The Eleventh Day

six months. Atta left without making a fuss. The second of his companions, the inspector came to suspect after 9/11, had been Adnan Shukrijumah. Shukrijumah, believed to have been an al Qaeda operative reporting to bin Laden, had as of this writing long been on the FBI’s Most Wanted List. Though born in Saudi Arabia, he was entitled to live in the United States—his family had moved to Florida in the mid-1990s, but left the country shortly before 9/11. Shukrijumah’s late father, an imam, had once served at the al-Farooq mosque in Brooklyn, the hub for jihadi recruiting during the anti-Soviet war (INS visit: [name redacted] Immigration Inspector to Mr. Garofano, 10/23/01, appointment list for May 2, 2001, follow-up interviews, Miami District Office, INS, 4/16/02, & MFR of [name redacted] Customs & Border Protection, 3/25/04, “Inspector Interviews,” B49, T5, CF, Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 30–; Shukrijumah: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 216n114, 256n138, CNN, 8/6/10, NY Daily News, 8/6/10, “Father Knows Terrorism Best,” 10/27/03, www.frontpagemag.com, Newsweek, 4/7/04, NYT, 9/3/06).

30 Atta/Shehhi turned up/rented/asked: Hijackers Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, Counterterrrorism to All Field Offices, 9/15/01, FBI 265A-NY-280350, Serial 2268, released under FOIA to Mike Williams of www.911myths.com, FBI memorandum, PENTTBOM, Summary of captioned investigation as of 11/4/01, 11/5/01, authors’ collection, AP, 10/19/01, WP, 12/16/01.

31 optional targets: KSM SUBST. Separately, there was to be much reference to a claim by Johnelle Bryant, a loan officer for the Department of Agriculture in Homestead, Florida, that Atta came to her office to inquire about a loan to buy a plane for conversion into a crop duster. When told he did not qualify, she said, he made threats, spoke of the destruction of U.S. monuments, and praised bin Laden. Bryant dated the incident as having occurred between late April and mid-May 2000. So far as is known, however, Atta did not arrive in the United States until June 3, 2000 (Timeline Pertaining to Hijackers in Florida, “Timelines 9/11, 2 of 2,” B20, T7, CF, ABC News, 6/6/02, Edward Epstein, “The Terror Crop Dusters,” www.edwardjayepstein.com, but see Miller & Stone, 268–).

32 Hanjour certificate: Hani Hanjour, AA Flight 77, FBI summary 03096, 4/19/02, www.scribd.com, Counterterrrorism to All Field Offices, 9/15/01, FBI 265A-NY-280350, Serial 2268, released under FOIA to Mike Williams of www.911myths.com, FBI 302 of int. FNU Milton, 4/12/02, INTELWIRE, CR, 226–;

33 Sporty’s video: Hijackers’ Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE;

34 Grand Canyon: Nawaf al-Hazmi, AA Flight 77, FBI summary 03177, 4/19/02, www.scribd.com;

35 greet muscle: Bamford, Shadow Factory, 50, Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 29–.

36 new arrivals/“The Hour”: CR, 231, BG, 3/3/02, 3/4/02. The thirteen were: Satam al-Suqami, Wail al-Shehri, Waleed al-Shehri, Abdul Aziz al-Omari, Ahmed al-Ghamdi, Hamza al-Ghamdi, Mohand al-Shehri, Majed Moqed, Salem al-Hazmi, Saeed al-Ghamdi, Ahmad al-Haznawi, and Ahmed al- Nami—all Saudis—and Fayez Banihammad, from the UAE. Also in the muscle group on 9/11 would be Hamzi and Mihdhar (the latter having arrived back in the United States as of early July). The group included two pairs of brothers, Nawaf and Salem al-Hazmi and Wail and Waleed al-Shehri—though Mohand al-Shehri was unrelated. The three Ghamdis appear to have been not close relatives but merely members of the large Ghamdi tribe. Saudi press reports noted that in Saudi Arabia “the names al Ghamdi and al Shehri are as common as the name Smith in the United States” (CR, 231, 237, Arab News, 9/18/01, 9/20/01, 9/22/01, BG, 3/3/02).

37 OBL picked: CR, 235;

38 5’7”: ibid., 231;

39 martyr: ibid., 234;

40 visa easy/Express: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 32–, 111–, CR, 235, “teater”/“Wasantwn”: Non-immigrant Visa Application of Wail al-Shehri, Joel Mowbray, “Visas for Terrorists,” National Review, archived at www.webcitation.org;

41 “did not think”: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 125, MFR 04016462, 12/5/03, CF;

42 sky marshals: CR, 236;

43 butcher/“to muddy”/told Dubai: KSM SUBST.

44 travel pairs/?“businessman”/?tourists/?unsatisfactory: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 29–, Janice Kephart, “The Complete Immigration Story of 9/11 Hijacker Satam al Suqami,” 9/10, www.cis.org. The authors refer here to documentation that was inadequate on its face, but passed muster at Immigration or Customs control. Four of the muscle hijackers, meanwhile, had markers in their passports later understood to have been signs of tampering associated with al Qaeda (Staff Report, 9/11 Terrorist Travel, 29, 33, 34).

45 prior arrangement: KSM SUBST;

46 flew DC/NY: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 29–;

47 Atta/Hazmi/money: CR, 237;

48 videos/“We left”: Guardian (U.K.), 4/16/02, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 2006, 133, CR 235, 525n104. The first hijacker videotape was released in April 2002 (Guardian [U.K.], 4/16/02).

49 Massoud/“If President Bush”: Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2008, 246–; Steve Coll, “Ahmad Shah Massoud Links with CIA,” 2/23/04, www.rawa.org, WP, 1/19 & 20/02;

50 “gained limited”: Defense Intelligence Agency, cable, “IIR [redacted]/The Assassination of Massoud Related to 11 September 2001 Attack,” 11/21/01, as released to the National Security Archive, www.gwu.edu, Schroen, 95–;

51 “was sending”: Tenet, 156;

52 Cairo/“We knew”: NYT, 6/4/02;

53 “something big was coming”: MFR 03009296, 11/3/03, MFR 04017179, 10/3/03;

54 Freeh/Ashcroft/denied: Newsweek, 5/27/02;

55 briefing documents/“public profile”: Staff Statement 10, CO, Shenon, 151–. The exception is the PDB of August 6, which is covered later in this chapter;

56 triumphalist speeches: Bergen, OBL I Know, 293–, Orange County Weekly, 9/7/02;

57 “They send”: The Australian, 12/21/07, The Age (Melbourne), 12/21/07;

58 “All the people”: Guardian (U.K.), 11/28/02;

59 Mihdhar/“I will make”: Bamford, Shadow Factory, 64;

60 “the success”: CR, 251;

61 “It’s time”: Fouda & Fielding, 166.

62 Taliban asked: CR, 251. The Taliban appear to have been concerned not only about U.S. reprisals, but also as to what bin Laden should target. Taliban leader Mullah Omar reportedly favored attacking Jews—not necessarily the United States. Emails found later on the terrorist computer obtained by Wall Street Journal reporter Cullison show there was also dissension amongst the terrorists as to whether to give bin Laden full support at this time. “Going on,” one writer complained, “is like fighting ghosts and windmills” (CR, 250–, WSJ, 7/2/02).

63 MBC reporter/“some news”/“coffin”: In the Footsteps of Bin Laden, 8/23/06, www.cnn.com, Bergen, OBL I Know, 284–. According to CIA reporting of KSM’s interrogations, KSM and Atef “were concerned about this lack of discretion and urged bin Laden not to make additional comments about the plot.” It seems odd then that Atef, normally described as having been professional, should have taken part in the MBC interview. He may have hoped at least to blur the truth by referring to the coming attacks as targeting “American and Israeli interests”—thus avoiding giving away the fact that the attack would be on U.S. territory. If that was his intention, the deception was successful—many in the U.S. had the impression that the attack would take place overseas (“were concerned”: KSM SUBST, Atef: CR, refs.; successful: e.g. CR, 256–).