The Eleventh Day

Trial, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, Vol. II-A, 3/7/06. Jarrah and Hani Hanjour, the other 9/11 hijack pilots, also trained on simulators (CR, 226–, Testimony of James Fitzgerald, U.S. v. Zacarias Moussaoui, 3/7/06).

103 OBL impatient 2000: CR, 251. The authors here cite the date used in the Commission Report, which in turn refers to KSM interrogations of 2003 and 2004. The longer account of KSM’s statements, the one generally used in this book, states that bin Laden tried in spring 2000 to bring the attacks forward—surely unlikely, as he well knew the hijack pilots had at that time barely embarked on their training (CR 250, 532n177, KSM SUBST).

104 KSM resisted/new candidate: KSM SUBST, MFR 04019351, 12/10–11/03, CF;

105 well-to-do: BG, 3/3/02, WP, 9/10/02;

106 back and forth: Statement of Robert Mueller, JI, 9/26/02, Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, 12, WP, 9/10/02;

107 Hanjour license: MFR 04021445, 1/13 & 1/25/04, CF, copies of license documents, “Airman Records—Hanjour,” B45, T5, CF;

108 pretending: WP, 9/10/02, BG, 3/3/02;

109 “frail”: FBI 302 of [name redacted], 9/18/01, “FBI 302s of Interest,” B17, T7, CF;

110 “quiet”: MFR 04017517, 1/7/04, CF;

111 “mouse”: McDermott, 204;

112 drink/pray: MFR 04017518, 1/5/04, CF;

113 in tears: CR, 520n55;

114 Afghanistan at 17: Report, JI, 135, Staff Statement 16, CO;

115 Atef sent KSM/KSM dispatched/thought: KSM SUBST;

116 Hanjour to U.S./Hazmi/flight school: Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 19–, Statement of Robert Mueller, JI, 9/26/02, CR, 226;

117 school owner/“No”: WP, 10/21/01, 9/10/02, Newsday, 9/23/01;

118 “content”/“warrior”: The Times (London), 9/20/01;

119 “ ’Orwah”: Fouda & Fielding, 111.

120 computer/“I went”: transcript of int. Ann Greaves, Four Corners: A Mission to Die For, 10/18/01, www.abc.net.au, ints. Mark Mikart; Cole: Katz, 269–, Miller & Stone, 226–, Wright, 319–, Graham with Nussbaum, 59–, Fox News, 1/13/09;

121 OBL deny/praise: ABC News, 3/1/00;

122 A destroyer: Time, 9/24/01, Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, 229, Wright, 333;

123 “With small”: Newsweek, 9/24/01.

124 “To those”: Clinton address, 10/18/00, http://usinfo.org;

125 “Let’s hope”: NYT, 10/13/01;

126 “What’s it gonna”: Richard Clarke, 224;

127 “major”: State of the Union address in WP, 1/27/00;

128 “not satisfactory”: CR, 187, Report, JI, 301. National Security Adviser Berger dated this memo as February 2000. Without giving a clear source, the 9/11 Commission dated it as early March (Report, JI, 301, CR 187, 505n99);

129 Predator: Staff Statement 7, CO, CR, 506n118, 513n238;

130 negotiations: CounterPunch, 1/16/08, 9/9/09, 11/1/04, Reuters, 6/4/04;

131 U.N. resolution: Resolution 1333, 12/19/00, http://avalon.law.yale. edu;

132 Tenet warned: Tenet, 128.

133 Pakistani told FBI: Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/18/02, JI, NBC News, 7/26/04, Sunday Times (London), 2/13/05. The Pakistani was Niaz Kahn, a former waiter from Oldham, near Manchester in the U.K., who apparently became involved in terrorism not because of his ideals but because he needed money. Two men he met in the U.K., he said, encouraged him to go to a camp in Pakistan, where he was given instruction in “conventional” hijackings, not suicide operations. He was eventually flown by a roundabout route to New York, but evaded the contact waiting for him and went to the FBI. Kahn’s story was first reported publicly in late 2004 (NBC News, 7/26/04, Vanity Fair, 11/04, transcript, int. Niaz Khan, 5/18/04, in collection of Jean-Charles Brisard).

134 Italian police/“studying”: int. Bruno Megale, Bergen, OBL I Know, 281, Miller & Stone, 274–. A U.S. Justice Department official was quoted after 9/11 as saying that a “small cadre of U.S. intelligence experts might have been privy to the Italian surveillance material.” On the other hand, other press reporting suggests that the surveillance of the two Yemenis was “not translated by Italian police” until May 2002 (LAT, 5/29/02, Chicago Tribune, 10/8/02).

135 Olympics: Sydney Morning Herald, 9/20/01. In October, the Defense Department held a tabletop exercise simulating the crash of an airliner into the courtyard of the Pentagon. Critics have cited this as an indication that the Pentagon received early intelligence of terrorist plans to target the building with an airplane. On the evidence, however, the exercise may simply have been designed to ensure readiness for any possible sort of plane crash into the Pentagon—which is close to Reagan National Airport (“Contingency Planning Pentagon MASCAL Exercise,” 11/3/00, www.dcmilitary.com, UPI, 4/22/04).

136 FBI/FAA downplayed: In April 2000, an FAA advisory issued to airlines and airports had stated that U.S. airliners could be targeted but that hijacking was “more probable outside the United States.” The advisory would not have been replaced as of September 11, 2001 (Staff Report, “The Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 8/26/04, CF, 59);

137 “do not suggest”: Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/18/02, JI, Report, JI, 104–;

138 “imprudent”: Report, JI, 334.

139 “Americans would”: CR, 198;

140 Clinton authorized: Tenet, 135;

141 Cheney/Powell/Rice: Testimony of Sandy Berger, 3/24/04, CO, Time, 8/12/02, DeYoung, 344;

142 “As I briefed”: Richard Clarke, 229;

143 “sitting”/“cognizant”: Rice int., www.whitehouse.gov, 3/24/04, Testimony, 4/8/04, CO;

144 did not know: Richard Clarke, 31;

145 “not an amateur”: ibid., 328;

146 Commission/“on American”: Phase III Report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, U.S. Commission on National Security, 2/15/01, viii, 6, Tenet, 16, Columbia Journalism Review, Nov/Dec 2001;

147 pressed to see: Hurley to Gorelick, 4/5/04, “Commissioner Prep for Rice,” B7, T3, CF;

148 “did not remember”: CR, 199, Ben-Veniste, 302–;

149 OBL biggest/“listened”: Clinton, 935–.

CHAPTER 26

1

“We are not”:

George W. Bush, Inaugural Address, 1/20/01,