intensely debated within Bolshevism. Lenin hated his followers interpreting Leninism without his guidance. Stalin was one of those leading Bolsheviks who was unafraid to stand up for his opinions without walking out of the faction.

He also had reservations about Lenin’s intellectual priorities in philosophy. In 1908 Lenin published a work of epistemology, Materialism and Empiriocriticism. At its core was a ferocious attack on his close collaborator Alexander Bogdanov. He objected to Bogdanov’s apparent philosophical relativism. For Lenin it was axiomatic that the ‘external world’ existed independently of its cognition by the individual human mind. ‘Reality’ was therefore an objective, discernible phenomenon. Lenin contended that Marxism constituted an irrefutable corpus of knowledge about society. He insisted that the mind functioned like a photographic apparatus accurately registering and relaying data of absolute truth. Any derogation from such premises, he asserted, implied a movement away from Marxist materialism and opened the intellectual gates to philosophical idealism and even to religion. Bogdanov, whose commitment to each and every statement of Marx and Engels was far from absolute, was castigated as an enemy of Marxism.

Stalin thought Lenin was wasting his time on topics of marginal importance for the Revolution. In a letter to Vladimir Bobrovski from Solvychegodsk in January 1911 he declared the epistemological controversy ‘a storm in a tea-cup’. Generally he ridiculed the emigres.⁹ Stalin thought that Bogdanov had done a convincing philosophical job and that ‘some particular mistakes of Ilich [were] correctly noted’.¹⁰ He wanted all Bolsheviks to concentrate on the large practical topics, and there were plenty of these needing to be discussed before appropriate policies could be formulated. Stalin was willing to criticise ‘the organisational policy of the editorial board’ of Proletari.¹¹ This board at Lenin’s behest had expelled Bogdanov from its membership. Stalin was indicating his dissent not only from Lenin’s epistemology but also from his enthusiasm for splitting the faction into ever tinier bits. He advised a moderation of polemics. Stalin counselled the leaders of the two sides in the factional controversy — Lenin and Bogdanov — to agree that ‘joint work is both permissible and necessary’.¹² Such an idea motivated Stalin in the next few years. Indeed he maintained it throughout 1917; for when Lenin was to demand severe disciplinary measures against Kamenev and Zinoviev, it was Stalin who led the opposition to him.

So at that time he was what was known as a Conciliator inside Bolshevism. He despised the emigre shenanigans and wanted the Bolsheviks, wherever they lived, to stick together. It was a question of priorities. Philosophy was not as important as the making of revolution. For this purpose it was essential to keep Bolsheviks together, and Lenin must not be allowed to endanger such an objective.

Yet Lenin tolerated Stalin, and much of his positive attitude is attributable to Stalin’s booklet Marxism and the National Question. Stalin’s later enemies unceremoniously dismissed the