The Eleventh Day

veterans:

Bergen,

Holy War Inc.

, 86, Richard Clarke, 137;

8

OBL to Bosnia/citizenship:

Ottawa Citizen

, 12/15/01,

WSJ

, 11/1/01;

9

Flottau:

John Schindler,

Unholy Terror

, Minneapolis: Zenith, 2007, 123– & see “British Journalist Eye-Witnessed Osama Bin Laden Entering Alija Izetbegovic’s Office,” 2/3/06.

www.slobodan-milosevic.org

,

The Times

(London), 9/28/07;

10 KSM twice: CR, 147, 488n5;

11 funds Chechnya: Benjamin & Simon, 113, Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, NY: Seven Stories, 2005, 95;

12 holdouts: Newsweek, 8/19/02.

13 Two hijackers: JI, Report, 131, Testimony of George Tenet, 6/18/02, JI. The future 9/11 hijackers who fought in Bosnia were Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. Zacarias Moussaoui, who was arrested before 9/11, reportedly served as a recruiter for the Chechen mujahideen (Mihdhar/Hazmi: Staff Statement 16, CO; Moussaoui: Legat, Paris to Minneapolis, FBI 199M-MP-60130, 8/22/01, Defense Exhibit 346, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, Tenet, 202);

14 Zawahiri in Sudan/directed/Mubarak: Wright, 185–, 213, 215–, bin Ladens & Sasson, 129–;

15 Zubaydah/manager: CR, 59, 169, 175, Thomas Jocelyn, “The Zubaydah Dossier,” 8/17/09, www.weeklystandard.com;

16 “The snake”: Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al., U.S. District Court for the Southern District of NY, S(7) 98-CR-1023, 2/6/01, CR, 59;

17 Yemen attacks: Staff Statement 15, CO, Atwan, 166. There were no American fatalities in the bombings, but an Australian tourist was killed (Staff Statement 15, CO);

18 Somalia/Black Hawks: transcript int. of OBL by Hamid Mir, 3/18/97, www.fas.org, Staff Statement 15, CO, int. Abdel Bari Atwan, Atwan, 36;

19 Riyadh attack: CR, 60, Staff Statement 15, CO, Wright, 211–, Burke, 154–;

20 “paved”: ed. Lawrence, 36–;

21 “adopt”: int. OBL by Hamid Mir;

22 Dhahran: Staff Statement 15, CO, CR, 60, Bamford, Pretext, 163, Benjamin & Simon, 224, William Simpson, 275;

23 Iran responsible?: CR, 60;

24 traveled Qatar/purchase: Christopher Blanchard, “Qatar: Background & U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 1/24/08, Stephen Hayes, “Case Closed,” 11/24/03, www.weeklystandard.com, Gareth Porter, “Investigating the Khobar Tower Bombing,” 6/24/09, CounterPunch.

25 “heroes”: ed. Lawrence, 52. The debate over responsibility for the Dhahran attack was prolonged and bitter. Vital reading on the subject includes the relevant part of a memoir by the FBI director of the day, Louis Freeh, and—for a very different view—a series of 2009 articles by reporter Gareth Porter (Louis Freeh, My FBI, NY: St. Martin’s, 2005, 1–, Gareth Porter, CounterPunch, 6/24/09);

26 interview: int. Abdel bari Atwan, Atwan, 36;

27 “They called”: France-Soir, 8/27/98, citing int. of 1995 & see bin Ladens & Sasson, 127;

28 royals persuaded/“They beseeched”: bin Ladens & Sasson, 104, Corbin, 57, MFR 04013955, 12/3/03, AP, 6/15/08, Bergen, OBL I Know, 150;

29 “behavior”: “State Dept. Issues Fact Sheet on Bin Laden,” 8/14/96 cited at Brisard & Dasquie, 169;

30 share sold off: Staff Report, “Monograph on Terrorist Financing, CO, Lacey, Inside the Kingdom, 177–, AP, 6/15/08.

31 formal cutoff/future: Bergen, Holy War Inc., 102, CR, 62, bin Ladens & Sasson, 128. Men who worked for bin Laden in Sudan have recalled him saying that money was short. One man, Jamal al-Fadl, defected following a clash over funding and became a useful informant for the United States. Bin Laden’s son Omar remembered a time in the Sudan when funds were limited after his father “lost access to his huge bank accounts in the Kingdom” (money short/Fadl: Testimony of L’Hossaine Kerchtou, 2/22/01, & Jamal al-Fadl, 2/7/01, U.S. v. Usama bin Laden et al., U.S. District Court for the Southern District of NY, S[7]98-CR-1023, CR, 62; “lost”: bin Ladens & Sasson, 12).

32 “Blood is”: int. of Rahimullah Yusufzai for Paladin InVision, 2006, Bergen, OBL I Know, 203 but see FBI 302s of int. bin Laden family members, “Saudi Flights,” B70, T5, CF;

33 “OBL has kept”: Note de Synthese, 7/24/00 in “Oussama Bin Laden,” leaked DGSE report, 9/13/01, seen by authors;

34 Yeslam: Scheuer, Osama bin Laden, 28;

35 “Some female”: Statement of Vincent Cannistraro, Hearings, Committee on International Realations, U.S. House of Reps, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., 10/3/01.

36 funding cut off: Whether or not bin Laden was really “disowned” by his family, there were over the years many suggestions that he had a personal fortune of some $300 million—from which he funded operations. According to the 9/11 Commission, this is merely “urban legend.” A commission analysis suggests he received approximately $1 million a year from the family coffers between 1970 and 1993—the year in which his share of the family business was sold and OBL’s portion “frozen.” The author Peter Bergen, writing in 2001, cited a source close to the family as saying bin Laden’s inheritance from his father was $35 million. In his 2008 biography of the bin Laden clan, Steve Coll stated that the value placed on OBL’s share of the family business at the time he was reportedly stripped of it was a surprisingly low $9.9 million. Even taken together, these sums total far less than the rumored $300 million figure.

The approximately $30 million consumed annually by al Qaeda operations prior to 9/11 apparently came from a core of “financial facilitators” and “fundraisers” in the Gulf—particularly in Saudi Arabia. The 9/11 operation itself cost only $400,000–$500,000. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed told his interrogators that bin Laden provided 85–90 percent of that. Investigators believe, however, that this money came not from personal funds, but rather from monies he controlled (official estimates: MFR 03010990, 11/4/03, CF, FBI memo, “Ali Ahmad Mesdaq, International Terrorism, Usama bin Laden,” 1/28/02, INTELWIRE,

WP

, 8/28/98; popular reports: e.g.

WP

, 8/28/98, “Tracing bin Laden’s Money,” 9/21/01,

www.ict.org

; “myth”/$1 million: Staff Report, “Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” CO; $35 million: Bergen,