The Eleventh Day

was down. (9/11 ATCSCC Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Transcripts Channel 5,” B3, NYC files, CF, MCC Tech logbook, “Miles Kara FAA HQ 3 of 3,” B19, T8, CF).

84 Arnold concedes: Testimony of Larry Arnold, 6/17/04, CO, MFR 04016749, 2/3/04, Vanity Fair, 9/06 & see re officers conceding same MFR 04016769, 1/23/04.

85 conflated Delta 1989: Miles Kara, “Archive for Delta 1989 Category,” 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger.com—with which the authors concur, int. John Werth, & see MFRs 04016769, 1/23/04, 04016749, 2/3/04. Colonel Marr, the NEADS battle commander, also offered inaccurate information about NEADS and Flight 93. The Air Force’s official 9/11 history, published as Air War over America in January 2003, quoted him as saying he and colleagues called in fighters from the airbase at Selfridge “so they could head 93 off at the pass … get in there, close on him, and convince him to turn.” The request to Selfridge was made, however, at about 9:43, before NORAD knew anything about Flight 93. The request was made, rather, in connection with Delta 1989, which—as discussed in the text—had not in fact been hijacked (“so they could”: Staff Monograph, “The Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 8/26/04, CF, 100n391; Selfridge request: 1989: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Transcripts Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF, Staff Monograph, “The Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 8/26/04, CF, 101n391).

86 Sudoku/shoddy work: Miles Kara, “NORAD’s Sudoko Puzzle, a Failure to Tell the Truth” & “Archive of the ‘May 23, 2003 Hearing’ Category,” 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org.

87 Marcus pointed: Marcus to Schmitz & Mead plus attachments, 7/29/04, “Referral of False Statements by Government Officials to FAA & DOD Inspectors General,” CF; Kara, for his part, told the authors that in his view the press release in question had been a “rush to judgment” by NORAD, that NORAD had simply wanted to “get out in front of FAA before the upcoming White House meeting to sort things out”; the tape malfuntion referred to, Kara said, did indeed occur (corr. Miles Kara, 2011);

88 “didn’t get together”: Testimony of Ralph Eberhart, 6/17/04, CO;

89 “NORAD’s public chronology”/“whoever at FAA”: “Sen. Dayton’s ‘NORAD Lied’ Transcript,” www.scoop.co.nz;

90 “At some”: Farmer, 4–.

CHAPTER 13

1

Wolfowitz:

Online NewsHour, 9/14/01,

www.pbs.org

;

2

“horrendous decision”:

Meet the Press

, NBC, 9/16/01;

3

“I recommended”:

Office of the Vice President Internal

Transcript, Telephone Interview of the Vice President by

Newsweek

, “Farmer—Misc.,” B9, NYC files, CF;

4

“You bet”:

WP

, 1/27/02;

5

“emphasized”:

CR, 40, 464n214;

6

2010 memoir:

Bush, 129–.

7

“The operational chain”:

Dept. of Defense Directive 5100.1, 9/25/87. The authors have here referred to the directive effectuating the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the relevant law on 9/11. Other Defense Department regulations in force in 2001 stated—on the matter of military cooperation with civilian authorities (like the FAA)—that the defense secretary had to approve “any request for potentially lethal support,” and that “only the President” could request the use of the military to respond to domestic terrorism. It was “understood” in 2001, the 9/11 Commission stated, that a shoot-down order would have to come from the National Command Authority—“a phrase used to describe the President and the Secretary of Defense.” Dr. David Griffin, the prominent skeptic, has suggested that the military did not in fact require authorization—that they could act at once in cases requiring “immediate responses.” The authors’ reading of the regulation Griffin cites is that in certain circumstances and “where time does not permit” prior approval, the military could indeed take “necessary action.” The sort of action it could take, however, is very specifically described and does

not

include the use of force (“understood”: CR 17, 43; Griffin:

New Pearl Harbor Revisited

, 265n12; regulation: DOD Directives, “Military Assistance to Civil Authorities,” 3025.1, 1/15/93, 3025.15, 2/18/97, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions, “Aircraft Piracy [Hijacking] and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects,” 3610.01, 7/31/97, 3610.01A, 6/1/01).

8

generals understood/exercise:

Testimony of Larry Arnold & Craig McKinley, 5/23/03, CO, CR 457n98;

9

“derelict balloon”/Only President:

MFR 04016749, 2/3/04, Testimony of Larry Arnold, 5/23/02, CO, CR 457n98;

10 Cheney furious: Shenon, 267, 411–, but see Kean & Hamilton, 261;

11 clear hint: CR, 40–, 464n213–216;

12 “We just didn’t”: Shenon, 265;

13 “The official version”: Farmer, 255.

14 “My recommendation”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2, B3, NYC files, CF;

15 Nasypany began asking: Vanity Fair, 9/06;

16 “I don’t know”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 4,” B3, NYC files, CF, FAA Memo, Full Transcript, Aircraft Accident: UAL175; New York, NY, 9/11/01, “AAL 11, UAL 175: FAA Produced documents, Transcripts used in interviews,” B2, NYC files, CF;

17 Rumsfeld movements from 9:37: see Ch. 5;

18 NMCC looked: CR, 37–;

19 “outrageous”: Cockburn, 3–;

20 “one or more calls”: Testimony of Donald Rumsfeld, 3/23/04, CO;

21 “tried without success”: Goldberg et al., 131;

22 “Are you okay?”: ibid., 131, 240n6. The assistant was Major Joseph Wassel, who set up the call. Wassel was interviewed for the Defense Department’s “Pentagon 9/11” report, but not by the staff of the 9/11 Commission. Wassel described an initial attempt to call the President through the White House Situation Room—a call he came to believe did not go through. Sometime later—Wassel could not pinpoint the time, but placed it as being when Rumsfeld was back in his Pentagon office, having returned from the crash site—the President called the defense secretary from Air Force One (Goldberg et al., 131, 240n6, AF