produce every phoneme as a separate, distinct element (as a simple computer modem would), our speech system starts preparing sound number two while it's still working on sound number one. Thus, before I start uttering the
This dance keeps the speed up, but it requires a lot of practice and can complicate the interpretation of the message.* What's good for muscle control isn't necessarily good for a listener. If you should mishear John Fogerty's 'There's a bad moon on the rise' as 'There's a bathroom on the right,'f so be it. From the perspective of evolution, the speech system, which works most of the time, is good enough, and that's all that matters.
Curmudgeons of every generation think that their children and grandchildren don't speak properly. Ogden Nash put it this way in 1962, in 'Laments for a Dying Language':
Coin brassy words at will, debase the coinage;
We're in an if-you-cannot-lick-them-join age,
A slovenliness provides its own excuse age,
Where usage overnight condones misusage.
Farewell, farewell to my beloved language,
Once English, now a vile orangutanguage.
Words in computer languages are fixed in meaning, but words in human languages change constantly; one generation's
^Co-articulation did not evolve exclusively for use in speech; we see the same principle at work in skilled pianists (who prepare for thumb-played notes about two notes before they play them), skilled typists, and major league baseball pitchers (who prepare the release of the ball well before it occurs).
fOr Jimi Hendrix's 'Excuse me while I kiss the sky' for 'Excuse me while I kiss this guy.' If you, like me, get a kick out of these examples, Google for the term
'bad,' and the next generation's
Part of the answer stems from how our
Take, for example, what might happen if you were walking through the Redwood Forest and saw a tree trunk; odds are, you would conclude that you were looking at a tree, even if that trunk happened to be so tall that you couldn't make out any leaves above. This habit of making snap judgments based on incomplete evidence (no leaves, no roots, just a trunk, and still we conclude we've seen a tree) is something we might call a logic of 'partial matching.'
The logical antithesis, of course, would be to wait until we'd seen the whole thing; call that a logic of 'full matching.' As you can imagine, he who waits until he's seen the whole tree would never be wrong, but also risks missing a lot of bona fide foliage. Evolution rewarded those who were swift to decide, not those who were too persnickety to act.
For better or worse, language inherited this system wholesale. You might think of a chair, for instance, as something with four legs, a back, and a horizontal surface for sitting. But as the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) realized, few concepts are really defined with such precision. Beanbag chairs, for example, are still considered chairs, even though they have neither an articulated back nor any sort of legs.
I call my cup of water a glass even though it's made of plastic; I call my boss the chair of my department even though so far as I can tell she merely sits in one. A linguist or phylogenist uses the word
Another idiosyncrasy of language, considerably more subtle, has to do with words like
The peculiar thing is that in addition to quantifiers, we have another whole system that does something similar. This second system traffics in what linguists call 'generics,' somewhat vague, generally accurate statements, such as
Generics are a whole different ball game, in many ways much less precise than quantifiers. It's just not clear how many dogs have to have four legs before the statement
*Is that good or bad? That depends on your point of view. The logic of partial matches is what makes languages sloppy, and, for better or worse, keeps poets, stand-up comedians, and linguistic curmudgeons gainfully employed. ('Didja ever notice that a near-miss isn't a miss at all?')